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The bank lending channel: an empirical assessment of measures 
 to stimulate bank lending in the European Union 
 
Abstract 
This thesis first examines the role of banks in the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy by focusing on the eight European new member States of Central and Eastern 
Europe over the 2004-2013 period. We specifically investigate the influence of monetary 
policy changes on bank lending activity and if this potential influence is contingent on 
bank characteristics, such as banks’ size, capital, liquidity, risk factor and market power. 
Moreover, we focus on the prospective role of banks in the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism in order to reveal any clear trends in banks’ lending behaviour during the 
2008-2011 financial crisis. 
Secondly, we investigate the impact of a protracted period of low monetary policy rates 
on loosening of banks’ credit standards regarding enterprises, households and consumer 
loans through concentrating on the nine Eurozone countries involved since the initiation 
of the Euro area Bank Lending Survey in the three distinct time frames of pre- (2002Q4-
2008Q3), mid- (2008Q4-2010Q4) and post- (2011Q1-2014:Q4) financial crisis. 
Furthermore, we test the fundamental concept of the risk taking channel by examining 
excessive risk-taking behaviour by banks in stressed vs. non-stressed countries of the 
Eurozone. In an additional analysis, the efficacy of the European Central Bank’s 3 year 
Long-Term Refinancing Operations is evaluated in great depth in order to determine 
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whether banks’ credit standards have been softened and the degree to which demand for 
loans has increased. 
Thirdly, we explore the financing structure of bank lending constrained Small and 
Medium Sized Enterprises in the eleven Eurozone countries by utilising firm-level data 
over the period of 2009 to 2014. We estimate if bank lending constrained firms 
demonstrate relatively more usage or requests for alternative financing. Additionally, a 
comprehensive investigation is presented by unveiling the impact and determinants of 
various financing constraints including credit lines, bank loans, trade credit and other 
lending on Eurozone firms. Furthermore, the notion of discouraged borrowers originally 
formulated by Kon and Storey (2003) is empirically evaluated. 
Finally, we present the conclusion of our research by further outlining its limitations and 
prospective scope for future studies. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis investigates the Bank Lending Channel (BLC) of Monetary Transmission 
Mechanism (MTM) by focusing on the eight European new member States of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) over the 2004-2013 period. Moreover, we examine the effect of a 
protracted period of low monetary policy rates on loosening of banks’ credit standards 
concerning enterprises, households and consumer loans by using quarterly data from the 
euro area Bank Lending Survey (BLS) from 2002 to 2014. Furthermore, utilising the euro 
area firm-level data, we determine whether bank lending constrained Small and Medium 
Sized Enterprises (SMEs) demonstrate relatively more usage or requests for alternative 
financing; additionally, we conduct a comprehensive analysis by revealing the impact and 
determinants associated with a broad range of financing constraints by further expanding 
upon the notion of discouraged borrowers over the 2009-2014 period. This introductory 
section concisely underscores the value of investigating the essential roles of  banks in 
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the newly accessed European Union 
(EU) States; the significance of examining the ensuing protracted periods of record low 
real interest rates prevalent in the euro area in light of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
of recent times; and finally, it stresses the importance of financing for SMEs, given that 
they are commonly referred to as the backbone of the EU economy. 
The 2007-8 GFC has clearly underlined the significance of stability of the banking sector, 
which supplies credit to the real economy. Many studies, such as Gambacorta and 
Marques-Ibanez (2011), suggest that the GFC served to show that the majority of 
macroeconomic literature did not appropriately consider financial intermediaries as a 
possible source of frictions in the MTM.  
In the wake of the 2007-09 financial crisis, there has been a renewed interest among 
monetary authorities and academics to investigate the role of banks in the MTM, 
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particularly the BLC which considers the potential consequences that changes in 
monetary policy can have on the issuing of loans by depository institutions. Prior to the 
GFC, implementing monetary policy was a matter of controlling the short-term interest 
rate. Following the GFC, the capacity of the main central banks to effect monetary policy 
waned and, accordingly, short-term rates approached the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) 
(Salachas et al., 2017). Several studies have endeavoured to determine the impact of 
monetary policy on the credit supply. One of the more challenging aspects is 
differentiating between potential supply and demand effects, which is especially 
challenging when analysing aggregated data. As a result, the literature has generally 
chosen to utilise disaggregated data (Leroy, 2014).  The empirical literature stressed three 
main bank characteristics or parameters of balance sheet strength which may influence 
the reaction of bank loans to changes in monetary policy, which include: bank size, 
liquidity and capitalisation (Kashyap and Stein, 1995, 2000; Kishan and Opiela, 2000, 
2006; Peek and Rosengren, 1995; Ehrmann et al., 2003; Gambacorta, 2005; Matousek 
and Sarantis, 2009; Altunbas et al., 2010; among others). In summary the research 
indicates that smaller, illiquid or poorly capitalised banks reduced lending as a result of a 
tightening monetary policy. According to Akinci et al. (2013), a novel area of research 
has surfaced, given that several empirical studies introduce a new series of questions that 
address the manner in which the BLC could be impacted by risk factors and bank 
consolidation (Altunbas et al., 2010; Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011; Kishan and 
Opiela, 2012; Olivero et al., 2011a, b; Amidu and Wolfe, 2013; Fungáčová et al., 2014; 
Leroy. 2014; amongst others).  
From the early 1990s, the CEE nations have undergone major economic changes. 
Specifically, these countries transitioned from a centrally-planned to a free-market 
structured economy (Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al., 2009a). Furthermore, a series of 
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changes aimed at the banking supervision structure were implemented according to the 
rules of the EU regulatory system (Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al., 2009a; 2009b). On a 
related note Allen et al. (2017) imply that a major issue was the establishment of a stable 
and efficient banking system as a requirement for consistent economic growth; yet, it was 
evident from an early stage that this would not be easily accomplished. In some instances, 
post-transition recessions resulted in bad loans and insufficient “capital positions, 
systematic banking crises, and an urgent need to both recapitalize and restructure 
banks”. Evaluating the BLC in the CEE nations is important because their economic 
systems have reflected substantial information asymmetry and ineffective legal 
frameworks with inadequate sanction instruments when finalising contracts (Matousek 
and Sarantis, 2009).  These issues create a situation in which the banking sector advances 
more quickly than the capital market. Moreover, since these States aspire to improve their 
EU-integration and would like to eventually join the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), it is crucial to investigate the mechanism of monetary policy transmission in these 
nations. However, there is little evidence in the current available literature regarding the 
BLC in the CEEs, and to a great extent the research is limited to a decade prior to their 
accession.   
The GFC has exerted a negative effect on bank lending in the major developed economies 
and the euro area with significant levels of heterogeneity seen in various nations 
(Ciccarelli et al., 2013; De Santis and Surico, 2013; Öztürk and Mrkaic, 2014).1 Similarly, 
a study by Ferrando et al. (2015) stresses that the euro area sovereign debt crisis, which 
occurred in 2010, substantially impaired financial markets and real economic activity in 
the euro area, which were both still affected by the GFC of 2007-09.  
                                                 
1 The banking sector is of immense significance for the EU Member States since most of these nations have 
financial systems that are bank-based instead of market-based (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002). 
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Borrowing costs especially in the Eurozone stressed countries became high enough to 
impact their capacity to repay the debts, banks tightened credit standards in response, and 
economic confidence reached a historical low point. Furthermore, inside this region, 
capital to the corporate sector is mainly issued by banks, which accounts for 
approximately 80% (Allen et al., 2004). Accordingly, this negatively affects banks’ 
health, in terms of the cost of funds and balance sheets, and their ability to approve loans 
or credit lines has seen a reduction. Yet, what factors were responsible for the GFC? 
Empirical research describes the origin of the financial turmoil as stemming from an 
immoderate relaxation of lending standards as a consequence of excessively low levels 
of short-term and long-term policies established in the central banks, a simultaneous 
broad utilisation of financial innovation leading to elevated securitisation behaviour and 
weak supervision standards, particularly for bank capital (Taylor, 2009; Allen and 
Carletti, 2010; Acharya et al., 2010; Maddaloni and Peydro, 2011; Forbes, 2015; among 
others). Moreover, in order to improve liquidity levels within the euro area banks, the 
European Central Bank (ECB) implemented two Long-Term Refinancing Operations 
(LTROs) in December 2011 and February 2012 in which €1 trillion of cheap loans were 
injected into the euro area banking system.  
In light of the GFC and the ensuing protracted periods of record low real interest rates 
occurring within the developed economies, the divisive issue concerning the propensity 
of economic entities to take on additional risk during periods of low interest rates has 
subsequently resurrected (Rajan, 2006; Diamond and Rajan, 2006; Adrian and Shin, 
2010; Borio and Zhu, 2012; Jimenez et al., 2014; Ioannidou et al., 2015, Bruno and Shin, 
2015; Halvorsen and Jacobsen, 2016; among others). This interest has fostered the notion 
of another element of the MTM, the risk-taking channel (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Borio 
and Zhu, 2012). Accordingly, Borio and Gambacorta (2017) suggest a minimum of two 
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possibilities through which this channel could function. The first theory states that low 
returns on investments, eg. government (risk-free) securities, could motivate banks, asset 
managers etc. to assume additional risk for contractual or institutional purposes. 
Alternatively, low interest rates impact valuations, incomes and cash flows, which may 
then influence banks’ perceptions of risk.  
In the context of the GFC, lending to SMEs became the primary topic of consideration 
for policymakers worldwide, since they are normally known as the backbone of the EU 
economy. They account for 99.8% of all enterprises, 57.4% of value added, and 66.8 % 
of employment in Europe (Muller et al., 2016). However, several countries have 
experienced substantial reductions in bank debt and equity capital movement in and out 
of SMEs, which is known to adversely affect firm performance (Freel et al., 2012; 
Cowling et al., 2012; Cowling et al., 2015). As a result, it is a worrying possibility that 
this funding gap could be impairing firm growth and economic recovery (Fraser et al., 
2015).  The empirical data implying that considering their substantial dependency on 
bank financing, SMEs tend to experience credit constraints if banks modify their loan 
portfolios as a result of adverse shocks impacting their balance sheets (Ferrando et al., 
2015; Thomadakis, 2015; among others). One perspective states that an insufficient 
supply of debt finance exists for the SME market (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), while the 
alternate view asserts that the problem is overinvestment exceeding levels deemed 
socially efficient (De Meza and Webb, 1987).  
Here it is important to recognise that the 2007-8 credit crunch resulted in both more 
enterprises facing rejection for external financing and more borrowers who did not apply 
for bank loans due to possible rejection fear, particularly with respect to the Eurozone 
periphery countries. A study by Cowling et al. (2016) affirms that an issue topic which 
merits more study is the group of SMEs which present as inviting investment 
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opportunities, yet are discouraged from sourcing external financing as they fear rejection; 
these are “discouraged borrowers”, a concept which is originally defined by Kon and 
Storey (2003) as “a good firm, requiring finance that chooses not to apply to the bank 
because it feels its application will be rejected”. Prior research concerning the prevalence 
of borrowers in the US and the UK has demonstrated that discouraged borrowers there 
are twice as common as denied borrowers (Levenson and Willard, 2000; Freel et al., 
2012). 
This thesis comprises five chapters. The next chapter, Chapter 2, explores the BLC of 
MTM through concentrating on the eight European new Member States that joined the 
EU in 2004 following the agreement by the Treaty of Accession 2003 in Athens. Using 
disaggregated data on banks from IBCA-Bankscope for the 2004-2013 period, we test 
whether the BLC is shaped by traditional bank characteristics such as bank size, liquidity, 
capitalisation, and by risk factors; analysing the latter is of particular importance given 
that risk factors allow a more rigorous analysis of the GFC (Altunbas et al., 2010; 
Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011; Kishan and Opiela, 2012). In line with recent 
literature, we include bank market power as an additional characteristic (Amidu and 
Wolfe, 2013; Fungáčová et al., 2014; Leroy, 2014; among others).2 Here a broad selection 
of interaction terms between the aforementioned five bank characteristics and monetary 
policy is considered in order to determine if they influence the transmission of monetary 
policy in the sample examined. Bank competition is estimated here via the Lerner index, 
a bank-specific gauge of competition, whereas monetary policy is proxied by the short 
term interest rate. Finally, in a further analysis we focus on the prospective role of banks 
                                                 
2 The level of bank competition may impact the effectiveness of monetary policy by facilitating or impairing 
the transmission of monetary policy decisions (Beck et al., 2013; Fungáčová et al., 2014; Leroy, 2014; 
among others). 
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in MTM with the purpose of discovering trends in banks’ lending behaviour during the 
2008-2011 financial crisis. A study by Matousek and Sarantis (2009) argues that the CEE 
States had variation in their “monetary, fiscal and transition policies” and discourage the 
notion of pooling the data for all countries as this would generate biased estimates 
concerning the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Likewise, Favero et al. 
(1999) imply that when utilising cross-sectional data on banks sourced from various 
nations, interest rates changes would act as a country dummy. As a result, we choose to 
unveil the modifications to the BLC in the CEE States by estimating the model 
individually for each State. Considering that several of the nations are home to a relatively 
small number of total banks, we establish the existence of the BLC within Baltic States 
by pooling data sampled from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with the purpose of 
addressing this issue; yet, this issue should not be a large one because these States have 
experienced comparable monetary and transition regimes.  
The following chapter, Chapter 3, investigates the euro area BLS through focusing on the 
nine euro area countries involved since the beginning of the survey from 2002Q4 to 
2014Q4. Hence, the Eurozone represents a novel institutional environment with a 
common monetary policy. This appears to be an adequate period because it includes a 
whole cycle of monetary policy which is defined as the time it takes for a monetary 
contraction and monetary easing to occur. Firstly, we evaluate whether the protracted 
periods of low monetary conditions prior to the financial crisis caused an increase in 
softening of banks’ credit standards as applied to approval of loans or credit lines to 
enterprises, households and consumer credit. Secondly, we examine if the intensity of this 
connection has been modified as a results of the expansionary monetary policy 
documented both during and after the GFC. Thirdly, we test the fundamental notion of 
risk taking channel by examining excessive risk-taking behaviour by banks in stressed vs. 
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non-stressed countries of the Eurozone for the pre- and post-financial crisis periods; 
Fourthly, in an additional analysis, the efficacy of the ECB 3 year LTROs is considered 
in extensive detail with the purpose of discovering if banks’ credit standards have been 
relaxed and determining the degree to which demand for loans has increased considering 
that a total sum of €1 trillion cheap loans was injected into the EU banking system under 
these operations. 
Chapter 4 evaluates the financing structure of bank lending constrained SMEs in the 
eleven euro area nations and uses the ECB/EC Survey on the Access to Finance of 
Enterprises (SAFE) for twelve waves from 2009H1 to 2014H2. For this chapter, we 
estimate if bank lending constrained SMEs demonstrate relatively more usage or requests 
for alternative financing, eg. grants or subsidised bank loans, trade credit, informal 
lending, leasing, hire purchase or factoring, market financing comprised of equity, issued 
debt securities or subordinated loans, and internal funds. Our measures of credit 
constraints distinguish between five types of constrained firms which take the following 
form: a) credit constrained firms, b) credit rationed firms, c) credit rejected firms, d) self-
rationed firms and e) discouraged firms. Furthermore, the impact and determinants 
involved in a wide range of financing constraints such as bank loans, trade credit, other 
financing and credit line are comprehensively revealed. Additionally, we contribute to 
the available literature by assessing the concept of discouraged borrowers originally 
formulated by Kon and Storey (2003) through investigating the key determinants of 
discouragement using firm-specific characteristics as well as banking and 
macroeconomic indicators. Finally, we regroup the original sample into two panels so as 
to unveil the important differences between the periphery vs. core countries of the 
Eurozone compared with the discoveries garnered from the whole sample and the 
resulting conclusion.   
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To conclude, Chapter 5 offers a summary of the contributions of this thesis and presents 
some ideas and policy implications. Additionally, the limitations of this research and 
thoughts for future research are addressed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
Chapter 2: The bank lending channel: an empirical analysis of EU 
accession countries from 2004-2013 
 
2.1 Introduction  
During the evolving process of fully integrating each of its member nations, the European 
Union (EU) commenced its eastern expansion strategy by including nations from Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE). The EU officially initiated a changeover process in March 
1998 which produced the larger Union by May 1st, 2004. Substantial political and 
economic transformations have occurred in each of the ten new EU Member States. The 
CEE nations in particular have transitioned from a centrally-planned to a free-market 
structured economy (Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al., 2009a). Moreover, a sequence of 
amendments directed at the banking supervision structure were established in keeping 
with the rules of the EU regulatory system (Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al., 2009a; 2009b).  
In light of the post-crisis credit crunch, monetary authorities and the academic world have 
experienced a resurrection of interest in evaluating the role of banks in the Monetary 
Transmission Mechanism (MTM), especially the Bank Lending Channel (BLC) which 
assumes that changes in monetary policy alter the supply schedules of bank loans 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). As stated by Matousek and Sarantis (2009) and Akinci et 
al. (2013), the BLC arises from a combination of a deposit market constraint and a binding 
lending constraint.  
The number of empirical studies that are attempting to investigate the effect of monetary 
policy shocks on bank lending activity and behaviour via the BLC is rapidly increasing; 
such papers include Kashyap and Stein (1995; 2000), Peek and Rosengren (1995), Kishan 
and Opiela (2000; 2006; 2012), Ehrmann et al. (2003), Gambacorta (2005), Matousek 
and Sarantis (2009), Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011), Akinci et al. (2013), 
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Fungáčová et al. (2014; 2016) and Leroy (2014), among others.3 Yet, having noted a gap 
in the existing literature, this chapter attempts to add to the current research through 
concentrating on the effect of monetary policy specifically in the newly accessed EU 
States.   
Our aim in this chapter is to investigate the BLC of MTM by focusing on the eight 
European new Member States that joined the EU in 2004 following the agreement by the 
Treaty of Accession 2003 in Athens. The aforementioned objective is consequently 
evaluated in further detail with reference to these countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, hereafter EU-8.4 
It is important to note that the BLC in EU-8 has not been previously tested before, 
although there have been several empirical studies that examined individual EU nations 
for its existence. However, Matousek and Sarantis (2009) is the only study that examines 
the BLC with reference to the panel of 8 CEE countries from 1994-2003. The data is 
sampled to take into account the decade following the accession, presenting the researcher 
with a novel benefit to reveal potential alterations regarding the BLC within the EU-8 
compared with the seminal study conducted in Matousek and Sarantis (2009) which 
examines the decade before the accession.5  
In this chapter the possibility of the BLC being molded by traditional bank characteristics 
(size, liquidity and capitalisation) as well as by risk factors is investigated; evaluating the 
                                                 
3 It must be stated here that the empirical studies conducted in the US are more conclusive than studies 
based in Europe.   
4 We exclude Malta and Cyprus, as there are major differences between their banking sector and the selected 
countries chosen for this study. 
5 This study utilises an unbalanced panel data set of banks in EU-8 nations spanning the time frame from 
2004-2013; this time selection is most appropriate for analysing the BLC since three nations were initiated 
into the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) during this period. Following this, the capability of these 
nations to direct monetary policy has been given to the European Central Bank (ECB).  
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latter is of particular significance as risk factors permit the development of a more 
comprehensive analysis of the 2007-8 financial crisis.  
Additionally, we consider a wide selection of interaction terms between the previously 
stated four bank characteristics and monetary policy with the purpose of ascertaining 
whether they affect the transmission of monetary policy in the sample examined.  
Conclusively, this study contributes on the available literature through a specific focus on 
the prospective role of banks in MTM in order to reveal any clear trends in banks’ lending 
behaviour during the financial turmoil.  
When examining the wide scope of available literature concerning the BLC, only a 
limited minority of the total research has targeted the impacts of bank structures and 
competition. As a result this chapter further contributes to the available research by 
determining if a bank possessing greater market power is more capable of protecting its 
lending activity in light of the changes in the monetary policy stance introduced to newly 
accessed EU States. In order to accomplish the aforementioned objective, this study 
follows an analogous contemporary methodology to that applied by Fungáčová et al. 
(2014) and Leroy (2014), which connects bank competition to the BLC of monetary 
policy.  
This study encounters an identification issue with respect to the disentanglement of loan 
supply from loan demand given that the BLC is only relevant to the bank lending supply. 
This problem is tackled by utilising the fundamental approach employed by Fungáčová 
et al. (2014), which accepts that all banks experience homogenous loan demand.6  
                                                 
6 Fungáčová et al. (2014) rationalise for the problem inherent on looking at actual loans supplied (and thus 
demanded) at prevailing interest rates borrowing the approach used in Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000), 
which is based on the assumption that every bank experiences identical loan demand and also that if bank 
lending variations are different between different types of banks, this must be a result of the different bank 
types changing their supplies of credit in dissimilar ways. 
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Such an assumption can be condemned, particularly as the 2007-8 credit crunch began, 
which has fostered a novel method used in Jimenez et al. (2012) that necessitates loan 
level data. As a result of the lack of extensive loan level data for the EU-8 countries, 
implementation of the aforementioned methodology is not possible in this study.  
During the course of the investigation, the following is demonstrated: the results based 
upon panel fixed effects specification do not specify direct correlation between monetary 
policy and bank loans via the money lending channel. For this reason the theory of a direct 
correlation is unsubstantiated; nevertheless an indirect influence from the BLC is 
supported through bank capitalisation. Similar corroborating data concerning the impact 
of bank capitalisation is reported in Matousek and Sarantis (2009), Gambacorta and 
Marques-Ibanez (2011), Leroy (2014), and Fungáčová et al. (2014).  
Moreover, contrary to the conclusions in Matousek and Sarantis (2009) for 8 CEE 
countries, we find no evidence to support the role of bank size in EU-8 nations. This 
deduction is in keeping with the literature that investigated the BLC, specifically in the 
context of banks in Western Europe (Ehrmann et al., 2003; Altunbas et al., 2010; 
Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011). While no supporting evidence is found in order 
to establish the existence of the BLC through bank liquidity except in Slovakia, bank risk 
appears to be a crucial differentiating factor in the reaction of banks to changes in the 
monetary policy stance within the EU-8 countries, this corroborates the findings 
documented in Altunbas et al. (2010), Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011), and 
Leroy (2014), among others. It can be determined that banking competition diminishes 
the effectiveness of monetary policy on a bank’s ability to lend to borrowers.  Yet, these 
finding are in contrast with the results obtained in an examination of the euro area 
countries by Leory (2014) and Fungáčová et al. (2014). 
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Furthermore, the model used in this study is constructed to consider any distinct 
movement on banks’ lending behaviour for the period of the financial turmoil.  The BLC 
is determined to have declined from 2008-2011, a conclusion derived from the fact that 
the majority of bank characteristics were ultimately determined to either not be significant 
or to have surprising negative values; these conclusions can be viewed as a further 
negation of the assumed function of such characteristics in maintaining bank lending 
activity and growth over the course of the global credit crisis.   
What are the key points that can be garnered from our findings in this chapter? We 
established that the traditional bank-specific traits commonly utilised in the literature such 
as size, liquidity and capitalisation are unable to completely encapsulate the functioning 
of the new magnitudes of the BLC of MTM, especially during the course of the financial 
crisis. These novel findings contradict the previous seminal results by Matousek and 
Sarantis (2009) that investigates the BLC with reference to the panel of eight CEE 
countries from 1994-2003. Additionally, the efficacy of monetary policy has been 
weakened during the financial crisis owing to a variety of different elements, such as bank 
aversion to increase lending activity and volume irrespective of the variations in the 
monetary policy. The important dilemma is whether these changes in the MTM will 
continue into the foreseeable future or disappear as the GFC diminishes? The findings 
presented in this study support a scenario in which these modifications can only be looked 
upon as ever changing and tend to evolve over years. Furthermore, the findings favour 
the roll-out of regulatory capital requirements and implies that this would not induce a 
diminishing of bank lending. Bank capital and liquidity exhibited positive and significant 
impact on bank lending growth over the total sample period. Consequently, it would be 
paramount that banks adhere to banking regulations created by the Basel Committee. This 
study calls for a better, widespread data accessibility on the entire banking system, 
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measurement by tier-1 capital ratio would be particularly beneficial in this regard as 
building on core capital eases the transmission of monetary policy. Additionally, the 
shadow banking system should be diligently scrutinised due to the potentially hazardous 
elements indigenous to this system, reinforcing the notion of having regulatory rules that 
are a good fit with its complementary financial institution. Moreover, our incisive analysis 
corroborates that banks in the newly accessed EU States with a high level of market power 
are less prone to the vicissitudes in monetary policy stance to issue bank loans. 
Specifically via tightening monetary policy, the monetary authorities are more likely to 
effectively lower the supply of bank loans within a banking market with reduced 
competition. 
.The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 offers an in-depth 
investigation of the developing EU-8 banking system. Section 2.3 presents a review of 
the literature on the BLC. Section 2.4 explains the data and methodological framework. 
Section 2.5 discusses the empirical results, while section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 Summary analysis of the financial framework in the recently accessed EU States 
The majority of the new EU States experienced financial reforms over the course of their 
transition on account that their banking sectors share several structural traits (Mamatzakis 
et al., 2008). These States have also seen increased domestically-sourced credit to the 
private sector during the sampled period. Yet, in spite of the aforementioned increase, the 
extent of financial intermediation in this set of countries remained below the average 
value in the EU. Furthermore, noteworthy efforts to reform were aimed at advancing 
banking sector-related legislation. 
A large-scale report from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) encompassing a quarter 
of a century’s worth of transition within Post-Communist Europe from 1990 to 2014 
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particularly concentrated on the CEE and Baltic States indicates that the first transition 
economic downturns coincided with high or hyper-inflation within the majority of 
nations, since prices migrated to market level while governments turned to “monetary 
financing of gaping fiscal deficits”.  
During the 1990s, nations sequentially tempered fiscal deficits and inflation, despite 
having false dawns in a few instances. Contrary to the instability and dissimilarity during 
the 1990s, growth models from the earlier portion of the 2000s demonstrated robustness 
without exception. In the background of advantageous worldwide conditions as well as 
growing confidence with quick convergence in Western Europe, average growth for the 
area measured 6 percent; here every country grew more than 3% each year, which was 
more rapid than the majority of nations have reliably managed to do pre- or post-crisis.7 
Roaf et al. (2014) assert that the imbalances accumulated from the “Great Moderation” 
time frame put transition economies at risk. Preliminary along with external shocks seen 
in the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy during 2008 and the EU crisis in 2010–2012 exerted 
tremendous consequences, affecting the CEE most detrimentally within emerging 
markets areas. The effect continues to echo, exhibited in persistent subpar potential 
growth, elevated unemployment and vulnerable financial markets. 
Table 1 illustrates the fact that the majority of countries saw substantial enhancements in 
banking reform practices; this has especially been the case since 2004.  The lowest value 
for the ranking index is 1, denoting minimal advancement in changing the socialist 
banking system and the highest rank is 4 which is characterised by changes which are in 
keeping with a market economy that is functional.  
                                                 
7 For a complete summary of the report carried out by the IMF, refer to Roaf et al. (2014) as depicted in 
references.  
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Table 1 presents the domestic credit to the private sector (as a percentage of GDP), the 
M2/GDP ratio and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
banking reform index. The EBRD banking reform measure offers a classification of 
advancement for liberalisation and institutional reform of the banking sector.  
The rate of interest liberalisation and banking reforms was comparable between the 
nations. Enhanced banking reform practices are reflected at the financial deepening level. 
From 2004 to the end of period sampled, the average M2/GDP ratio increased from 48.2% 
to 61.3%. The same period also saw an increased rate of domestic credit to GDP from 
40.5% to 58.12%.  
From the perspective of the EU, the new banking union and regulation act compatibly to 
mould novel prospects in banking. Such advances are predicted to generate beneficial 
influences, largely in the transition nations, through improving financial stability while 
decreasing fragmentation. Accordingly, this introduces the option of additional 
advantages for EU members choosing to become members of the banking union, 
decreasing compliance costs for cross-border banks as well as issues concerning “home-
                                                 
8 The EBRD banking index most recent analysis of the Czech Republic is 2007 whereas Credit to private 
sector in addition to M2/GDP ratio data gathered for the Slovak Republic is limited up to 2008. 
Table 1: Banking sector indicators8 
Country Credit to the private sector                            M2/GDP        EBRD banking index              
 2004 2013 2004 2013 2004 2010 
Czech Republic 31 58 56 81 3.7 4* 
Estonia 61 75 58 68 4 4 
Hungary 46 52 49 63 4 3.7 
Latvia 51 61 38 43 3.7 3.7 
Lithuania 29 46 35 47 3.3 3.7 
Poland 28 55 40 60 3.3 3.7 
Slovakia 30 45 57 55 3.7 3.7 
Slovenia 48 73 53 74 3.3 3.3 
EU-8 40.5 58.12 48.2 61.3     
Source: The World Bank, EBRD Transition Report. 
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host supervision”, in spite of the cost of loss of autonomy at the country level (Roaf et 
al., 2014). 
2.2.1 The Fraser Index of Economic Freedom and its constituents 
The Fraser Index of Economic Freedom is made up of five elements characterised as: size 
of government: expenditures, taxes, and enterprises GOV-Findex; legal system and 
property rights LSP-Findex; access to sound money SMO-Findex; freedom to trade 
internationally FTI-Findex; and regulation of credit, labour, and business REG-Findex. 
 The aforementioned components are weighted to produce a composite index t; this index 
is measured from 0-10 in order of ascending levels of economic freedom as conducted in 
Gwartney et al. (2014).  
The mean scores for the economies of EU-8 nations from 2004-2012 are outlined in Table 
2. Whilst examining the regional mean values, the degree of general economic freedom 
OVR-Findex is 7.31, a value which is lower than several of the other components of the 
economic freedom, for example access to sound money SMO-Findex and freedom to trade 
internationally FTI-Findex which yields values of 9.17 and 7.96 respectively.  
When analysing the sample taken, the data suggests that reforms corresponding to size of 
government GOV-Findex and legal system and property rights LSP-Findex occur less 
frequently as the regional averages for these indices are calculated at 5.70 and 6.39 
respectively. At the domestic level the standout nations with respect to the OVR-Findex are 
Estonia (7.82), Slovak Republic (7.50) and Lithuania (7.48); the aforementioned 
countries produce a higher score when compared with the regional mean value in the 
majority of the main components in the overall index of economic freedom (see Table 2). 
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In Table 3 the economic freedom variables over time in EU-8 are illustrated. The time 
frame examined in this study reveals modest growth for the bulk of components of 
economic freedom in addition to the OVR-Findex. Most remarkably, the LSP-Findex shows 
the highest increase from 6.13 in 2004 to 6.31 in 2012. Yet, it is also worth mentioning 
that just the FTI-Findex undergoes a modest reduction during the time frame sampled (see 
Table 3). 
 
 
Table 2: Progress of economic freedom in the EU-8 markets (2004-2012) 
Country GOV-Findex LSP-Findex SMO-Findex FTI-Findex REG-Findex OVR-Findex 
Czech Republic 4.96 6.19 9.3 7.93 7.39 7.15 
Estonia 6.41 7.22 9.25 8.48 7.72 7.82 
Hungary 4.95 6.41 9.42 7.96 7.38 7.22 
Latvia 5.83 6.55 8.87 8.15 7.41 7.36 
Lithuania 6.78 6.46 8.99 7.86 7.32 7.48 
Poland 5.49 6.03 9.33 7.39 7.04 7.05 
Slovakia 6.44 6.1 9.35 8.15 7.45 7.5 
Slovenia 4.71 6.16 8.87 7.75 6.81 6.86 
Average EU-8 5.70 6.39 9.17 7.96 7.32 7.31 
Notes: figures correspond to average values, ranging from 0–10. Larger values signify a more liberal economic 
environment. Source: the 2014 version of the Fraser index of economic freedom. 
Table 3: Development of economic freedom over a period in the EU-8 (2004-12) 
Year GOV-Findex LSP-Findex SMO-Findex FTI-Findex REG-Findex OVR-Findex 
2004 5.71 6.13 9.09 8.28 7.31 7.30 
2005 5.69 6.42 9.09 8.01 7.34 7.31 
2006 5.68 6.55 9.12 7.99 7.30 7.33 
2007 5.84 6.49 9.15 8.03 7.29 7.36 
2008 5.77 6.42 9.15 7.97 7.33 7.33 
2009 5.46 6.43 9.40 7.91 7.31 7.30 
2010 5.50 6.37 9.27 7.88 7.17 7.24 
2011 5.76 6.38 9.21 7.80 7.32 7.29 
2012 5.88 6.31 9.12 7.77 7.45 7.30 
Average EU-8 5.70 6.39 9.18 7.96 7.31 7.31 
Notes: Figures correspond to average values, ranging from 0–10. Larger values signify a more liberal economic 
environment. Source: The 2014 version of the Fraser index of economic freedom. 
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2.3 Literature review 
2.3.1 The credit channel mechanism of monetary policy  
It is very challenging to determine the scale, temporal incidence and components involved 
in the reaction of the economy to significant changes in monetary policy if only the 
traditional interest-rate (neoclassical cost-of-capital) effects are considered. The credit 
channel and its endogenous mechanisms can be used in this case to bridge the gap in our 
understanding of these phenomena (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). 
The term ‘credit channel’ can be misleading given that it suggests a distinct alternative 
to the conventional monetary policy transmission mechanism. Instead, the credit channel 
is an augmentation to this mechanism rather than a separate channel (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995). Proponents of the channel argue that monetary policy also influences the 
magnitude of the external finance premium, in addition to its more widely accepted 
impact on interest rate levels.  
As stated by the credit channel theory, the influence of monetary policy on interest rates 
is intensified through variation within the external finance premium which is defined as 
the variance in cost between internally available capital and externally acquired capital. 
External funds can be acquired by borrowing or offering equity and internal funding 
through holding on to earnings from a given company’s cash flow. The value of the 
external finance premium provides insight into credit market imperfections which 
influence the dynamic concerning the returns that creditors expect to earn and the amount 
that prospective borrowers expect to pay. In keeping with the ‘credit view’, alterations in 
monetary policy that serve to increase or decrease interest rates in the open market will 
also have a directly correlated effect on the external finance premium. As a result of this 
extra influence of monetary policy, its effect is enhanced with respect to the cost of 
borrowing, and real spending and activity (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). 
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2.3.2 The two subdivisions of the credit channel  
Frexias and Rochet (2008) put forward two possibilities that may clarify the manner in 
which the policies of the central bank influence the external finance premium within 
credit markets. The first is the balance sheet channel, which emphasises the potential 
effect that modifications to the monetary policy can have on a borrower’s income 
statements and balance sheets. The explanation provided by the balance sheet channel is 
based on the hypothesis that the external finance premium for a borrower is contingent 
on that borrower’s financial status. The BLC is the other possibility which specifically 
considers the potential consequences that changes in monetary policy can have on the 
issuing of loans by depository institutions. Apart from its influence on balance sheets for 
a borrower, the monetary policy can also impact the external financial premium by 
disrupting the supply of intermediated credit, such as credit provided by commercial 
banks; this is the essence of the BLC. 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) described a model of the BLC which proposed that when 
the Fed conducts open market sales that serve to deplete reserves and, consequently, bank 
deposits; this could restrict the supply of credit through limited access to loanable capital 
for the banks. Such an outcome would be passed on through the level and composition of 
bank assets, and is, in addition to the conventional effects of interest-rates and supply of 
capital, reflected in decreasing bank liabilities. Furthermore, the model is based on the 
assumption that securities and loans and imperfect alternatives in the collection of 
investments held by the banks; therefore, the banks would be disinclined to totally accept 
deposit losses by decreasing securities holdings. 
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2.3.3 Stylised facts and empirical evidence concerning the BLC 
Following the influential conclusions derived from Benanke and Blinder (1988) which 
discovers the existence of a transmission channel through the credit supply, several 
studies have endeavoured to differentiate between the various channels involved in the 
MTM.  
A study conducted by Matousek and Sarantis (2009) highlights that during a tight 
monetary policy, a central bank indirectly forces banks to switch primarily from insured 
funds and reserves to uninsured and non-reservable sources of capital.  Accordingly, 
adverse-selection problems may occur as a result which could influence a bank’s lending 
position and activity (Stein, 1998). 
Market constraints limit the amount of debt that the bank can issue (Van Hoose, 2007). 
Romer and Romer (1990) stress that, if necessary, banks are capable of self-financing 
using funding that is independent from deposit sources; therefore, banks are able to offset 
the effects of monetary policy constriction to their lending activity by simply offering 
more Certificates of Deposits (CDs). In view on that, the BLC could theoretically be 
ineffective if banks were allowed to offer unchecked amounts of CDs, or bonds immune 
to reserve requirements (Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011).  
Opponents of the BLC theory appear to believe that the weakest aspect of this view is the 
suggestion that the Fed can influence banks’ loan supply plans just by altering the 
reserves. This point can be directly addressed through thorough analysis of the subgroups 
present in disaggregated bank data. Considering the intrinsic uncertainties that arise from 
solely analysing aggregate data, it would be prudent to make use of disaggregated data 
with the purpose of investigating the lending view and its implications. The lending view 
posits that tight monetary policy is particularly hard on smaller firms which are heavily 
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bank-dependent; whereas larger firms are not as vulnerable since they often have sources 
of external financing that are bank-independent. 
The available literature stresses three primary bank attributes which can also be 
considered gauges of balance sheet strength and that have the potential to influence the 
reaction of bank lending to a change in monetary policy; these characteristics include: 
bank size, capitalisation and liquidity. It is prudent to note at this stage the general 
conclusion that can be deduced using the existing literature as a reference is that the 
studies appear to support the existence of a BLC in the US which operates via small banks 
(Kashyap and Stein, 1995), small and poorly capitalised banks (Kishan and Opiela, 2000), 
or small banks with low liquidity (Kashyap and Stein, 2000).  
Indeed the data from the EU Banking system is substantially less convincing than from 
the US. De Bont (1999) conducts an analysis of six EU nations and determines that a BLC 
exists in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands when the short-term interest rate is 
essentially utilised as a substitute for monetary policy action. However, there is 
insufficient evidence to support the existence of a BLC in France, Italy or the UK. 
Altunbas et al. (2002) determine that within the EMU systems, banks that experience 
suboptimal capitalisation demonstrated a tendency to be more responsive to alterations in 
monetary policy, irrespective of size. Additionally, Ehrmann et al. (2003) examine micro 
and aggregate data, concentrating on the four biggest economies in the Eurozone. The 
study determines that banks with lower liquidity showed a tendency to adapt a strong 
reaction to changes in monetary policy than their more liquid counterparts. Gambacorta 
(2005) analyses quarterly-derived data taken from Italian banks and determines that the 
BLC operates via poorly capitalised banks with low liquidity. An extensive study by 
Matousek and Sarantis (2009) aims to determine the role of banks in the MTM and the 
existence of a BLC in the eight CEE nations; the study concludes that liquidity and size 
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were the two most relevant bank characteristics that determined a bank’s response to the 
changes in monetary policy. 
The BLC assumes that smaller banks are more vulnerable to the issues that arise from 
information asymmetry when compared with larger banks which are able to provide CDs 
and other market instruments. Smaller banks are therefore considered to be more sensitive 
to expansionary and constrictive monetary policy shocks (Kashyap and Stein, 1995 and 
2000; Kishan and Opiela, 2000). Poorly-capitalised banks are forced to decrease their 
loan supply to a greater degree when compared with well-capitalised banks, following a 
period of tight monetary policy; this ability is a result of the former’s limited capacity to 
access uninsured sources of funding (Peek and Rosengren, 1995; Kishan and Opiela, 2000 
and 2006). Liquidity is another important bank characteristic which can be utilised to 
shield loan portfolios by decreasing their liquid assets. Consequently, banks with lower 
liquidity are less capable of protecting their loan portfolios (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; 
Ehrmann et al., 2003; Matousek and Sarantis, 2009; Altunbas et al., 2010). These 
characteristics are considered to be positively correlated with bank loan activity. 
2.3.4 Changes to the BLC after the 2007-8 financial crisis  
The 2007-08 credit turmoil served to underscore the importance of financial markets’ 
perception of risk with respect to the banks’ ability to generate funds. Furthermore, in this 
regard banks’ balance sheets have been vulnerable to credit turmoil in several respects 
(Altunbas et al., 2010).  Correspondingly, Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) 
investigate the effect that banking strategy has on the supply of credit and the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy within the period of the financial crisis. The study asserts 
that banks possessing a larger percentage of profitable, yet high-risk, non-interest income 
sources exercised more frugal lending to borrowers. A similar study by Kishan and Opiela 
25 
 
(2012) investigates the effects of the 2007-8 credit crisis on the BLC and established risk 
factors involved in the MTM. 
Following the failure of the Lehman Brothers investment bank in September 2008, 
Mullineux (2013) posits that the commencement of the global financial crises produced 
a greater tightening in bank lending, also known as the ‘Credit Crunch’. This constriction 
was a result of the understanding that banks should ‘deleverage’ by increasing the capital 
to asset ratios through combining reducing assets and raising new capital. 
These conclusions are in keeping with Cohen (2013), a study that analyses a sample of 
82 large international banks taken from advanced and emerging economies in order to 
identify banking lending strategies post-crisis. The study notes that banks which emerged 
from the crisis with higher capital ratios and increased profitability could increase their 
lending activity to a greater degree. In order to support long term growth, financial and 
non-financial institutions should adapt to the low leverage conditions within an economy 
which primarily funds robust, lucrative projects and avoids untenable booms (Cohen, 
2013). 
Comparatively, Bech et al. (2014) suggest that deleveraging within a standard downturn 
does not serve to yield any substantial benefits during the recovery that follows. 
Alternatively, deleveraging under these crisis conditions had a positive, significant 
correlation to the magnitude of the following recovery. Given that highly leveraged banks 
are prone to distorted lending decisions, Admati et al. (2013) assert that banks with 
greater capitalisation make comparatively wiser lending choices. Specifically, such banks 
are less inclined to assume higher risks and will be accordingly less vulnerable to issues 
concerning ‘debt overhang’ which would preclude them from making loans of high value. 
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In the context of the post financial crisis period, a study by Mullineux (2013) states that 
banks endure relatively high ‘fixed costs’ when lending. As a result, they prefer to make 
a few larger loans than many smaller loans. With respect to borrowers that require less 
capital, credit provision, low transactions cost and invoice discounting (i.e. ‘factoring’ or 
lending based on assets) via the Internet could be more suitable. Accordingly, the banking 
system at large is therefore adjusting to plug credit gaps created by traditional commercial 
banks. These banks are also dropping business to the capital markets since smaller firms 
gain are able to access direct debt finance from the bond markets at increasingly 
affordable rates. 
The gaps created and left by traditional commercial banks have fostered a process of 
disintermediation in which shadow banking and other elements of the financial system 
can cover these gaps. Admati et al. (2013) argue that this is a consequence of higher 
capital requirements which would serve to shift key activities from the regulated 
components to the shadow-banking system in which leverage is commonly even greater 
than the standard banking system. Yet, the majority of highly leveraged institutions within 
the shadow-banking component were channels and organised investment mediums, as 
opposed to being separate units, which has been originated and backed by specific 
financial institutions that comprised the regulated components of the financial system.   
Notably, shadow banking technology involves less capital and confers safety through 
issuing collateral to repo investors and can obtain the collateral on short term notice. 
Consequently, money derived from shadow-banking is far more likely to run when 
compared with standard bank money, which qualifies the banking model as more suited 
for investing in illiquid assets (Stein, 2014). 
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2.3.5 Monetary policy and bank competition 
Recent examples of empirical studies that investigate the connections existing between 
the degree of competition and the impact of monetary policy on bank lending are: Adams 
and Amel (2005), Gunji et al. (2009) and Olivero et al. (2011a,b). Adams and Amel 
(2005) utilise aggregate US data sampled during the period 1996-2002 to investigate the 
connections between banking competition and the transmission of monetary policy; the 
authors determine that the effect of monetary policy on loan originations is lower in 
markets with higher concentration.  
In contrast, Gunji et al. (2009) determine that competition interpreted using the H-statistic 
lowers the severity of the BLC. Correspondingly, Olivero et al. (2011a, b) examine the 
issue regarding whether bank competition affects the BLC in a selection of Asian and 
Latin American nations sampled from 1996 to 2006; here concentration indices, and the 
Panzar and Rosse H-statistic yield contradictory results when used to gauge competition. 
When opting for concentration indices (Olivero et al., 2011a), competition enhances the 
efficacy of monetary policy. Fungáčová et al. (2014) conclude that the variation in results 
are likely a consequence of the varied components inherent to the banking industry 
encapsulated in the competition metrics. 
Leroy (2014) advocates that banks with market power, proxied via the Lerner index, 
possess credit supplies which are not as vulnerable to monetary policy shocks in a sample 
of 11 Eurozone countries from 1999 to 2011. Similarly, a study by Fungáčová et al. 
(2014) affirms that the impact of monetary policy on bank lending is determined by bank 
competition in the euro area. The authors advise that bank market power exerts a 
significant influence on the efficacy of monetary policy. As a result, broad differences in 
the degree of a bank’s market power can yield asymmetric effects due to the “single 
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monetary policy”. The previously mentioned results contradict an earlier study by Amidu 
and Wolfe (2013) which investigates a substantial panel dataset sampling 55 nations 
during the period 2000-2007; these results indicate that more banking sector competition 
diminishes the effectiveness of monetary policy on bank lending. 
2.4 Methodology 
2.4.1 The data 
In this analysis annual data over the period of 2004-2013 is examined. The sample 
includes commercial, savings and co-operative banks from 8 new EU accession countries 
which are as follows: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovenia and Slovakia. Given the significant variation between the Maltese and Cypriot 
banking sectors when compared with sectors in the other countries selected, they were 
not included in the countries chosen for this study. 
Disaggregated bank data can be obtained from Bankscope, a commercial database 
maintained by International Bank Credit Analysis Ltd. (IBCA) and the Brussels-based 
Bureau van Dijk which is the primary source of data for European banks. Given that EU-
8 joined the EU in 2004, the sample for this study therefore spans from 2004-2013, which 
should be an adequate duration of time given that an entire cycle of monetary policy is 
encompassed in this period.9  
While EU-8 failed to meet the euro area entry requirements when their accession took 
place, the Treaties of Accession grants them an adjustment period. In other words they 
are considered Member States but inclusive of a ‘derogation’.  Evaluating the BLC during 
this specific time frame of this study is also crucial because this period saw the 
                                                 
9 The analysed period from 2004-2013 saw a gradual trend in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) in all EU-
8 countries. If bank X is merged with bank Y, we treat them as one single entity from the beginning of 
sample period. 
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introduction of three nations to the euro area. The first EU-8 nation to join the Eurozone 
was Slovenia, in 2007 as well as Slovakia in 2009 and Estonia in 2011. Subsequently, 
their ability to dictate monetary policy has been granted to the ECB.  
Matousek and Sarantis (2009) argue that especially the CEE nations have experienced 
dissimilar “monetary”, “fiscal” and “transition policies” and discourage the notion of 
combining the data since this would generate biased estimates. Similarly, Favero et al. 
(1999) suggest that when employing cross-sectional data from banks located in various 
nations, interest rates changes would act as a country dummy. As a result this study 
chooses to unveil the modifications to the BLC in EU-8 by estimating the model 
individually in each nation sampled.  Given that several of the nations are home to a 
comparatively small number of total banks, we establish the existence of the BLC within 
Baltic States through combining data sampled from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with 
the purpose of addressing this issue.10 
2.4.2 Model specification and variables 
Within the available literature there are two commonly adopted approaches utilised for 
testing the BLC. The first is to organise banks with respect to the relevant bank 
characteristics (bank size, liquidity and capital).11 Such an approach requires that there be 
a large number of banks available for sampling. While this might not be an issue in 
countries such as the US, for example, other nations have relatively fewer banks that 
prohibit this approach. Alternatively, a panel data model that permits the reaction of bank 
lending to monetary policy shifts to be contingent on bank characteristics can be used, 
such as seen in Ehrmann et al. (2003); this approach circumvents the aforementioned 
                                                 
10 The exceptions we make here is by pooling the three Baltic countries, this methodology is in line with 
Matousek and Sarantis (2009) study. 
11 In order to review research using the first method, consult: Altunbas (2002), Kashyap and Stein (1995, 
2000), and Kishan and Opliea (2000, 2006). 
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problem of numbers of banks using a template derived from Bernanke and Blinder (1988). 
Consequently, their methodology is employed in this research.  
The empirical model used in Ehrmann et al. (2003) reveals an equation specific to bank 
loans, which considers the reaction of bank lending to monetary policy both directly via 
the influence of the money channel and indirectly by bank characteristics through the 
BLC. Additionally, the original model has been adapted in order to investigate the impact 
of the financial crisis on the aforementioned two channels. This is accomplished through 
introducing a dummy variable (C), which takes the value of 1 for 2008-2011 and zero 
elsewhere. The equation given below represents the original model.1: 
Δ ln 𝐿𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽 Δ ln  𝐿 𝑖𝑡 − 1 + ∑ 𝛿 𝑗
1
𝑗=0
Δln GGDP t − j + ∑ 𝜒
 1
𝑗=0
𝑗 Δ R t − j
+ ∑ 𝜆 𝑗 
1
𝑗=0
Δ CPI t − j +  ∑ 𝜃𝑘 𝑍𝑘𝑖𝑡 − 1  
4
𝑘=1
+  ∑ ∑  𝜃𝑘𝑗
1
𝑗=0
𝑍 𝑘𝑖𝑡 − 1 Δ R t − j
4
𝑘=1
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝜌 𝑘ℎ𝑗
1
𝑗=0
4
ℎ=𝑘+1
𝑍 𝑘𝑖𝑡 − 1 𝑍ℎ𝑖𝑡 − 1 Δ R t − j
2
𝑘=1
+  𝜀 𝑖𝑡 
where i=1,…, N is the number of banks, t=1, ….,T representing the period of 
inspection from 2004 to 2013; and,  j reflects the number of lags. L*12 denotes bank loans, 
R represents the short-term interest rates on money markets and is essentially used to 
reflect the monetary policy stance13, GGDP and CPI reflect the growth rate of GDP and 
the inflation rate, respectively, which represent the demand for loan proxies. GGDP is the 
growth rate of nominal gross domestic product and CPI is the harmonised indices of 
consumer prices and is represented in a similar configuration as GGDP.  Additionally, ln 
is the natural logarithm operator, 𝛥 is the first difference operator, ZK represents the 
K=1,2,3,4 bank characteristics variables: size (S), capital (CAP), liquidity (LIQ) and risk 
                                                 
12 Δ 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 represents the difference of the natural logarithm of loans, i.e. the dependent variable.  
13 This consists of the money market rates on deposit with 3 months maturity.   
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(Risk). Traits which are specific to banks are denoted by t-1 with the purpose of reducing 
a potential endogeneity bias. Lastly, possible fixed-effects among the banks were allowed 
for by αi and ε it indicates the error term. 
Size (S), capital (CAP), liquidity (LIQ) and risk (Risk14) are bank-specific characteristics, 
which are used to assess the existence of the distributional influences of monetary policy 
on banks.  
S𝑖𝑡 = ln 𝐴𝑖𝑡 −
∑ ln 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑁𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑖
                                                                                                            
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 =
𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡 
−
∑
𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝑖
𝑁𝑖
𝑖=1
𝑇
 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 =  
𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡
−
∑
𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝑖
𝑁𝑖
𝑖=1
𝑇
  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 =
(ROA + CAR)
(SDROA)
−  
∑
(ROA + CAR)
(SDROA)
𝑁𝑖
𝑖=1
𝑇
 
The size of each bank is represented by the natural logarithm of total assets (A). Bank 
capitalisation is assessed here as a ratio of total equity (CAP) to total assets, which is also 
known as the standard capital ratio, liquidity ratio is defined as cash, trading securities 
and interbank lending of maturities with less than three months to total assets; and, finally, 
(Risk) is characterised by the Z-score15 as a ratio of the total sum of ROA and the CAR 
to SDROA. De Nicolo et al. (2003) described the Z-index as a proxy measure of a firm’s 
probability of failure, specifically assessing the “distance to default”. The index is a tool 
                                                 
14 The value of the index becomes greater with increased return on assets (ROA) and a greater equity capital-
to-asset ratio (CAR), but decreases with higher standard deviation of returns on assets (SDROA). As a 
result, higher values of the index denote a lesser risk profile for a bank. Therefore, a more favourable profile 
can be attained by increasing ROA by improving profitability, increasing K by decreasing leverage and/or 
lowering S by improving diversification (De Nicolo et al., 2003). 
15 All of the sample years (three years and above) are used in the rolling window when computing the 
SDROA for each bank. 
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used to assess systematic risk potential when combined with a group of systematically 
significant financial institutions.16 
The aforementioned proxy is a widely acceptable measure of bank risks and can be 
deemed as an accounting based risk indicator. Craig and Santos (1997) and Lown et al. 
(2000a) both used the Z-score as a proxy for measuring risk when looking at the U.S. 
bank Holding Companies (BHCs). De Nicolo et al. (2004) employed the Z-index of the 
aggregate of the largest five banks in their analysis of 500 largest financial institutions 
worldwide. Berger et al. (2009) measured financial stability in 30 developed countries 
utilising the Z-index. Additionally, Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) studied the impact of 
national banking market concentration on financial stability for the 25 Member States of 
the EU (EU-25) using the same proxy. 
In order to expand upon the work done in Ehrmann et al. (2003) and Gambacorta (2005), 
in our case each of the four banks characteristics must be normalised in the context of 
their average across all the banks. This is done with the purpose of producing indicators 
that equal a value of zero over all observations. Accordingly, in the previously discussed 
regression Model. 1, the average of the interaction terms (Δ R t − j 𝜕 Size it − 1, Δ R t −
j 𝜕 𝐿𝑖𝑞 𝑖𝑡 − 1, Δ R t − j 𝜕 𝐶𝑎𝑝 𝑖𝑡 − 1 and Δ R t − j 𝜕 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ) 1 also produces a 
value of zero. Furthermore, the monetary policy effect for the average bank can be 
directly understood by parameters 𝜒𝑗.  
The size indicator has been normalised not only in terms of the average of the entire 
period of the sample, but also in terms of each solitary period, which eliminates 
                                                 
16 For studies using the z-score as a measure of bank soundness, see, among others; Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 
(2008), Angkinand and Wihlborg (2008), Delis et al. (2011). 
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undesirable trends with respect to size; specifically, that which could arise as a result of 
the premise that size is measured in nominal terms.  
Here bank-level gauge of competition is employed, which in contrast to additional 
measures (Herfindahl- index and the market share of n-biggest banks in the system), in 
order to contrast market power in various banks. In keeping with the novel Industrial 
Organisation (IO) method, the market power is ascertained via Lerner index which 
confers the added benefit inherent in a separate, dynamic gauge of market power (Brämer 
et al., 2013). The Lerner index gauges the banks’ capacity to increase prices in excess of 
marginal costs; this index with greater units therefore suggests greater market power and 
reduced competitive market conditions. Moreover, the Lerner index is determined as the 
proportion of the remainder between price of output and marginal cost to the price, the 
latter of which is calculated utilising the proportion of total revenues to total assets. 
Marginal cost is calculated based on a translog cost function with one output (total assets) 
as well as the subsequently listed three input prices: price of labour, price of capital and 
price of funds.  
A cost function utilising panel data of bank fixed effects is calculated, incorporating time 
dummy variables to control for heterogeneity in the available sample. Linear 
homogeneity restrictions are applied to input prices as suggested in Weil (2013) and 
Fungáčová et al. (2014). This is done by normalising total costs as well as input prices 
via one input price. Accordingly, the cost function has the following designation: 
ln (
𝑇𝐶
𝑊3
)  α0 + α1 ln y + 
α2
2
 (lny)2 + α3 ln(
𝑊1
𝑊3
) + α4 ln(
𝑊2
𝑊3
) + α5 ln(
𝑊1
𝑊3
) ln(
𝑊2
𝑊3
) + 
α6
2
  
(ln((
𝑊1
𝑊3
)2 + 
α7
2
  (ln((
𝑊2
𝑊3
)2+ α8 ln y ln(
𝑊1
𝑊3
) + α9 ln y ln(
𝑊2
𝑊3
) + 𝜀                                           (1)                                
where TC represents the total cost which is calculated as the total of personnel 
expenses, other non-interest expenses and interest paid. Y denotes total assets, w1 denotes 
34 
 
the price of labour estimated as a proportion personnel expenses to total assets, w2 
symbolises the price of physical capital and is estimated as a proportion of non-interest 
expenses to fixed assets. Finally, w3 denotes the price of borrowed funds, defined as the 
ratio of interest expenses to deposits and short-term funding. The measured coefficients 
of the cost function from the preceding cost function are subsequently utilised to calculate 
the marginal cost (MC): 
MC= 
𝑇𝐶
𝑦
 (α1+ α2 ln y + α8 ln(
𝑊1
𝑊3
) + α9 ln(
𝑊2
𝑊3
))                                                                  (2)                                                                                             
After marginal cost and the price of output are estimated, this facilitates the calculation of 
the Lerner index specific to every bank sampled and consequently a complete estimation 
of bank competition. 
2.4.3 Research questions 
The following are the three research questions which can be verified utilising the equation 
outlined in Model. 1: (1) Do specific components pertaining to banks, such as size, 
capital, liquidity and risk factor, influence the loan supply? (2) Is the presence of a BLC 
for monetary policy substantiated by the data? (3) Does the period of financial crisis 
include movement on the banks’ lending behaviour?  
The first question can be tested by adopting the following reasoning: for instance, when 
examining the influence on bank lending as a consequence of a variation in bank size 
conveyed via: 𝛥𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑖𝑡 ∆⁄ 𝑆t-1 (in which 𝜃S is the designated coefficient for bank size in 
the vector 𝜃). Given that 𝜃S> 0, it demonstrates that large banks supply additional loans. 
Accordingly, through adopting this methodology the validity of the subsequent 
assumptions can be verified: high risk, less liquid and poorly capitalised banks are more 
vulnerable to provide loans in relation with their counterparts on the opposite side of the 
spectrum, i.e., low risk, highly liquid and well capitalised banks. It is suggested here that 
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the interaction term of the bank-specific characteristics with the short-term interest rate 
will serve to demonstrate the distributional effects of the monetary policy position.  
The second question is verified using the following analysis below: 
If (𝜕2𝛥𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑖𝑡 𝜕⁄ 𝛥𝑅𝑡 − 𝑗𝜕𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 1) > 0,this means that lending activity present in large 
banks is less vulnerable to monetary policy changes than that of small banks. 
Banks with higher liquidity can extend credit by reducing their liquid assets supply; this 
implies that (𝜕2𝛥𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑖𝑡 𝜕⁄ 𝛥𝑅𝑡 − 𝑗𝜕𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 − 1) > 0. Therefore, less liquid banks must 
reduce their loan portfolio. 
Banks possessing higher capitalisation are not as vulnerable to monetary policy changes, 
which suggests that (𝜕2𝛥𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑖𝑡 𝜕⁄ 𝛥𝑅𝑡 − 𝑗𝜕𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 1) > 0. 
An analogous relationship exists for bank risks. This theory states that low risk banks are 
less sensitive to monetary policy changes; this means (𝜕2𝛥𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑖𝑡 𝜕⁄ 𝛥𝑅𝑡 − 𝑗𝜕𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 −
1) > 0. 
Therefore, the existence of a BLC implies that the two-way interaction terms will contain 
positive coefficients in the aforementioned model, i.e, ∅𝑘𝑗> 0. 
An additional consideration of this study17 examines if the following three-way 
interaction terms are important indicators of loan growth:  
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝐿𝐼𝑄 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ ∆𝑅𝑡, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝐿𝐼𝑄 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗  ∆𝑅𝑡 − 1, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗
𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ ∆𝑅𝑡, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗  ∆𝑅𝑡 − 1,   𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗
 ∆𝑅𝑡, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗  ∆𝑅𝑡 − 1, 𝐿𝐼𝑄 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ ∆𝑅𝑡, 𝐿𝐼𝑄 𝑖𝑡 −
                                                 
17 Note that positive coefficients on these three-way interaction terms in the presence of a BLC (i.e., 𝜌𝑘ℎ𝑗 >
0) are predicted using the same principles and reasoning described for two-way interaction terms (see 
Appendix. B, Table B1 for a comprehensive synopsis of the predicted signs of coefficients). 
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1 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ ∆𝑅𝑡 − 1 , 𝐿𝐼𝑄 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ ∆𝑅𝑡,   𝐿𝐼𝑄 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗
∆𝑅 𝑡 − 1, 𝐶𝐴𝑝 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ ∆𝑅𝑡,   𝐶𝐴𝑝 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑖𝑡 − 1. 
The third test is conducted through adopting and using the same approach as outlined in 
the first and second question; thus, this can be achieved by examining the statistical 
significance specific to the coefficient found for the time frames of (2008-2011) financial 
crises with the purpose of uncovering the potential role of bank-specific characteristics 
and possible changes to the BLC of monetary policy during the aforementioned phase.  
Moreover, further analysis is necessary to determine if the BLC of monetary policy is 
influenced via bank market power in the context of a supplemental bank-specific trait, in 
addition to size, liquidly, capital and risk. Utilising the aforementioned reasoning, the 
non-interacted and two-way interaction terms between bank competition and monetary 
policy changes are considered with the purpose of investigating if bank competition 
affects the MTM in the newly accessed EU States.  
Figure 1 shows the fact that, following 2007, the average lending growth rate in EU-8 
States experienced a significant decline and has not since recovered. Since 2009 only 
volatile, inconsistent growth was reported with the lowest rates seen in Baltic States, 
Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland all in 2009, and Slovenia in 2013. 
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Figure 1: Average lending growth rate from 2004-2013 
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This research utilises the money market interest rates as the monetary policy rate. Figure 
2 illustrates a comparative analysis of the changes in three month money market rates 
(ΔR) in selected EU-8 States and the euro area. The data indicates that the central banks 
of the nations investigated fix the policy rates based on and very similar to their 
counterparts’ decisions. Moreover, nations that became members of the euro area, 
including and after 2007, stopped announcing money market rates individually once they 
joined the euro area and the unified interbank market within this union. 
Figure 2: Money market interest rates, deposit liabilities, 3 months (80-100 days 
maturity) annual frequency 
 
Source: (ECB, Eurostat, OECD and Central Banks) 
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2.5 Estimation results 
Model.1 comprises cross-sectional fixed-effects and a lagged dependent variable. The 
latter component necessitates the utilisation of a Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimation procedure when examining a panel containing a 
comparatively small time-series dimension, i.e. T is at most 10 in our sample.  
Given that Model.1 also consists of a lagged dependent variable, GMM must be used in 
order to estimate it as suggested in Arellano and Bond (1991); specifically, in this case 
the Arellano and Bond two-step system estimator containing corrected coefficient 
standard errors from Windmeijer (2005) is appropriate here. When examining GMM 
regressions on simulated panels, Windmeijer (2005) determines that the two-step efficient 
GMM is superior to the one-step system, given that it allows for reduced standard errors 
and bias. Furthermore, Roodman (2009) notes that the two-step system with the 
Windmeijer (2005) correction yields comparatively accurate modelling, supporting the 
notion of the superiority of the two-step estimation with corrected standard errors 
approach over the robust one-step. As a result it produces a system consisting of two 
equations, the original and transformed equations, which are collectively termed system 
GMM. The combined two-step estimator holds against any number of cross-correlation 
and heteroskedastic patterns that the sandwich covariance estimator represents, and is 
efficient (Roodman, 2009). 
Caution must be taken when presupposing the presence of fixed-effects and dynamics 
because such an assumption could negatively affect inference, which is in keeping with 
contemporary estimation practices presented in Akinci et al. (2013) and Fungáčová et al. 
(2014). The dynamic equation illustrated in Model.1 is commonly analysed via the 
Arellano and Bond GMM methodology described in Arellano and Bond (1991). 
However, the dynamics in the levels of data are not evident since they are not presented 
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in their first differences. Given that annual data as opposed to quarterly data is utilised 
here, the outcome is actually not unexpected. When considering that Fungáčová et al. 
(2014) underline the idea that a convincing argument can be made regarding the reason 
why lending in the previous quarter could affect contemporary lending, the study also 
suggests that it would be more difficult to find an economic justification that explains 
why the previous year’s lending should affect the present year’s lending; this is consistent 
with the evaluation of Turkish monetary policy seen in Akinci et al. (2013). Accordingly, 
the Model. 1 is tested via the panel fixed effects18 as our preferred specification while 
omitting the lagged dependent variable.19 
2.5.1 Does the data support the existence of a BLC for monetary policy in the 
CEE States? 
The primary estimations with respect to the total period analysed are first considered and 
the results specific for the financial crisis are subsequently compared with the purpose of 
elucidating the potential role of banks in monetary policy transmission.  
Here the findings of the empirical analysis concerning the BLC of MTM within in the 
newly accessed EU States are outlined (see Tables 4A-4F). With respect to bank-specific 
traits, the model is initially estimated using individual characteristic in a segmented 
process as documented in columns 1-4 and subsequently with every possible three-way 
interaction term as illustrated in columns 5-10, and ultimately using each of the four 
characteristics collectively as shown in column 11. 
                                                 
18 Employing the fixed effects specification here is warranted following a Hausman test. In order to 
circumvent issues with collinearity concerning the specified variables, first correlations of every variable 
are evaluated. A high level of correlation between variables employed in all models were not observed.  
19 In this methodology time period fixed-effects cannot be included since macroeconomic variables only 
show changes in time instead of being spread across banks; therefore, they would be flawlessly collinear 
with period effects.   
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Somewhat unexpectedly it can been seen that the growth of bank lending in response to 
the monetary policy stance derived from money market rates in the short term is not 
significant with the exception of the Czech Republic and Slovenia, i.e. the results indicate 
no  direct correlation between the two via the money lending channel. Hence, the theory 
of a direct correlation is unsubstantiated, yet an indirect influence through the BLC is 
supported and documented below. 
When evaluating the instances in which each bank-specific trait appears individually, it 
can be determined that the bank size is significant in most countries except in the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia, while it bears a negative coefficient which could support the 
argument that smaller banks could have more variable lending activity if newly founded, 
relative to the larger banks.  The results from the two and three-way interaction terms of 
these bank-specific attributes uphold the previous findings for bank size in all the newly 
accessed EU States; where the trend of the coefficient sign stays intact. 
Liquidity is determined to have a significant influence in the majority of nations when 
entering along with other bank-specific traits, yet solely in Hungary and Slovakia when 
employed by itself.  Capitalisation maintains the expected positive coefficient with a 
propensity to be significant only in the case of Slovenia. The negative and significant 
correlation shows that banks in Slovakia have a greater inclination to secure their capital 
levels rather than to utilise funds to issue fresh loans to borrowers. Finally, the degree of 
risk reveals a significant positive coefficient just in Hungary, and is unlikely to be 
statistically significant for most of the rest of the countries.  
Yet, with the purpose of evaluating monetary policy and its distributional effects, and 
establishing the existence of the BLC within the EU new Member States, the coefficients 
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of the interaction terms between the traits specific to banks and the monetary policy 
measurements require investigation. 
The interaction term of bank size on its own with the interest rates is not statistically 
significant. Furthermore, bank size becomes statistically insignificant when entering 
along with other bank-specific characteristics in all countries except in the case of Baltic 
States and Hungary. In contrast to the findings in Matousek and Sarantis (2009) for 8 
CEE countries, Horváth et al. (2006) for Hungary, Pruteanu (2007) for the Czech 
Republic, and Wróbel and Pawlowska (2002) for Poland, we find no evidence to support 
the role of bank size in the newly EU accession nations. This finding is in line with studies 
that examined the BLC with reference to Western European banks (Ehrmann et al., 2003; 
Altunbas et al., 2002; Gambacorta, 2005; Altunbas et al., 2010; Gambacorta and 
Marques-Ibanez, 2011; Fungáčová et al., 2014; among others). We find that bank 
liquidity is a crucial differentiating factor in the reaction of banks to changes in the 
monetary policy stance within few investigated countries. Of particular interest is that 
despite the fact that the interaction term for bank liquidity and interest rates for Poland is 
statistically significant, it carries a negative coefficient which is inconsistent with the 
BLC hypothesis and cannot be utilised to determine whether the channel exists. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence to establish the existence of the BLC via bank liquidity in 
Slovakia where the interaction terms of bank liquidity on its own with the interest rates 
are statistically significant in most cases. Comparable supporting evidence for the 
influence of bank liquidity is documented in Ehrmann et al. (2003), Gambacorta (2005), 
Altunbas et al. (2010) and Leroy (2014), among others. 
Bank capitalisation appears to be a significant, contributing bank-specific characteristic 
when evaluating the banks’ response to monetary policy changes in Baltic States and 
Slovakia. When considering the three-way interaction terms, it is observed that well-
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capitalised and low risk banks realised more loan growth in Poland and the Czech 
Republic. This assessment upholds the previous study by Matousek and Saranatis (2009) 
which suggests that the effect of bank capital on the banks’ reaction to monetary policy 
variation is important in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovak Republic. Concerning 
the CEE countries, the results here are similar to earlier investigations that obtained 
results supporting the influence of capitalisation in the Czech Republic (Pruteanu, 2007) 
and Poland (Wróbel and Pawlowska, 2002). 
Given that the standard capital to asset ratio is an accounting-based indicator, it has 
received lots of criticism, specifically during the onset of financial crises, for not 
capturing the risk tailored to the crisis. The inclusion of the Tier-1 ratio helps us to fully 
capture the capital adequacy of banks.20 
The data indicates that the role of capital is unrelated to the indicator of capitalisation that 
was used. In support of the available literature with respect to the BLC, the importance 
of the tier-1 ratio in a sound banking system must be acknowledged. Here it is suggested 
that the results found in this study would be inverted, in the instance that unrestricted 
access to all the bank data from the sample and period evaluated was possible. Matousek 
and Saranatis (2009) rationalise that the potential issues is not likely to be the 
capitalisation of lone banks but instead the whole bank network. Additionally, Ehrmann 
et al. (2003) postulate that bank capitalisation could have already reached a point at which 
bank lending activity is uninfluenced by changes in monetary policy stance. Yet, the 
influence of bank capitalisation most specifically during the financial crisis could be 
worthwhile noting. 
                                                 
20 The available data on the tier-1 ratio is limited to less than a quarter of the total sample in the majority 
of countries. 
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Finally, bank risk seems to have a significant role in the assessment of the banks’ response 
to monetary policy changes in Slovenia and Slovakia. This is in keeping with the 
postulation made by Altunbas et al. (2010) and Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011). 
Whereas some conflicting data is present for Baltic States, there is no corroborating data 
in Hungary. 
A sensitivity analysis is also carried out within this study by considering two further 
variables in the original specification with the purpose of ascertaining whether the 
aforementioned variables are significant contributors to the bank credit supply; these 
include Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) And Loan Loss Provisions (LLPs) as a percentage 
of gross loans.  
The two additional accounting-based risk indicators known as NPLs and LLPs. NPLs 
show the quality of bank-held assets and the possible negative exposure to asset market 
values and earnings as a result of a decline in quality of loans, while LLPs are defined as 
a proportion of loans for an ex-post indicator of credit risk. Yet, when examining non-
interacted and two-way interacted variables between these two risk indicators and the 
monetary policy indicator, no supporting evidence is obtained.  
With respect to demand which is proxied by both the GDP growth (GGDP) and inflation 
(CPI), the current value of GGDP is determined to be statistically significant in most cases 
where the demand has a conceivable positive coefficient, which implies a significant 
impact on credit growth. Favourable economic conditions are conducive to expanded loan 
supply by banks. Yet, the CPI proxy is statistically insignificant in most cases while also 
bearing a negative coefficient.
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Table 4A: Estimates of Model.1 using bank data in Baltic States (2004-2013) 
 
Specification 
Size Liq Cap Risk Size Liq Size Cap Size Risk Liq Cap Liq Risk Cap Risk Size Liq Cap Risk 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
∆Rt  -0.0064 -0.0099 -0.0130 -0.0099 0.0050 -0.0102 -0.0083 -0.0070 -0.0058 -0.0154 0.0005 
∆Rt-1 0.0061 0.0023 -0.0005 0.0017 0.0091 0.0020 -0.0055 0.0027 0.0012 -0.0020 0.0080 
GGDPt 1.686*** 2.058*** 1.994*** 2.018*** 1.457*** 1.718*** 1.726*** 1.922*** 1.905*** 1.985*** 1.482*** 
GGDPt-1 0.799* 0.6090 0.8800 0.6860 0.4940 0.872* 0.829* 0.7460 0.6570 0.8950 0.626* 
CPIt -0.035*** -0.0326* -0.0357** -0.0328* -0.030*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.0331** -0.0312* -0.0348** -0.0312*** 
CPIt-1 0.0171 0.0374*** 0.0334** 0.0327** 0.0110 0.0192 0.0175 0.0315** 0.0299* 0.0313* 0.0129 
Size it-1 -0.360*    -0.439* -0.3530 -0.379*    -0.450* 
Size it-1×∆Rt 0.0075*    0.0090* 0.0021 0.0001    0.0000 
Liqit-1  0.2480   0.985*   0.2490 0.2330  1.015** 
Liq it-1×∆Rt  -0.0254   0.0168   0.0010 0.0443  0.0329 
Cap it-1   0.4230   -0.4230  0.3710  0.5480 0.5880 
Cap it-1×∆Rt   -0.253*   -0.2140  -0.2180  -0.2760 -0.0974 
Risk it-1    0.0062   -0.0058  0.0067 -0.0010 -0.0141 
Risk it-1×∆Rt    -0.0019   -0.0021  -0.0022 -0.0011 -0.0019 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0022    0.0003 0.0052 -0.0010    0.0028 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1  -0.0119   -0.0609   -0.0146 -0.0117  -0.0286 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   0.0729   0.0282  0.0366  0.245* 0.1470 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1    -0.0004   -0.0024**  -0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0011 
Size it-1×Liq it-1×∆Rt     0.0058       
Size it-1× Liq it-1×∆Rt-1     -0.0236       
Size it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt      -0.0097      
Size it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1      -0.0566      
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt       -0.0001     
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1       -0.0016**     
Liq it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt        -1.078*    
Liq it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1        -0.8260    
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt         -0.0021   
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1         0.0020   
Cap it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt          0.0170  
Cap it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1          0.0079  
REG -0.209** -0.277* -0.292** -0.265** -0.210** -0.203* -0.199** -0.285** -0.272** -0.285** -0.202* 
Intercept 0.376* 0.358* 0.393* 0.359* 0.439* 0.341* 0.363* 0.400* 0.391* 0.387* 0.424* 
R-squared 0.522 0.353 0.401 0.386 0.568 0.534 0.549 0.401 0.383 0.413 0.600 
Number of observations 231 231 231 225 231 231 225 231 225 225 225 
Panel estimation with bank fixed effects. Dependant variable is the loan growth rate, ∆Rt = yearly change of the short-term interest rate; Size it-1 = log of total assets; Liqit-1= liquidity ratio; Cap it-
1= capital to asset ratio and Risk it-1= return on assets (ROA) + equity capital to assets ratio (CAR) divided by standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA). Standard errors are robust yet 
are not depicted. REG denotes regulation variable concerning the degree that banks are permitted to commence activities within securities, insurance, real estate and non-financial sectors 
from World Bank indices on bank regulation (Barth et al., 2004). The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 4B: Estimates of Model.1 using bank data in Czech Republic (2004-2013)  
 
Specification 
Size Liq Cap Risk Size Liq Size Cap Size Risk Liq Cap Liq Risk Cap Risk Size Liq Cap Risk Foreign 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
∆Rt  -0.201* -0.1890 -0.158* -0.2120 -0.1420 -0.172* -0.199* -0.1620 -0.1870 -0.166* -0.1540 -0.198* 
∆Rt-1 0.471** 0.434** 0.395** 0.475** 0.381* 0.430** 0.468** 0.397** 0.432** 0.403** 0.378** 0.436** 
GGDPt 1.785*** 2.097*** 1.867*** 2.314** 1.604** 1.723** 1.859*** 1.879** 2.122*** 1.824*** 1.788** 2.026** 
GGDPt-1 -1.176* -0.970* -0.788* -1.038** -0.822* -0.943* -1.140* -0.817* -0.932* -0.926* -0.778* -1.023* 
CPIt -0.0674** -0.072*** -0.0675** -0.073*** -0.0613** -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.0675** -0.0711** -0.0715** -0.0658** -0.0717** 
CPIt-1 -0.185* -0.167* -0.149* -0.182* -0.147* -0.165* -0.183* -0.150* -0.168* -0.155* -0.141* -0.151* 
Size it-1 -0.1040    -0.0602 -0.0379 -0.0871    -0.0080 -0.0301 
Size it-1×∆Rt 0.0118    0.0006 -0.0039 0.0096    -0.0066 0.0118 
Liqit-1  0.0179   0.0110   0.0063 0.0242  0.0085 -0.0506 
Liq it-1×∆Rt  -0.3320   -0.1760   -0.3050 -0.2960  -0.3380 -0.385** 
Cap it-1   0.5640   -0.3350  0.5080  0.7410 0.8830 -2.0090 
Cap it-1×∆Rt   -0.2980   -0.3430  -0.3620  -0.748* -0.6290 -0.4430 
Risk it-1    0.0035   0.0011  0.0027 -0.0019 -0.0016 0.0039 
Risk it-1×∆Rt    0.0007   0.0004  0.0000 0.0018 0.0008 0.0009 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0158    0.0026 0.0053 0.0160    0.0044 -0.0088 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1  -0.1970   -0.0544   -0.0834 -0.2250  -0.0479 -0.0533 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   0.0037   0.1540  0.1690  -0.1770 0.3460 0.2930 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1    0.0001   -0.0005  -0.0004 0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0003 
Size it-1×Liq it-1×∆Rt     0.2360        
Size it-1× Liq it-1×∆Rt-1     0.0299        
Size it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt      -0.4500       
Size it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1      0.3230       
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt       -0.0001      
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1       0.0003      
Liq it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt        1.1390     
Liq it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1        -0.8010     
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt         0.0025    
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1         -0.0089    
Cap it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt          0.0102   
Cap it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1          0.0364*   
Intercept 0.823** 0.754** 0.693** 0.791** 0.681** 0.745** 0.814** 0.697** 0.750** 0.730** 0.675** 0.698* 
R-squared 0.312 0.380 0.344 0.275 0.412 0.334 0.286 0.425 0.378 0.362 0.410 0.457 
Number of observations 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 107 
Panel estimation with bank fixed effects. Dependant variable is the loan growth rate, ∆Rt = yearly change of the short-term interest rate; Size it-1 = log of total assets; Liqit-1= liquidity ratio; Cap it-1= capital to asset 
ratio and Risk it-1= return on assets (ROA) + equity capital to assets ratio (CAR) divided by standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA). Standard errors are robust yet are not depicted. The symbols ***, **, 
and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 4C: Estimates of Model.1 using bank data in Hungary (2004-2013)  
 
Specification 
Size Liq Cap Risk Size Liq Size Cap Size Risk Liq Cap Liq Risk Cap Risk Size Liq Cap Risk Foreign 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
∆Rt  0.0040 0.0047 -0.1030 -0.0669 0.0556 0.0172 0.0375 -0.0106 0.0029 -0.0654 0.1350 0.0481 
∆Rt-1 -0.0029 -0.0553 -0.0331 -0.0261 -0.0241 0.0167 0.0136 -0.0601 -0.0534 -0.0190 -0.0037 -0.0418 
GGDPt 2.6020 0.2600 0.5610 0.6900 1.4870 3.0380 2.9400 0.0650 0.2070 0.7650 2.6270 -0.1280 
GGDPt-1 0.0169 -1.3290 2.0670 1.3270 -1.876* -0.2420 -0.5120 -1.1770 -1.3370 1.2910 -3.672*** -3.3880 
CPIt -0.0347 0.0413 0.0981 0.0727 -0.0318 -0.0665 -0.0743 0.0579 0.0421 0.0692 -0.1270 -0.0045 
CPIt-1 0.0536 0.0947** 0.0166 0.0267 0.0974*** 0.0534 0.0536 0.0984** 0.0891** 0.0261 0.126*** 0.149** 
Size it-1 -0.719**    -0.474*** -0.811** -0.771**    -0.657*** -0.719* 
Size it-1×∆Rt 0.0024    0.0084 0.0052 0.0104*    0.0118 -0.0119 
Liqit-1  3.481**   2.985***   3.576* 3.186*  3.126** 2.209** 
Liq it-1×∆Rt  0.0692   0.1600   0.0901 0.0806  0.1720 -0.0557 
Cap it-1   1.6700   -1.0400  -0.0302  -0.9840 -5.2240 -2.8750 
Cap it-1×∆Rt   0.2060   0.0440  -0.1530  -0.0933 -0.3890 -0.5560 
Risk it-1    0.0265   0.0093  0.0098 0.0347 0.0437* 0.0285* 
Risk it-1×∆Rt    0.0009   0.0000  -0.0008 0.0016 -0.0005 0.0001 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0007    0.0037 0.0061 0.0023    -0.0052 -0.0014 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1  0.0502   0.125*   0.0805 0.1910  0.0297 0.1850 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   0.0190   0.3710  -0.1550  -0.3060 -0.4080 0.1570 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1    0.0006   0.0008  0.0000 0.0025 0.0012 0.0006 
Size it-1×Liq it-1×∆Rt     0.0432        
Size it-1× Liq it-1×∆Rt-1     0.0466        
Size it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt      -0.1670       
Size it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1      0.1020       
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt       0.0004      
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1       0.0001      
Liq it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt        -0.2970     
Liq it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1        -1.5280     
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt         0.0046    
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1         0.0164    
Cap it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt          0.0069   
Cap it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1          -0.0038   
Intercept 0.0254 -0.554 -0.536 -0.418 -0.161 0.194 0.296 -0.658 -0.535 -0.397 0.274 -0.308 
R-squared 0.203 0.304 0.028 0.044 0.370 0.189 0.192 0.282 0.289 0.013 0.413 0.636 
Number of observations 140 140 140 136 140 140 136 140 136 136 136 87 
Panel estimation with bank fixed effects. Dependant variable is the loan growth rate, ∆Rt = yearly change of the short-term interest rate; Size it-1 = log of total assets; Liqit-1= liquidity ratio; Cap it-1= capital to asset 
ratio and Risk it-1= return on assets (ROA) + equity capital to assets ratio (CAR) divided by standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA). Standard errors are robust yet are not depicted. The symbols ***, **, 
and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
48 
 
 
 
Table 4D: Estimates of Model.1 using bank data in Poland (2004-2013)  
 
Specification 
Size Liq Cap Risk Size Liq Size Cap Size Risk Liq Cap Liq Risk Cap Risk Size Liq Cap Risk Foreign 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
∆Rt  0.0079 -0.0574 -0.0740 -0.0718 0.0172 0.0744 0.0303 -0.0762 -0.0619 -0.0914 0.0545 0.0657 
∆Rt-1 0.0015 0.131* 0.0900* 0.0981* 0.0329 -0.0471 -0.0123 0.124** 0.134* 0.101* -0.0143 -0.0027 
GGDPt 0.5110 1.3790 1.5780 1.6610 0.2010 -0.4070 0.2730 1.3540 1.3630 1.6340 -0.4360 -0.3690 
GGDPt-1 0.0702 -0.7190 -0.2100 -0.2260 -0.4460 0.1810 0.1240 -0.7580 -0.7460 -0.2960 -0.3400 -0.4510 
CPIt 0.0004 0.0348 0.0422 0.0444 -0.0089 -0.0570 -0.0192 0.0453 0.0383 0.0512 -0.0443 -0.0549 
CPIt-1 -0.0074 -0.1240 -0.0878 -0.0883 -0.0511 0.0312 0.0057 -0.1320 -0.1270 -0.0974 -0.0135 -0.0193 
Size it-1 -0.384*    -0.388* -0.474* -0.417*    -0.467* -0.511* 
Size it-1×∆Rt -0.0045    -0.0034 -0.0069 -0.0040    -0.0057 -0.0138 
Liqit-1  0.4520   0.5350   0.5170 0.5800  0.4190 0.5420 
Liq it-1×∆Rt  -0.487*   -0.536**   -0.523* -0.510**  -0.526** -0.559** 
Cap it-1   -0.0047   -3.6510  0.4740  -0.7820 -2.9570 -3.8370 
Cap it-1×∆Rt   -0.5560   -0.6510  -0.7810  -0.3020 -1.0090 -1.512* 
Risk it-1    0.0014   -0.0068  0.0056 0.0073 -0.0017 -0.0003 
Risk it-1×∆Rt    -0.0008   -0.0004  -0.0010 -0.0006 0.0001 0.0006 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0011    0.0083 -0.0008 -0.0001    0.0020 0.0029 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1  0.2280   0.2570   0.225* 0.291**  0.1730 0.1850 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   -0.2500   -0.2590  -0.3620  -0.1640 -0.3890 -0.4840 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1    -0.0002   -0.0004  -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0002 
Size it-1×Liq it-1×∆Rt     -0.0085        
Size it-1× Liq it-1×∆Rt-1     0.1880        
Size it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt      0.1640       
Size it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1      0.1840       
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt       0.0001      
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1       0.0000      
Liq it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt        0.3120     
Liq it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1        -1.4310     
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt         0.0010    
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1         -0.0088*    
Cap it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt          0.0316**   
Cap it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1          0.0075   
Intercept 0.180 0.425 0.221 0.217 0.419 0.245 0.206 0.423 0.431 0.239 0.405 0.468 
R-squared 0.109 0.116 0.032 0.030 0.190 0.115 0.095 0.111 0.121 0.028 0.191 0.199 
Number of observations 243 243 243 241 243 243 241 243 241 241 241 195 
Panel estimation with bank fixed effects. Dependant variable is the loan growth rate, ∆Rt = yearly change of the short-term interest rate; Size it-1 = log of total assets; Liqit-1= liquidity ratio; Cap it-1= capital 
to asset ratio and Risk it-1= return on assets (ROA) + equity capital to assets ratio (CAR) divided by standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA). Standard errors are robust yet are not depicted. The symbols 
***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 4E: Estimates of Model.1 using bank data in Slovakia (2004-2013) 
 
Specification 
Size Liq Cap Risk Size Liq Size Cap Size Risk Liq Cap Liq Risk Cap Risk Size Liq Cap Risk 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
∆Rt  0.0106 0.0511 0.0633 0.0601 0.0091 0.0145 0.0046 0.0625 0.0698 0.0488 0.0106 
∆Rt-1 0.0286 0.0570 0.0379 0.0413 0.0452 0.0128 0.0223 0.0541* 0.0660 0.0253 0.0283 
GGDPt 0.7330 -0.6300 0.3710 0.2430 -0.2330 1.0520 0.6780 -0.3150 -0.8830 0.5680 0.4490 
GGDPt-1 0.5510 -0.1030 0.0972 0.1820 0.0080 0.1300 0.3700 -0.0558 -0.1310 0.1250 0.0170 
CPIt -0.0016 0.0069 -0.0159 -0.0164 0.0288 0.0150 0.0042 -0.0063 0.0059 -0.0107 0.0316 
CPIt-1 -0.0215 -0.0172 0.0067 -0.0064 -0.0285 -0.0036 -0.0203 -0.0057 -0.0172 0.0093 -0.0097 
Size it-1 -0.412**    -0.427** -0.455*** -0.431**    -0.493** 
Size it-1×∆Rt -0.0153    -0.0114 -0.0005 -0.0135    -0.0004 
Liqit-1  1.128*   1.279*   0.708* 1.217*  0.787* 
Liq it-1×∆Rt  0.409*   0.383*   0.3100 0.535*  0.248* 
Cap it-1   -3.0630   -3.200*  -2.5600  -4.253* -3.709* 
Cap it-1×∆Rt   0.2580   1.333*  0.5640  0.3300 1.4460 
Risk it-1    -0.0049   -0.0059  -0.0039 0.0063 0.0053 
Risk it-1×∆Rt    0.0001   0.0002  0.0009* -0.0004 0.0000 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.0123    -0.0069 -0.0037 -0.0086    -0.0026 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1  0.4680   0.4650   0.288* 0.5180  0.376** 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   0.5560   0.2590  0.3370  0.1270 0.582* 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1    -0.0003   -0.0003  0.0003 -0.0005 0.0001 
Size it-1×Liq it-1×∆Rt     0.0335       
Size it-1× Liq it-1×∆Rt-1     -0.0748       
Size it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt      0.3430      
Size it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1      -0.4980      
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt       0.0008     
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1       0.0006     
Liq it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt        -6.3920    
Liq it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1        4.5650    
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt         0.0043   
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1         0.0000   
Cap it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt          -0.0171  
Cap it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1          -0.0280  
Intercept 0.0938 0.228 0.104 0.159 0.161 -0.0156 0.0957 0.192 0.250 0.0361 0.0100 
R-squared 0.362 0.296 0.351 0.197 0.455 0.553 0.380 0.399 0.270 0.349 0.581 
Number of observations 80 80 80 79 80 80 79 80 79 79 79 
Panel estimation with bank fixed effects. Dependant variable is the loan growth rate, ∆Rt = yearly change of the short-term interest rate; Size it-1 = log of total assets; Liqit-1= liquidity ratio; Cap it-
1= capital to asset ratio and Risk it-1= return on assets (ROA) + equity capital to assets ratio (CAR) divided by standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA). Standard errors are robust yet 
are not depicted. The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 4F: Estimates of Model.1 using bank data in Slovenia (2004-2013) 
 
Specification 
Size Liq Cap Risk Size Liq Size Cap Size Risk Liq Cap Liq Risk Cap Risk Size Liq Cap Risk 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
∆Rt  -0.0032 0.0047 -0.0001 -0.0026 0.0079 0.0000 -0.0041 0.0073 0.0030 -0.0018 0.0139 
∆Rt-1 -0.0519** -0.0453* -0.0506* -0.0512** -0.0457* -0.0512* -0.0559** -0.0419 -0.0457* -0.0478* -0.0456* 
GGDPt 0.6390 0.3690 0.5750 0.6180 0.3010 0.6080 0.6440 0.2770 0.3780 0.6570 0.1750 
GGDPt-1 3.896*** 3.498** 3.751*** 3.924*** 3.509** 3.740*** 3.929*** 3.256** 3.556** 3.559*** 3.176** 
CPIt -0.0208 -0.0170 -0.0217 -0.0249 -0.0178 -0.0181 -0.0216 -0.0135 -0.0187 -0.0196 -0.0123 
CPIt-1 -0.0634** -0.0555* -0.060*** -0.066*** -0.0538* -0.0590** -0.0652** -0.0481* -0.0579* -0.0591** -0.0415* 
Size it-1 0.0500    -0.0144 0.0588 0.0544    0.0025 
Size it-1×∆Rt 0.0012    -0.0001 -0.0050 0.0047    0.0072 
Liqit-1  0.3920   0.4090   0.4400 0.3910  0.5060 
Liq it-1×∆Rt  -0.0176   -0.0012   0.0038 0.0180  0.1650 
Cap it-1   1.8420   1.8500  2.0800  2.2480 3.0720 
Cap it-1×∆Rt   0.0743   0.0390  0.0868  0.3320 0.1780 
Risk it-1    0.0037   0.0035  0.0032 -0.0018 -0.0056 
Risk it-1×∆Rt    0.0008**   0.0010  0.0008 0.0012* 0.0012* 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.0125*    -0.0100 -0.0112 -0.0138*    -0.0075 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1  -0.0410   -0.0479   -0.0338 -0.0228  -0.0609 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   -0.0962   -0.0710  -0.0397  -0.1030 -0.1380 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1    0.0008   -0.0001  0.0008* 0.0008 0.0006* 
Size it-1×Liq it-1×∆Rt     -0.0292       
Size it-1× Liq it-1×∆Rt-1     -0.1530       
Size it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt      -0.3610      
Size it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1      0.0111      
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt       0.0000     
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1       -0.0011     
Liq it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt        -1.6920    
Liq it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1        3.2280    
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt         -0.0075   
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1         -0.0026   
Cap it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt          0.0762  
Cap it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1          0.0013  
Intercept 0.146 0.142* 0.151** 0.166** 0.141 0.134* 0.151 0.124* 0.149* 0.146* 0.110 
R-squared 0.689 0.696 0.698 0.690 0.693 0.697 0.692 0.713 0.698 0.705 0.730 
Number of observations 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 
Panel estimation with bank fixed effects. Dependant variable is the loan growth rate, ∆Rt = yearly change of the short-term interest rate; Size it-1 = log of total assets; Liqit-1= liquidity ratio; 
Cap it-1= capital to asset ratio and Risk it-1= return on assets (ROA) + equity capital to assets ratio (CAR) divided by standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA). Standard errors are 
robust yet are not depicted. The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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In keeping with the methods described in Barth et al. (2004), a regulation variable (REG) 
was adopted into the model which considers the extent to which banks are allowed to 
engage in securities, insurance and real estate activities. The data shows a negative value 
for the regulation variable, corroborating the notion that banks reduced lending 
specifically in Baltic States in which particular institutional components facilitated their 
additional influence within non-traditional banking activities. However, the empirical 
model is largely measured using national data in the case of the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, as a result the cross-country-difference issue is not 
applicable.  Due to the small number of observation per country, it would be not feasible 
to make comparative analyses among Baltic States with respect to pre-and post-euro 
adoption. 
Additionally, foreign banks are differentiated according to their interpretation by the 
Bankscope which characterises them as possessing unmediated or complete participation 
in excess of 50%. As a result of the inadequate instances of observations in Baltic States, 
Slovakia and Slovenia, performing a correlation study was not possible at this point, as 
demonstrated in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary; for the most part the 
coefficients were not significantly different from the main findings and the deduction 
resulting from this research. As a result the primary discussion remains intact. 
 2.5.2 The impact of bank competition on the BLC 
The Lerner index is added to the first column and correspondingly the interaction terms 
of monetary policy are restricted to the connections specific to the index with the purpose 
of determining its value. In the next column four main bank-specific traits are added: size, 
capital, liquidity and risk. Additionally, the final column evaluates the interaction term 
for the previously mentioned characteristic along with the Lerner index (see Tables 5A-
5B). 
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The interaction terms between the Lerner index and monetary policy, and its impact on 
the supply of loan, indicate a negative and statistically significant correlation amongst 
Baltic States, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia.  
A negative coefficient suggests that monetary policy has a greater effect in a background 
of imperfect markets. Specifically, by contracting the monetary policy indicator, the 
monetary officials are likely to successfully reduce the supply of bank loans within a 
banking market with reduced competition; this prediction is supported by Amidu and 
Wolfe (2013) which offer results corroborating the likelihood of a greater correlation 
between market imperfection and the effectiveness of the monetary policy. Yet, these 
results contradict those yielded in examinations of the euro area countries such as in Leory 
(2014) and Fungáčová et al. (2014). 
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Table 5A: Main estimations, including Lerner index (2004-2013) 
 
Specification 
Baltic States Czech Republic Hungary 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
∆Rt  0.0016 0.0103 0.0056 -0.1220 -0.1250 -0.158* -0.1110 0.2800 0.2930 
∆Rt-1 0.0092 0.0143 0.0112 0.326* 0.348* 0.369** -0.0401 0.0393 0.0428 
GGDPt 2.062*** 1.412*** 1.319*** 1.570** 1.487** 1.732** 0.3720 4.1000 4.0780 
GGDPt-1 0.0464 0.2080 0.3350 -0.5710 -0.6660 -0.6900 1.6830 -5.9020 -6.9000 
CPIt -0.0204* -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.0548* -0.0577** -0.0601** 0.0959 -0.2800 -0.2840 
CPIt-1 0.0451*** 0.0100 0.0066 -0.125* -0.133* -0.140** 0.0007 0.138** 0.160** 
Size it-1  -0.591** -0.621***  -0.0304 -0.0010  -0.999** -1.131** 
Size it-1×∆Rt   0.0046   0.0030   0.0101 
Liqit-1  0.784* 0.763*  -0.0478 -0.0208  2.669** 2.201** 
Liq it-1×∆Rt   0.0359   -0.331*   -0.0529 
Cap it-1  -2.3060 -2.7610  0.9360 0.9280  -7.0830 -8.3710 
Cap it-1×∆Rt   -0.0534   -0.3840   -0.8400 
Risk it-1  0.0016 0.0005  -0.0040 -0.0010  0.0514 0.0615 
Risk it-1×∆Rt   -0.0018   0.0014   0.0018 
Lerner Index it-1 0.336* 0.2160 0.2260 -0.1430 -0.0341 -0.1170 -0.8250 -0.4710 -0.7470 
Lerner Index it-1*∆Rt -0.0308 -0.0730* -0.0572 -0.2700 -0.2600 -0.211* 0.0034 -0.2090 -0.0200 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1   0.0046   0.0027   -0.0035 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1   -0.0400   -0.0468   0.2250 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   0.1980   0.3490   -0.3150 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1   -0.0006   -0.0005   0.0014 
Lerner Index it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0174 -0.0194 -0.0237 0.0423 0.0344 0.0357 0.0856 0.0206 0.0140 
Intercept -0.154* 0.186 0.203 0.579* 0.637** 0.645** -0.460 1.416 1.393 
R-squared 0.355 0.625 0.677 0.325 0.307 0.394 0.030 0.442 0.456 
Number of observations 223 217 217 124 124 124 122 119 119 
Panel estimation with bank fixed effects. Dependant variable is the loan growth rate, ∆Rt = yearly change of the short-term interest rate; Size it-1 = log of total assets; Liqit-1= 
liquidity ratio; Cap it-1= capital to asset ratio, Risk it-1= return on assets (ROA) + equity capital to assets ratio (CAR) divided by standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA) 
and Lerner index it-1=  is determined as the proportion of the remainder between price of output and marginal cost to the price Standard errors are robust yet are not depicted. 
The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
54 
 
  
Table 5B: Main estimations, including Lerner index (2004-2013) 
 
Specification 
Poland Slovakia Slovenia 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
∆Rt  -0.0565 0.0869 0.0394 0.0507 -0.0010 0.0003 -0.0161 0.0174 0.0201 
∆Rt-1 0.131* -0.0383 0.0063 0.0513 0.0126 0.0321 -0.0391 -0.0389 -0.0390 
GGDPt 1.7830 -0.2970 -0.0062 0.3250 1.0060 0.6140 1.0750 0.1770 0.2180 
GGDPt-1 -0.2880 0.1720 -0.3940 0.3400 0.0705 -0.0779 3.429** 3.137** 3.095* 
CPIt 0.0269 -0.0663 -0.0344 -0.0243 0.0120 0.0330 -0.0233 -0.0135 -0.0153 
CPIt-1 -0.0725 0.0638 -0.0065 -0.0178 -0.0051 -0.0171 -0.0631** -0.0427* -0.0372 
Size it-1  -0.586* -0.606*  -0.465** -0.534**   -0.0118 -0.0238 
Size it-1×∆Rt   0.0061   0.0252     0.0034 
Liqit-1  0.4500 0.3780  0.1690 0.7010   0.5460 0.4830 
Liq it-1×∆Rt   -0.547***   0.319**     0.0457 
Cap it-1  -5.7080 -4.8780  -3.902* -3.6250   3.508* 3.464* 
Cap it-1×∆Rt   -0.0979   1.5560     0.311* 
Risk it-1  0.0035 -0.0020  0.0027 0.0038   -0.0075 -0.0068 
Risk it-1×∆Rt   -0.0010   0.0002     0.0007 
Lerner Index it-1 -0.4700 0.0895 0.1870 -0.5320 0.2030 0.1080 0.1270 -0.1150 -0.1390 
Lerner Index it-1*∆Rt -0.364* -0.3260 -0.3310 -0.1070 -0.0872 -0.2490 -0.1150 -0.1290 -0.1550 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1   -0.0069   -0.0011     -0.0060 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1   0.0900   0.384**     -0.154* 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   -0.3780   0.518*     0.2240 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1   -0.0004   0.0000     0.0002 
Lerner Index it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.0739 -0.0293 -0.0095 -0.1810 -0.0429 0.0088 -0.0779 -0.0983* -0.161** 
Intercept 0.217 0.296 0.451 0.203 -0.003 0.017 0.152* 0.122 0.113 
R-squared 0.068 0.156 0.216 0.271 0.534 0.577 0.683 0.720 0.719 
Number of observations 199 198 198 80 79 79 113 113 113 
Panel estimation with bank fixed effects. Dependant variable is the loan growth rate, ∆Rt = yearly change of the short-term interest rate; Size it-1 = log of total assets; Liqit-1= 
liquidity ratio; Cap it-1= capital to asset ratio, Risk it-1= return on assets (ROA) + equity capital to assets ratio (CAR) divided by standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA) 
and Lerner index it-1=  is determined as the proportion of the remainder between price of output and marginal cost to the price Standard errors are robust yet are not depicted. 
The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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2.5.3 The impact of the financial crisis 
In keeping with the deductions and inferences made in the available theoretical models 
about the BLC, the impact of bank size, liquidity, capital and risk on bank-sourced lending 
should conceivably bear positive coefficients; this means that large, highly liquid banks, 
well-capitalised and low risk banks should be less likely to change their credit portfolio, 
especially in the instance of a banking crisis and consequently to monetary policy stance 
changes.  
Yet, as our model tailored for the period of 2008-2011 implies, said coefficients are 
ultimately not significant; this conclusion serves as an additional refutation of the role of 
said indicators in allowing banks to maintain lending activity and growth during a 
financial crisis, which apparently does not include the positive interaction term of bank 
liquidity with interest rates in the case of Slovakia (see Table 6A-6C). The data shows 
that bank liquidity is a crucial differentiating factor in the reaction of banks to changes in 
the monetary policy in Slovakia most notably during the financial crisis. The monetary 
policy makers reacted to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) by slashing interest rates to 
nearly zero and keeping them there for a record duration of time with the purpose of 
enabling bank lending activity. Under these circumstances Keynes (1936) characterise 
monetary policy as similar to ‘pushing and string’ while also presenting the idea of a 
‘liquidity trap’. With the intention of increasing the rate of economic recovery, the central 
banks have introduced several unconventional monetary policy practices coined ‘non-
standard policy measures’, ‘quantitative easing’ and ‘credit easing’. When examining 
the aim of the ECB, Cour-Thimann and Winkler (2013) highlight that the central bank 
employs non-standard measures that act as a complement to the standard interest rate 
policy rather than as a replacement for it. Such measures have served to enhance credit 
flows and financing conditions because they are geared at assisting the effective diffusion 
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of interest rate policies throughout the euro area at a time when other policies and 
developments have proved ineffective in several areas of Europe’s financial sector. As 
stressed in Mullineux (2013), the central banks’ practice of offering an elastic supply of 
liquidity could therefore be similar to ‘pushing on a string’; yet, in order to sufficiently 
stimulate the economy, banks need to begin lending idle cash to investment firms utilising 
this capital. 
As reflected in the model specific for the crisis, the growth of bank lending in response 
to the monetary policy stance derived from money market rates in the short term is not 
significant yet again in most cases. Considering substantially reduced monetary policy 
rates within the crisis period, an inverse correlation between interest rates and bank 
lending growth would be predicted; yet, this assumption is unsupported by the estimated 
data. In contrast to the theoretical justification for the money channel, which endorses a 
concept of an indirect relationship between bank lending growth and monetary policy 
stance, in the model that evaluates the period of the crisis it is suggested that an 
unanticipated positive relation exists in Slovenia possibly a consequence of a ‘pushing on 
a string effect’. 
What this really highlights is that notwithstanding the labours of the national central banks 
to keep interest rates low and inject liquidity into their economic systems, bank lending 
has stayed subdued. This result can be correlated with that seen when examining the 
critical investigation of the Japanese economy in Werner (2012) which highlights that 
continuous interest rate reductions for a period spanning over a decade were unsuccessful 
at stimulating the economy and expanding the money supply. The estimations made here 
indicate that the prevalence of BLC was reduced throughout the credit crisis. The 
influence of the financial crisis is thought to have been more distinct for the credit supply 
than for the credit demand. Here it is suggested that the effectiveness of monetary policy 
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has been reduced during this period for a variety of reasons, such as bank aversion to 
increase lending activity and volume irrespective of the monetary policy stance.  
2.5.4 Extensions and robustness tests 
In addition this study also assesses unconventional monetary policy by introducing a 
further proxy corresponding the ratio between each central bank’s total assets and 
nominal GDP for the crisis sample.21 The previously addressed proxy suggests a similar 
effect as these measures seem to be ineffective in covering reduced lending activity by 
banks following the aftermath of financial turmoil. It is important to mention that the ratio 
has a predicted negative sign when included in the model specific for the crisis sample, 
which is in contrast to a recent study conducted in Fungáčová et al. (2014) and 
Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) in which the direct positive relation was 
determined for the euro area and more industrialised countries. 
The ultimate robustness check includes assessing the possible modifications to the BLC 
in EU-8 via pooling data, which is accomplished through amending the records to a 
unified currency, the euro. Stated in other terms, this study determines whether combined 
bank coefficients for EU-8 ‘club’ may vary with the primary inference derived from this 
study. The outcomes documented in Appendix C indicate for the most part, particularly 
during the financial crisis period, that the coefficients were not significantly different for 
EU-8 ‘club’ and the deduction resulting from this study. As a result the primary 
conclusions remain intact.     
 
                                                 
21 The data for constructing this proxy were taken from Bankscope and Eurostat which consists of the 
following central banks: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. 
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Table 6A: Regression results: Crisis effects (2008-11) 
 Baltic States  Czech Republic  
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
∆Rt-1 0.0431 0.0730* 0.0660* 0.0720** 0.0722* 0.007 0.111 0.090 0.076 0.108 0.067 0.105 
∆Rt-1*C -0.034 -0.0635* -0.0583* -0.0642* -0.0628* -0.001 -0.109 -0.088 -0.065 -0.108 -0.057 -0.102 
Central bank assets/GDP t-1 -0.850*** -0.687*** -0.699*** -0.681*** -0.801*** -0.917*** -0.184 -0.070 -0.122 -0.112 -0.121 -0.252 
GGDPt-1 0.434** 0.542** 0.652*** 0.592*** 0.553*** 0.327* 0.405 0.759** 0.784** 0.847** 0.669** 0.362 
CPIt-1 -0.0175* -0.005 -0.0069* -0.007 -0.007 -0.018** -0.015 -0.0296* -0.030 -0.030 -0.027 -0.011 
Size it-1 -0.443*     -0.66*** -0.164*     -0.098 
Size it-1*C 0.009     0.040 -0.025     -0.045 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 0.022     0.034 0.041     0.136*** 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1*C -0.021     -0.030 -0.029     -0.141** 
Liqit-1  0.235    0.807*  -0.217    -0.326 
Liqit-1*C  0.165    -0.004  0.500    0.372 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1  0.049    0.329*  -1.210*    -1.74*** 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1*C  -0.057    -0.386**  1.020    1.730*** 
Cap it-1   0.493   -2.930   0.278   2.950 
Cap it-1*C   1.615   1.766   0.253   -1.064 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   0.457   0.472   -0.821   3.368 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1*C   -0.221   -0.161   0.638   -3.256 
Risk it-1    0.007  -0.012    0.002  -0.010 
Risk it-1*C    0.012  0.008    -0.001  0.000 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1    -0.002  -0.0077*    0.002  -0.003 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1*C    0.002  0.0078*    -0.002  0.003 
Lerner Index it-1     0.548** 0.456*     -0.307 -0.275 
Lerner Index it-1*C     -0.207 -0.216     0.149 0.363* 
Lerner Index it-1*∆Rt-1     -0.194 -0.197     -0.004 -0.618 
Lerner Index it-1*∆Rt-1*C     0.212 0.174     0.058 0.682 
Intercept 0.280*** 0.192*** 0.191*** 0.200*** 0.212*** 0.399*** 0.183** 0.174** 0.179** 0.174** 0.168** 0.211** 
R-squared 0.419 0.170 0.220 0.201 0.244 0.624 0.258 0.229 0.217 0.128 0.181 0.283 
Number of observations 231 231 231 225 223 217 130 130 130 130 124 124 
Panel estimation with bank fixed effects. Dependant variable is the loan growth rate, ∆Rt = yearly change of the short-term interest rate; Size it-1 = log of total assets; Liqit-1= liquidity ratio; Cap it-
1= capital to asset ratio, Risk it-1= return on assets (ROA) + equity capital to assets ratio (CAR) divided by standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA) and Lerner index it-1=  is determined 
as the proportion of the remainder between price of output and marginal cost to the price Standard errors are robust yet are not depicted. C= dummy crisis. The symbols ***, **, and * indicates 
significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 6B: Regression results: Crisis effects (2008-11) 
 Hungary  Poland  
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
∆Rt-1 0.0003 -0.030 -0.015 -0.012 -0.018 0.011 0.071 0.176 0.120 0.127 0.203* 0.171 
∆Rt-1*C -0.104 -0.027 -0.036 -0.003 -0.018 -0.158 -0.096 -0.105 -0.075 -0.083 -0.124 -0.166 
Central bank assets/GDP t-1 -0.778* -0.056 -0.546 -0.387 -0.522*** 0.006 0.293 0.333 0.542 0.568 0.542 -0.099 
GGDPt-1 -1.441** -0.75* -0.280 -0.382 -0.390 -2.903* 0.007 -0.769 -0.451 -0.414 -0.743 -0.656 
CPIt-1 0.0511* 0.058* 0.026 0.031* 0.001 0.149* -0.088 -0.19*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.21*** -0.110 
Size it-1 -0.785**     -1.309* -0.394*     -0.583* 
Size it-1*C 0.077     0.040 0.026     -0.001 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.006     0.005 0.009     0.040 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1*C 0.021     0.040 -0.009     -0.059 
Liqit-1  3.199*    3.434**  1.353*    1.598** 
Liqit-1*C  0.145    -0.938  -1.448*    -1.82*** 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1  0.191    0.322  1.148**    1.045* 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1*C  -0.434    -0.482  -1.24***    -1.149** 
Cap it-1   0.660   -6.016   1.200   -4.451 
Cap it-1*C   1.845   -4.428   -0.741   1.793 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   0.057   0.897   -0.313   0.424 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1*C   -0.208   -2.411   0.258   -1.148 
Risk it-1    0.025  0.046    0.003  -0.006 
Risk it-1*C    0.008  0.022    -0.001  0.000 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1    0.000  -0.001    0.000  -0.001 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1*C    0.006  0.006    0.000  0.001 
Lerner Index it-1     -0.838 -0.320     -0.167 -0.047 
Lerner Index it-1*C     0.668 0.836     -0.421 -0.140 
Lerner Index it-1*∆Rt-1     0.056 0.292     -0.536 -1.021* 
Lerner Index it-1*∆Rt-1*C     0.260 0.143     0.605 1.204* 
Intercept 0.060 -0.177 0.073 0.051 0.171 0.023 0.451 0.831*** 0.729** 0.711** 0.859** 0.724* 
R-squared 0.197 0.308 0.003 0.043 0.028 0.501 0.112 0.175 0.025 0.023 0.044 0.273 
Number of observations 140 140 140 136 122 119 243 243 243 241 199 198 
Panel estimation with bank fixed effects. Dependant variable is the loan growth rate, ∆Rt = yearly change of the short-term interest rate; Size it-1 = log of total assets; Liqit-1= liquidity 
ratio; Cap it-1= capital to asset ratio, Risk it-1= return on assets (ROA) + equity capital to assets ratio (CAR) divided by standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA) and Lerner 
index it-1=  is determined as the proportion of the remainder between price of output and marginal cost to the price Standard errors are robust yet are not depicted. C= dummy crisis. 
The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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 Table 6C: Regression results: Crisis effects (2008-11) 
 Slovakia  Slovenia  
Specification  1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
∆Rt-1 0.0597** 0.0835*** 0.0597* 0.0615* 0.0707* 0.0824* -0.170* -0.142 -0.167* -0.184* -0.188* -0.095 
∆Rt-1*C -0.033 0.036 -0.005 -0.009 -0.032 -0.029 0.122 0.105 0.122* 0.139 0.148* 0.067 
Central bank assets/GDPt-1 -0.284** -0.369** -0.429* -0.378** -0.313* -0.385 0.316 0.284 0.317 0.383 0.371 0.120 
GGDPt-1 0.517 -1.235 -0.420 -0.375 0.047 -0.329 4.547*** 3.965*** 4.326*** 4.539*** 4.466*** 3.277** 
CPIt-1 -0.041 -0.054 -0.0316* -0.0390* -0.037 -0.038 -0.082*** -0.075** -0.079*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.0643* 
Size it-1 -0.376*     -0.358* 0.050     -0.062 
Size it-1*C -0.006     0.024 0.001     -0.008 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 0.002     -0.018 -0.013     0.006 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1*C -0.023     0.046 0.000     -0.013 
Liqit-1  0.899*    0.568  0.391    0.587 
Liqit-1*C  0.042    -0.151  0.219    -0.266 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1  -0.083    -0.155  0.010    -0.024 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1*C  0.543*    0.268  -0.031    -0.196 
Cap it-1   -3.187**   -2.551   1.879   4.204* 
Cap it-1*C   0.362   -0.645   -0.192   -0.911 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   0.403   -0.030   -0.129   0.654 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1*C   0.380   1.089   0.015   -0.600 
Risk it-1    -0.006  0.002    0.004  -0.011 
Risk it-1*C    0.000  0.000    -0.002  -0.002 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1    0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1*C    -0.001  -0.001    0.001  0.001 
Lerner Index it-1     -0.538 -0.071     0.088 -0.157 
Lerner Index it-1*C     -0.229 -0.174     0.005 0.144 
Lerner Index it-1*∆Rt-1     0.006 0.105     -0.185 -0.139 
Lerner Index it-1*∆Rt-1*C         -0.294 -0.273         0.124 0.005 
Intercept 0.252* 0.480* 0.311* 0.333*** 0.283** 0.326* 0.080* 0.095* 0.083* 0.077* 0.079* 0.116** 
R-squared 0.264 0.230 0.286 0.143 0.249 0.411 0.690 0.699 0.699 0.692 0.677 0.703 
Number of observations 80 80 80 79 80 79 119 119 119 119 113 113 
Panel estimation with bank fixed effects. Dependant variable is the loan growth rate, ∆Rt = yearly change of the short-term interest rate; Size it-1 = log of total assets; Liqit-1= liquidity 
ratio; Cap it-1= capital to asset ratio, Risk it-1= return on assets (ROA) + equity capital to assets ratio (CAR) divided by standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA) and Lerner index 
it-1=  is determined as the proportion of the remainder between price of output and marginal cost to the price Standard errors are robust yet are not depicted. C= dummy crisis. The symbols 
***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we explore the role of the banks with respect to the MTM, specifically by 
examining the 8 accession countries which became members of the EU in accordance 
with the pact stated in the Treaty of Accession from 2004 to 2013. This approach is in 
contrast to prior research by Matousek and Sarantis (2009) which used a reference panel 
of similar countries, covering the decade preceding the accession (1994-2003). The data 
indicates that the BLC has experienced an evolved development over the period in EU-8, 
considering the time frame in this research.  
The existence of the BLC is demonstrated via capitalisation which appears to be a 
significant, contributing bank-specific characteristic when evaluating the banks’ response 
to monetary policy changes in the Czech Republic, Baltic States, Poland, and Slovakia. 
Furthermore, the coefficient on bank size is determined to be statistically insignificant for 
EU-8. Therefore, the matter of informational asymmetry is not vital in the BLC for EU-
8. Additionally, the results reveal that bank risk is a crucial differentiating factor in the 
reaction of banks to changes in the monetary policy stance within the EU-8 countries. It 
is determined that the remaining bank-specific traits appear to be irrelevant considerations 
when evaluating the response of banks to changes in monetary policy for the total duration 
of this study.  
The model used in this study is constructed to consider any distinct movement on banks’ 
lending behaviour for the period of financial turmoil. Revealing the fact that bank 
characteristics can change the strength of the BLC. From 2008 to 2011, the BLC of 
monetary policy is impaired, which serving as an additional refutation of the role of said 
indicators in allowing banks to maintain lending activity and growth during a financial 
crisis.  
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This study proposes that the effectiveness of monetary policy has been reduced 
throughout the credit crisis for different reasons, such as bank aversion to increase lending 
activity and volume irrespective of the monetary policy stance.  
The inference drawn from a negative coefficient for the Lerner index is that monetary 
policy shows greater efficiency in a background of imperfect markets. In line with the 
analysis of 55 developing countries carried out by Amidu and Wolfe (2013), the results 
of this study corroborate the notion of a greater correlation between market imperfection 
and the effectiveness of the monetary policy; however, this outcome contradicts the 
conclusions drawn following research conducted by Leory (2014) and Fungáčová et al. 
(2014) concerning the Eurozone countries. 
Moreover, this study supports the introduction of regulatory capital requirements and 
suggests that this would not cause reduced lending. Bank capital and liquidity have 
plausible positive and significant effects on bank loan growth, during the course of the 
investigation 2004-2013. Accordingly, it is advised that banks fulfil the standards set by 
these regulations and requirements. In addition, the shadow banking system must also be 
monitored as a result of more potentially dangerous components native to this system, 
reinforcing the idea of having regulation procedures that are a good fit with its 
complementary financial institution.  
This study recommends widespread data availability on the entire banking system, 
including more detail. Measurement by tier-1 capital ratio would be particularly useful as 
it would permit subsequent research to perform a detailed evaluation of the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism since it considers additional parameters. 
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Table A1: Description of variables used in the regressions 
Variable Description Calculation Sources 
∆L Gross Loan The difference of the natural logarithm of loans Bankscope 
S Size Log of total assets Bankscope 
CAP Capital to asset ratio Total equity/ Total assets Bankscope 
LIQ Liquidity ratio Cash, trading securities and interbank lending of maturities less 
than three months / Total assets 
Bankscope 
Risk Z-score (risk) Return on assets (ROA) + equity capital to assets ratio (CAR)/ 
standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA). 
Bankscope 
∆R Short-term interest rates Annual change in the money market rates on deposit with 3 months 
maturity  
Eurostat 
TC Total costs Total of personnel expenses, other non-interest expenses and 
interest paid 
Bankscope 
Y Total assets Total assets Bankscope 
W1 Price of labour Personnel expenses to total assets Bankscope 
W2 Price of P-capital  Non-interest expenses to fixed assets Bankscope 
W3 Price of B-funds Ratio of interest expenses to deposits and short-term funding Bankscope 
∆ln GGDP GDP growth  Growth rate of nominal GDP Eurostat 
∆CPI CPI Growth rate of harmonised indices of consumer prices Eurostat 
NSPM Non-standard policy 
measures 
Central bank’s total assets/ nominal GDP Bankscope 
Eurostat 
Tier-1 Tier1-capital Core equity capital/ risk-weighted assets Bankscope 
NPLs NPLs ratio Non-performing loans / gross loan Bankscope 
LLPs LLPs ratio Loan loss provision / gross loan Bankscope 
REG Regulation The extent to which banks are allowed to engage in securities, 
insurance and real estate activities 
Barth et al. 
(2004) 
64 
 Table A2: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
Baltic States           
Δln (Loans) 254 0.154 0.389 -1.047 3.183 
Size 254 13.556 1.546 8.958 17.067 
Capitalisation 254 0.099 0.074 -0.705 0.376 
Liquidity  254 0.31 0.205 0.006 0.997 
Risk factor  254 8.265 9.04 -7.871 66.742 
Lerner index 254 -0.026 0.211 -0.896 0.524 
ΔR 254 -0.345 3.445 -11.1 5.09 
GDP growth 254 0.074 0.13 -0.261 0.272 
CPI 254 3.92 3.138 -1.2 15.3 
Czech Republic           
Δln (Loans) 141 0.136 0.203 -0.253 1.077 
Size 141 18.369 1.421 13.327 20.691 
Capitalisation 141 0.101 0.104 0.005 0.987 
Liquidity  141 0.239 0.171 0 0.838 
Risk factor  141 30.559 19.341 0.172 78.748 
Lerner index 141 0.103 0.301 -1.824 0.441 
ΔR 141 -0.211 0.81 -1.85 0.94 
GDP growth 141 0.055 0.077 -0.082 0.154 
CPI 141 2.44 1.53 0.6 6.3 
Hungary           
Δln (Loans) 155 0.097 0.486 -3.872 2.963 
Size 155 19.6 1.924 15.809 23.063 
Capitalisation 155 0.122 0.083 0.002 0.481 
Liquidity  155 0.209 0.192 0.003 0.978 
Risk factor  155 16.774 25.23 -1.649 173.598 
Lerner index 155 0.063 0.202 -0.579 0.658 
ΔR 155 -0.817 2.243 -4.83 1.48 
GDP growth 155 0.021 0.067 -0.138 0.106 
CPI 155 4.82 1.714 1.7 7.9 
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Table A2: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
Poland           
Δln (Loans) 264 0.146 0.361 -1.75 3.763 
Size 264 15.855 1.696 10.688 19.11 
Capitalisation 264 0.12 0.079 0.033 0.918 
Liquidity  264 0.17 0.161 0 0.873 
Risk factor  264 28.149 26.66 -16.268 156.768 
Lerner index 264 0 0.395 -1.75 0.721 
ΔR 264 -0.354 1.152 -1.94 1.62 
GDP growth 264 0.073 0.095 -0.145 0.178 
CPI 264 2.9 1.124 0.8 4.2 
Slovakia           
Δln (Loans) 87 0.112 0.16 -0.371 0.83 
Size 87 14.475 1.353 12.051 16.346 
Capitalisation 87 0.091 0.073 -0.002 0.699 
Liquidity  87 0.18 0.131 0.02 0.63 
Risk factor  87 26.791 29.671 -1.212 144.598 
Lerner index 87 0.077 0.187 -0.529 0.406 
ΔR 87 -0.462 1.131 -2.63 1.44 
GDP growth 87 0.084 0.075 -0.031 0.212 
CPI 87 3.13 1.942 0.7 7.5 
Slovenia           
Δln (Loans) 128 0.087 0.162 -0.359 0.597 
Size 128 14.313 0.972 11.377 16.791 
Capitalisation 128 0.083 0.038 0.011 0.244 
Liquidity 128 0.12 0.088 0.01 0.429 
Risk factor 128 9.828 12.346 -3.078 56.516 
Lerner index 128 0.217 0.155 -0.882 0.654 
ΔR 128 -0.493 1.156 -3.41 0.7 
GDP growth 128 0.029 0.05 -0.048 0.108 
CPI 128 2.78 1.215 0.9 5.5 
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22  The hypothetical foundation of the assertion stated in this segment is sourced from empirically supported research (Gambacorta, 2005; Matousek & Sarantis, 2009; Altunbas, 
et al., 2010; Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011 and Akinci et al., 2013; among others). 
Appendix B 
Table B1: A synopsis of the predicted signs of coefficients 
Variable Expected 
sing 
Hypothetical Outlook 22 
Sizeit-1 +/- Large banks may be less vulnerable to dramatic changes in monetary policy (+). Smaller banks could have more variable lending activity if newly founded, 
relative to the larger banks. Additionally, a healthy lending relationship between small banks and firms could be a possibility (-) 
Sizeit-1*C +/- Too big to fail (+) / Too big to be bailed out (-) 
CAPit-1 + Banks that are well-capitalised banks tend to increase the loan supply  
CAPit-1*C + Especially during the period of the financial crisis 
LIQit-1 + Banks with higher liquidity are expected to increase their loan supply 
LIQit-1*C + Especially during the period of the financial crisis 
Riskit-1 +/- Bank loan portfolios that are low risk are not as vulnerable if mandated by regulation from capital markets (+) 
Banks with higher risk could increase their lending activity (-) 
Riskit-1*C + During the period of the financial crisis, banks with less risk are not particularly disposed to decrease their lending activity relative to the opposite side of the 
spectrum 
∆𝑅t - Tight monetary policy results in decreased lending activity (-) 
∆𝑅t-1*C +/- During the period of the financial crisis a “pushing on a string effect” could occur (+); this effect could be augmented (-) 
GGDPt + Favourable economic conditions are conducive to expanded loan supply by banks 
CPIt +/- Inflation levels could have a favourable impact on the growth of nominal loans (+). Inflation rates could have the opposite effect on these loans (-) 
The bank lending channel (BLC) postulation: 
The 2-way and 3-way interaction between bank characteristics and the monetary policy measurement 
Sizeit-1∗ ∆Rt 
Sizeit-1∗ ∆𝑅t-1*C 
+ 
+ 
Larger banks are predicted to resist the changes in monetary policy 
Especially during the period of the financial crisis 
CAPit-1∗ ∆Rt 
CAPit-1∗ ∆𝑅t-1*C 
+ 
+ 
Well-capitalised banks are predicted to resist the changes in monetary policy 
Especially during the period of the financial crisis 
LIQit-1∗ ∆Rt 
LIQit-1∗ ∆𝑅t-1*C 
+ 
+ 
Highly liquid banks are predicted to resist the changes in monetary policy 
Especially during the period of the financial crisis 
Riskit-1∗ ∆Rt 
Riskit-1∗ ∆𝑅t-1*C 
+ 
+ 
Low risk banks are less sensitive to monetary policy changes 
Especially during the period of the financial crisis 
Sizeit-1* CAPit-1∗ ∆Rt 
Sizeit-1* CAPit-1∗ ∆𝑅t-1*C 
+ 
+ 
Large banks that are well-capitalised are predicted to resist the changes in monetary policy 
Especially during the period of the financial crisis 
Sizeit-1* LIQit-1∗ ∆Rt + Large banks with high liquidity are predicted to resist the changes in monetary policy 
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Sizeit-1*LIQit-1∗ ∆𝑅t-1*C + Especially during the period of the financial crisis        
Sizeit-1* Riskit-1∗ ∆Rt 
Sizeit-1*Riskit-1∗ ∆𝑅t-1*C 
+ 
+ 
Large banks with low risk are less sensitive to monetary policy changes 
Especially during the period of the financial crisis 
CAPit-1* LIQit-1∗ ∆Rt 
CAPit-1* LIQit-1∗ ∆𝑅t-1*C 
+ 
+ 
Banks with high liquidity that are well-capitalised  are predicted to resist the changes in monetary policy 
Especially during the period of the financial crisis 
CAPit-1* RISKit-1∗ ∆Rt 
CAPit-1* RISKit-1∗ ∆𝑅t-1*C 
+ 
+ 
Well capitalised and low risk banks are less sensitive to monetary policy changes 
Especially during the period of the financial crisis 
LIQit-1* RISKit-1∗ ∆Rt 
LIQit-1* RISKit-1∗ ∆𝑅t-1*C 
+ 
+ 
Liquid and low risk banks are less sensitive to monetary policy changes 
Especially during the period of the financial crisis 
Notes: The sample for this study spans from 2004 to 2013. The signs + (-), ++ (--), +++ (---) indicate significance of a statistic at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, 
correspondingly. C denotes the period of financial crisis. 
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Table B2: Correlation matrix 
 ∆ ln(𝐿) ∆R Size Liquidity Capital Tier 1 Risk Lerner REG 
∆ ln(𝐿) 1.0000         
∆R 0.0349 
0.2786 
1.0000        
Size -0.1678 
0.0000 
0.0074 
0.8005 
1.0000       
Liquidity 0.2229 
0.0000 
-0.0256 
0.3831 
-0.3253 
0.0000 
1.0000      
Capital 0.1597 
0.0000 
-0.0230 
0.4333 
-0.2716 
0.0000 
0.1021 
0.0003 
1.0000     
Tier 1 0.1481 
0.0030 
-0.0275 
0.5713 
-0.2514 
0.0000 
0.1950 
0.0000 
0.8879 
0.0000 
1.0000    
Risk 0.0167 
0.5933 
0.0164 
0.5819 
-0.1566 
0.0000 
0.0230 
0.4236 
0.1712 
0.0000 
0.2044 
0.0000 
1.0000   
Lerner -0.0295 
0.3924 
0.0478 
0.1445 
0.2076 
0.0000 
-0.1688 
0.0000 
0.2450 
0.0000 
0.1752 
0.0003 
-0.0017 
0.9587 
1.0000  
REG -0.0268 
0.3869 
-0.0274 
0.2581 
0.1099 
0.0001 
-0.0101 
0.7219 
-0.1712 
0.0000 
-0.0835 
0.0749 
-0.2605 
0.0000 
0.0676 
0.0327 
1.0000 
The sample for this study spans from 2004-2013. P-values in italics. 
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Appendix C  
Table C1: Estimates of Model.1 using bank data (robustness check) 
 
Specification 
Size Liq Cap Risk Size Liq Size Cap Size Risk Liq Cap Liq Risk Cap Risk Size Liq Cap Risk Foreign 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
∆Rt  0.0305*** 0.0234*** 0.0256** 0.0211** 0.0276*** 0.0290*** 0.0198** 0.0252** 0.0223** 0.0215** 0.0224*** 0.0236** 
∆Rt-1 0.0283*** 0.0149** 0.0188** 0.0222** 0.0273*** 0.0284*** 0.0320*** 0.0152** 0.0179** 0.0187** 0.0297*** 0.0314** 
GGDPt 0.0641*** 0.0517** 0.0550** 0.0546** 0.0595*** 0.0626*** 0.0631*** 0.0500** 0.0482** 0.0545** 0.0559*** 0.0393** 
GGDPt-1 0.0600*** 0.0125 0.033*** 0.0340*** 0.0383** 0.0591*** 0.0611*** 0.0115 0.0109 0.0331*** 0.0381** 0.0487*** 
CPIt -0.0049 0.0120* 0.0116* 0.0120* -0.0043 -0.0043 -0.0046 0.0115* 0.0119* 0.0115* -0.0033 -0.00159 
CPIt-1 -0.025*** -0.0116 -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.0123* -0.0133* -0.018*** -0.0238*** -0.0259** 
Size it-1 -0.201***    -0.195*** -0.197*** -0.207***    -0.196*** -0.234*** 
Size it-1×∆Rt 0.0001    -0.0003 -0.0037 -0.0029    -0.0057 -0.0147 
Liqit-1  1.061**   0.991**   1.060** 1.124***  1.047** 0.863* 
Liq it-1×∆Rt  -0.0251      -0.0093 -0.0540  -0.0267 -0.0976 
Cap it-1   0.9160   0.4280  0.8040  0.8700 -0.2230 0.391 
Cap it-1×∆Rt   -0.1640   -0.2190  -0.1060  -0.1120 -0.2290 -0.227 
Risk it-1    0.0068   0.0049  0.00883* 0.0022 0.00705* 0.0059 
Risk it-1×∆Rt    -0.0003   -0.0009**  -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004* -0.0006* 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.0010    -0.0004 0.0009 -0.0028    0.0029 0.0122* 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1  0.0282      0.0265 0.0092  0.0211 0.100* 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   0.0584   0.0237  0.0137  0.0926 0.0104 0.458 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1    0.0002   0.0001  0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 
Size it-1×Liq it-1×∆Rt     -0.0154        
Size it-1× Liq it-1×∆Rt-1     0.00176        
Size it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt      -0.00764       
Size it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1      -0.0201       
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt       -0.0002*      
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1       -0.0002      
Liq it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt        -0.650     
Liq it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1        -0.132     
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt         -0.00281    
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1         -0.00130    
Cap it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt          0.00826   
Cap it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1          0.00574   
Country control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept -0.188 -0.179 0.358 0.195 -0.589 -0.0791 -0.153 -0.0658 -0.323 0.376 -0.563 -0.481 
R-squared 0.142 0.110 0.067 0.055 0.194 0.150 0.151 0.127 0.122 0.065 0.210 0.230 
Number of observations 964 964 964 945 964 964 945 964 945 945 945 595 
Panel estimation with bank fixed effects. Dependant variable is the loan growth rate, ΔRt = yearly change of the short-term interest rate; Size it-1 = log of total assets; Liqit-1= liquidity ratio; Cap it-1= 
capital to asset ratio and Risk it-1= return on assets (ROA) + equity capital to assets ratio (CAR) divided by standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA). Standard errors are robust yet are not depicted. 
Country control denotes regulation with respect to enforcing contract law and resolving insolvency. The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table C2: Main estimations, including Lerner index 
 
Specification 
Main results 
1 2 3 
∆Rt  0.0289*** 0.0318*** 0.0166* 
∆Rt-1 0.0178** 0.0244*** 0.0234** 
GGDPt 0.0624** 0.0617** 0.0621*** 
GGDPt-1 0.0400** 0.0508** 0.0542** 
CPIt 0.0118** -0.0009 -0.0005 
CPIt-1 -0.0187*** -0.0235** -0.0283*** 
Size it-1   -0.172* -0.184* 
Size it-1×∆Rt     -0.0073 
Liqit-1   0.621** 0.611** 
Liq it-1×∆Rt     -0.0241 
Cap it-1   0.0623 -0.2560 
Cap it-1×∆Rt     -0.1480 
Risk it-1   0.0075 0.0073 
Risk it-1×∆Rt     -0.0010* 
Lerner Index it-1 -0.0104 -0.0109 -0.0026 
Lerner Index it-1*∆Rt -0.1150 -0.1010 -0.0997 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1     0.0031 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1     0.0323 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1     -0.0447 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1     -0.0002 
Lerner Index it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0016 -0.0038 -0.0101 
Country control Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept -0.190 -0.838 -0.680 
R-squared 0.088 0.199 0.206 
Number of observations 663 663 663 
Panel estimation with bank fixed effects. Dependant variable is the loan growth rate, ∆Rt = yearly change of the 
short-term interest rate; Size it-1 = log of total assets; Liqit-1= liquidity ratio; Cap it-1= capital to asset ratio, Risk 
it-1= return on assets (ROA) + equity capital to assets ratio (CAR) divided by standard deviation of return on 
assets (SDROA) and Lerner index it-1=  is determined as the proportion of the remainder between price of output 
and marginal cost to the price. Country control denotes regulation with respect to enforcing contract law and 
resolving insolvency. Standard errors are robust yet are not depicted. The symbols ***, **, and * indicates 
significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table C3: Regression results: Crisis effects  
 Crisis results 
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 
∆Rt-1 0.0283 0.0056 -0.0051 -0.0067 -0.0079 0.0507* 
∆Rt-1*C -0.0321* -0.0055 0.0059 0.0137 0.0059 -0.0610* 
Central bank assets/GDP t-1 -1.138*** -0.519*** -0.591*** -0.553*** -0.640*** -1.066*** 
GGDPt-1 -0.0426** -0.0362* -0.0291* -0.0207 -0.0296 -0.0327** 
CPIt-1 -0.0094* 0.0039 0.0006 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0038 
Size it-1 -0.298***     -0.263*** 
Size it-1*C 0.0126     0.0042 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.0025     0.0000 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1*C 0.0000     -0.0016 
Liqit-1  1.007**    0.496* 
Liqit-1*C  -0.0645    -0.4290 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1  -0.0144    -0.0304 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1*C  -0.0059    0.0088 
Cap it-1   0.6400   -0.7630 
Cap it-1*C   0.7340   -0.1570 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   0.0248   0.4400 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1*C   0.1420   -0.5110 
Risk it-1    0.0054  0.0042 
Risk it-1*C    0.0017  0.0009 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1    -0.0005  0.0009 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1*C    0.0010  -0.0012 
Lerner Index it-1     -0.0169 -0.0282 
Lerner Index it-1*C     0.0341 0.0504 
Lerner Index it-1*∆Rt-1     -0.0244 -0.1080 
Lerner Index it-1*∆Rt-1*C     0.0386 0.1150 
Country control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept -0.959* -0.2360 0.0394 -0.1600 -0.1510 0.306*** 
R-squared 0.236 0.092 0.055 0.048 0.054 0.302 
Number of observations 964 964 964 945 777 763 
Panel estimation with bank fixed effects. Dependant variable is the loan growth rate, ∆Rt = yearly change of the short-term interest rate; Size it-1 = log of total assets; Liqit-
1= liquidity ratio; Cap it-1= capital to asset ratio, Risk it-1= return on assets (ROA) + equity capital to assets ratio (CAR) divided by standard deviation of return on assets 
(SDROA) and Lerner index it-1=  is determined as the proportion of the remainder between price of output and marginal cost to the price. Country control denotes regulation 
with respect to enforcing contract law and resolving insolvency. Standard errors are robust yet are not depicted. C= dummy crisis. The symbols ***, **, and * indicates 
significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Chapter 3: The impact of a low interest rate environment: Empirical 
evidence from the euro area Bank Lending Survey 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The euro was introduced to international financial markets in 1999 and was a crucial 
course of action in European integration, merging the biggest trade bloc at the time and 
establishing a powerful world currency. The euro is the single currency in 19 of the 
European Union's Member States which combine to form the Eurozone. The European 
Central Bank (ECB) functions in part to steer the monetary policy in the Eurozone, a 
world economy trumped only by the United States (U.S.).   
The 2008–2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has had a detrimental impact on bank 
lending in the main industrialised nations, together with the euro area with significant 
levels of heterogeneity within the different nations (Ciccarelli et al., 2013; De Santis and 
Surico, 2013). Additionally, inside this region, capital to the corporate segment is 
primarily supplied by banks, which is equal to approximately 80% as proposed by Allen 
et al. (2004).  As a result, this has had negative repercussions for banks’ health, with 
respect to cost of funds and balance sheet; therefore, their capacity to approve loans or 
credit lines has been diminished.  
Empirical studies implicate the origin of the financial crisis as stemming from an 
immoderate relaxation of lending standards as a result of excessively low levels of short-
term policies accepted in the central banks (Taylor, 2009; Allen and Carletti, 2010; 
Maddaloni and Peydro, 2011; Forbes, 2015; among others).  
Moreover, in light of the GFC of recent times and the ensuing protracted periods of record 
low real interest rates prevalent in the more established economic nations, the debate 
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regarding the tendency of economic entities to assume additional risk during periods of 
low interest rates has been resurrected (Diamond and Rajan, 2006; Adrian and Shin, 2010; 
Borio and Zhu, 2012; Jimenez et al., 2014; Ioannidou et al., 2015; among others). 
Accordingly, this question has fuelled speculation regarding the effects of the risk-taking 
channel, a further mechanism in monetary policy transmission, on the credit supply.  
Furthermore, with the purpose of assisting liquidity levels within the euro area banks, the 
ECB carried out two Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) in December 2011 
and February 2012 where a total sum of €1 trillion cheap loans was injected into the euro 
area banking system. The current available literature regarding these subjects is 
inconclusive, meriting further investigation. 
The aim of this chapter is to build on the empirical works by Maddaloni and Peydro 
(2011/2013) through empirically developing the evaluation of the euro area Bank 
Lending Survey (BLS) and highlighting the 9 euro area countries that participated since 
the initiation of the survey. Having identified a gap in the existing literature, this chapter 
attempts to add to the current research by further considering the post-financial crisis time 
frame. Additional new queries corresponding to consumer credit in parallel with those 
related to enterprises and households are therefore addressed. In this case the Eurozone 
embodies a novel institutional environment with a collective monetary policy.  
The contributions of this chapter to the existing literature are fourfold: (1) the period 
following the financial crisis experienced an additional decline in short term interest rates, 
so much so that the value remained negative throughout this period.23 Accordingly, the 
influence of monetary policy rates on lending standards for this time frame is analysed 
with the purpose of deciding if maintaining policy rates at a previously unsurpassed low 
value has actually resulted in additional relaxation of bank’s credit standards; (2) the time 
                                                 
23 Figure 4 documents the trend of short term interest rates in the EU-9 countries. 
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frames pre-, mid- and post-crisis are independently evaluated, given that the ECB does 
not have a policy of publicly reporting the survey data for Austria, Ireland and Finland in 
net percentage terms. The prior results obtained by Maddaloni and Peydro (2011/2013) 
cannot be the sole basis of reference, given that their conclusions are sourced from the 
U.S. opinion survey and 12 Eurozone nations that contributed from the beginning of the 
survey. Consequently, the nations chosen for empirical analysis are as follows: Belgium, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, 
hereafter EU-9; (3) the selected countries are grouped according to the effects as well as 
the severity of the financial crisis into two panels of A and B. Panel A consists of Greece, 
Spain, Italy and Portugal, while Panel B contains Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands. The purpose of this task is to evaluate the impact of 
monetary policy rates on banks’ margins concerning riskier loans particularly for the pre- 
and post-financial crisis periods; (4) the efficiency of the ECB 3 year LTROs that were 
carried out in December 2011 and February 2012 are evaluated in great depth in order to 
determine whether banks’ credit standards have been relaxed and ascertain the degree to 
which demand for loans has risen considering that a total sum of €1 trillion cheap loans 
was injected into the European Union (EU) banking system under these operations. 
Over the period of the evaluation, the following outcomes are recorded: the results 
indicate that low-short term interest rates prior to the crisis caused a loosening of credit 
standards concerning enterprises, household and consumer loans. In spite of the scope of 
expansionary monetary policy primarily documented in the post-crisis period, we find 
that negative Taylor-rule residuals only led to softening of total lending standards for 
enterprises loans while the demand for loans remained somewhat consistent.  
The data shows that higher rates of GDP growth are linked with the softening of total 
lending standards, particularly in the pre-crisis sample, corroborating the argument made 
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in Maddaloni and Peydro (2011) which states that banks’ credit standards are ‘pro-
cyclical’. Moreover, 10-year government bond rates are largely not quantified as 
statistically significant, stressing the fact that lending standards are not impacted by long-
term national interest rates.   
It can be determined that prior to the beginning of the crisis, banks unexpectedly relaxed 
margins for loans to borrowers perceived as riskier, in an environment of low monetary 
rates; this conclusion supports the prior conclusion made by Jimenez et al. (2014) and 
Ioannidou et al. (2015). Yet, in stressed nations the data suggests that excessive risk-
taking in bank lending behaviour happened, mainly during periods of low monetary 
policy rates both pre- and post-crisis. 
The implementation of the 3 years LTRO by the ECB negatively impacted the 
development of banks’ credit tightening, which is encouraging and vital in order to 
mitigate the probable, severe consequences of the latest financial crisis. Regardless, the 
advantages of this scheme have yet to be experienced within the EU-9 real economy with 
a simultaneous increase in net demand. This deduction is in keeping with Popov and Van 
Horen (2015), a study which indicates that the reduced rate of lending persisted after the 
ECB’s LTRO in December 2011 and these measures were apparently unsuccessful in 
preventing the total reduction in bank lending in the euro area. 
The rest of this chapter is structured in the following layout. Section 3.2 presents a review 
of the empirical literature. Section 3.3 details an in-depth outline of the data and 
methodological framework. Section 3.4 discusses the empirical results, while section 3.5 
provides the conclusions. 
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3.2 Literature review 
In order to fully grasp the concepts discussed in this study, it would be prudent to briefly 
review the fundamentals of the terms intrinsic to the subject. First, this section offers a 
crucial analysis of the empirical studies which utilised the lending survey data of the euro 
area in conjunction with data from the US. Subsequently, we examine the topical 
discussion during the time frame of low interest rates and their effects on banks’ lending 
behaviour. In addition, the recent measures adopted by the ECB in the wake of the 
financial crisis are examined here, noting the cautious lending behaviour by banks to the 
public and the private sector. Lastly, research questions with their corresponding 
supporting rationales are presented. 
3.2.1 What do lending surveys actually reveal about the impact of monetary 
policy? 
Ever since January 2003 after the BLS specific to the euro area was initiated, researchers 
have been increasingly curious to analyse its data. Yet, given the survey’s brief nature, 
such an investigation was delayed and is only now being explored.  
De Bondt et al. (2010) demonstrate that data in the BLS allows the estimation of realised 
and expected credit standards in the euro area. The study suggests that, in addition to loan 
demand and the official interest rate, bank loan supply factors, the balance sheet position 
of borrowers and risk perception in the economy should also be included when 
determining important factors for bank credit and real GDP growth. Similarly, Hempell 
and Kok (2010) utilise an identical approach and information with the purpose of 
conducting an investigation that concentrates on the crisis phase while, analysing the 
comparative significance attributed to different elements responsible for supply 
limitations.   
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An examination of the available literature reveals that just a handful of studies have 
benefited from the bank-level BLS information. The Blaes (2011) study investigates the 
potential function of limitations applying to banks by characterising the distinct decrease 
in bank lending to German non-financial corporations (NFCs) throughout the course of 
the credit crisis. The study reports that the stifling influence of limitations applied to banks 
was harshest from quarter three of 2009 to quarter one of 2010. Correspondingly, a study 
by Del Giovane et al. (2011) merges micro data regarding the cost of lending together 
with data concerning loan regulations taken from banks in Italy partaking in the survey. 
The study concludes that supply elements, for example balance sheet positions and 
perceived credit risk, are important; these elements ostensibly exerted subtle influences 
on the decline of bank loans throughout Italy during the crisis period from 2007 to 2009. 
Concentrating on the euro area nations, Maddaloni and Peydro (2013) evaluate the 
influence of short-term interest rates and macroprudential policy on lending standards 
prior to the financial crisis, and regarding the provision of central bank liquidity 
throughout the crisis utilising the BLS data from 2002Q4-2010Q4, the outcome implies 
that monetary policy rates and central bank provision of long-term liquidity function in a 
supplementary capacity to obviate a potential credit crisis for firms 
When examining the US, Berger and Udell (2004) utilise individual bank-level data of 
US banks’ lending standards during the period 1980–2000. The research offers supporting 
data by demonstrating that the reduced capacity of the loan officer may be employed as 
a reason for the detected pro-cyclicality specific to bank loans. Furthermore, Lown and 
Morgan (2006) employ a VAR examination through utilising macro-data gathered by the 
Federal Reserve’s Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SOSLP) and demonstrate that variation 
in the credit supply standards assist in forecasting progress in lending and economic 
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activity.24 The study demonstrates that each recession period has preceded a period of 
modest constriction of credit standards.  
A seminal paper by Maddaloni and Peydro (2011) utilising a novel collection of data from 
the euro area and the U.S. bank lending standards suggests that low (monetary policy) 
short-term interest rates relax standards for both household and corporate loans. This 
relaxation—particularly for mortgages—is augmented through securitisation action, 
supervision for bank capital and low monetary policy rates for a protracted time frame. 
On the other hand low long-term interest rates fail to relax lending standards. Ultimately, 
nations with more relaxed lending standards prior to the crisis corresponding to negative 
Taylor rule residuals subsequently produced a poorer economic display. Such conclusions 
aid in elucidating the source of the crisis, while also offering significant implications to 
policy.  
Moreover, Bassett et al. (2014) utilise research to take advantage of the bank level 
reaction to the SOSLP; the results show that modified lending standards, adapted for the 
macroeconomic and bank-related elements, influence loan demand. Constrictive shocks 
affecting the credit supply result in a significant decrease in output and the capacity of 
businesses and households to borrow funds from banks, in addition to broadening credit 
spreads and an easing of monetary policy. 
3.2.2 Low interest rates monetary framework and bank lending behaviour 
The debate of whether low interest rates could involve additional risk-taking through bank 
lending behaviour has developed into a primary point of contention in contemporary 
economic literature and among practitioners. Yet, the contemporary available literature 
regarding this subject is indecisive, warranting further investigation. 
                                                 
24 In order to examine empirical investigations which utilise SOSLP, refer to Lown et al. (2000b), Lown 
and Morgan (2002), Cunningham (2006), Basistha and Kurov (2008), Hirtle (2009), Ivashina and 
Scharfstein (2010), and Becker and Ivashina (2014), among others. 
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Indeed the justification for a risk-taking channel in the presence of low interest rates could 
be that these conditions motivate asset managers to assume additional risk for three types 
of reasons: behavioural, contractual or institutional (Rajan, 2006).25 The aforementioned 
explanation is known as the ‘search for yield’ and leads to an unusually high rise in 
demand for riskier assets with the potential for higher returns from banks.  
The risk-taking channel in the transmission of monetary policy is well-defined by Borio 
and Zhu (2012) which characterise the channel as the effect of variations in policy rates 
with respect to either risk-tolerance or perception of risk; specifically, these policy 
changes affect the magnitude of risk present in portfolios, the valuation of assets and the 
extension of funding both in price and non-price components.26 In contrast, elevated 
interest rates diminish banks’ net worth resulting in “gambling for resurrection” as a 
solution (Kane, 1989). One method of reinforcing this influence is practicing extensive 
utilisation of Value-at-Risk approaches for economic and regulatory capital objectives 
(Danielsson et al., 2004). A study conducted by Gambacorta (2009) highlights that rising 
markets confer increased stability, which allows financial firms to take advantage of their 
risk budgets, promoting position-taking. By the same token Adrian and Shin (2010) 
suggest a model in which banks actively modify their balance sheets to reflect economic 
conditions; specifically, they offer more leverage during economic booms and less during 
bursts. Therefore, it can be said in this case that leverage is procyclical.27  
The results from a seminal study by Jimenez et al. (2014) indicate that banks are far more 
inclined to undertake high-risk lending practices as a result of lower overnight interest 
                                                 
25 Similarly, Adrian et al. (2010) stress that changes to the monetary policy stance impact the essential “risk 
appetite” of financial intermediaries. 
26 Borio and Zhu (2012) argue that the procyclical influence from assessments of probability of default, 
loss given default, correlations and volatilities is a robust indicator of the effect of risk perceptions. See as 
well Allen and Gale (2000), Diamond and Rajan (2006), and Acharya and Naqvi (2012), among others.  
27 Leverage of this nature is interpreted as the result of banks’ activity and management which serve to 
enhance their balance sheets in response to variations in measured risk and prices. 
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rates. In fact these conditions appear to motivate banks with relatively less funding to 
accept increased numbers of loan applications from firms that were previously considered 
too risky. If an application was approved, the loan was for an unusually high amount and 
not secured through use of collateral. Additionally, loan applications approved by lesser-
funded banks are also more likely to default under conditions of low overnight rates. 
However, long-term lower interest rates along with current account deficits, securitisation 
and additional important macro variables do not have this impact. The study concludes 
that monetary policy does have an impact on credit supply composition, especially when 
analysing credit risk. 
From 1999 to 2003 in Bolivia there were substantial fluctuations in the federal funds rate. 
Ioannidou et al. (2015) investigate the effect of this rate on the pricing and risk of new 
bank loans during this period. The results indicate that reduced US federal funds rates 
before loan origination increase the likelihood of default for bank loans granted to 
individuals for each month. Moreover, banks with higher liquidity and lesser funding 
from foreign sources assume additional risk during periods of low federal funding. Under 
these conditions such banks even decrease loan distribution in spite of the presumed 
higher element of risk associated with this strategy.28 
3.2.3 Expansionary monetary policy vs. cautious lending by Eurozone banks 
While analysing the goal of the ECB, Cour-Thimann and Winkler (2012) state that the 
central bank employs non-standard measures that act as a complement to the standard 
interest rate policy rather than as a replacement for it. These non-standard measures have 
been primarily targeted towards banks in order to avoid chaotic deleveraging in the euro 
                                                 
28 It is worthwhile mentioning that the Bolivian economy is not harmonised with the American economy; 
however, its banking system is almost completely dollarized. Accordingly, the US federal funds rate is 
deemed to be the best suited measure of monetary policy (Ioannidou et al., 2015). This seminal study was 
indeed among the first empirical works that unveiled the influence of monetary policy on risk-taking by 
banks. 
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area economy and enhance liquidity and funding (Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2012). 
Accordingly, the ECB’s unconventional monetary policies are expected to safeguard the 
ability of solvent banks in the region to maintain lending to the public and private sectors. 
A study by Ciccarelli et al. (2013) investigates the monetary transmission via banks of 
different sizes and finds that, by the end of 2011, the effects of borrower’s credit frictions 
were not attenuated, particularly in the struggling nations. Given that smaller banks 
generally lend to Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs), the study suggests that 
the procedures implemented until 2011 likely failed to rectify issues regarding credit 
availability which arose from adverse risk conditions and the declining net worth of firms. 
This conclusion is especially relevant to smaller firms in distressed the euro area nations. 
Upon examining data from 91 large banks in 45 nations, Beck et al. (2011) determine that 
foreign, domestic private and government-owned banks utilise a variety of lending 
technologies and organisational structures for the purpose of financing SMEs. Loans to 
these smaller firms, specifically in the context of extent, type and pricing, are weakly 
correlated with the aforementioned technologies and structures, signifying that 
‘relationship lending’ need not be the sole basis for SME loans.29  
In order to determine the relationship between monetary policy and lending in Europe, 
De Santis and Surico (2013) evaluate balance sheet data of the four largest economies in 
the Eurozone sampled from 1999 to 2011. The study reveals that in Germany and Italy, 
which both house a relatively large number of banks, the impact of monetary policy on 
lending was pronounced and diverse. In contrast, the impact in Spain was relatively weak 
and France experienced a more homogenous effect; both nations are characterised by a 
                                                 
29 In support of this conclusion, Beck et al. (2011) also find little significant variation regarding the extent, 
type and pricing of SME funding among different types of banks. Alternatively, significant variation is 
found between developed and developing nations, considered to be a result of variation in legal and 
institutional financial systems. 
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relatively higher degree of market concentration. Furthermore, some data suggests that 
monetary policy has a greater influence on the relatively smaller savings banks in Italy, 
and the savings and cooperative banks that possess relatively low liquidity and capital in 
Germany.  In the euro area the 2007-8 economic crisis has had a negative impact on the 
Monetary Transmission Mechanism (MTM) (Öztürk and Mrkaic, 2014). When conducting 
an analysis to determine the level of access that SMEs have to bank financing, data from 
several thousand firms from the euro area reveals that the costs associated with 
modifications to the leverage of the borrower as well as bank funding affect the 
aforementioned access to finance for these smaller firms. Specifically, greater borrowers’ 
debt-to-asset ratios and bank financing costs are adversely and significantly correlated 
with SMEs’ access to financing.   
Furthermore, monetary policy inside the Eurozone experienced ‘fragmenting’, 
specifically in terms of the fact that reduced interest rates determined by the ECB did not 
influence the banks in periphery nations to stop charging high lending rates by banks in 
said countries, relative to the ‘core’ nations. Accordingly, these higher interest rates 
documented in the periphery nations exhibited a risk associated with the exchange rate 
that would normally be absent from a completely developed monetary union, which 
served to warp the allotment of capital and hinder lending activity and volume to SMEs 
especially, leading to poor economic growth in the periphery nations (Mullineux, 2015). 
In June 2014 the ECB issued a package of measures utilising a strategy comparable to 
that of the UK’s ‘Funding for Lending Scheme’ (FLS) overseen by HM Treasury and the 
Bank of England. In August 2012 the FLS began offering cheap loans for up to a period 
of four years to financial institutions that demonstrated increased mortgage and SME 
lending. However, the FLS has not managed to successfully stimulate a significant 
increase in lending to SMEs in the UK (Mullineux, 2013 and 2015). Notwithstanding, the 
83 
 
ECB is set to enact a ‘Targeted LTRO’ (TLTRO) scheme that facilitates expanded access 
to cheap financing for SME lending (Mullineux, 2015). In order to support this scheme 
and to stimulate the future SME lending market, the ECB is also considering the benefits 
of buying SME-loan backed securities. When evaluating studies for relevance to these 
issues, it is important to note that most of the available literature on unconventional 
monetary policy does not consider the ECB’s 3 year LTROs which were carried out in 
December 2011 and February 2012 where a total sum of €1 trillion cheap loans was 
injected into the banking system in order to facilitate lending by bank to SMEs that were 
hit by the crisis in the Eurozone.30  
3.2.4 Hypotheses development 
We carry out an empirical assessment through evaluating the subsequently outlined 
research hypotheses in the EU-9: 
Hypothesis I. The protracted periods of low monetary conditions prior to the financial 
crisis result in an excessive relaxation of banks’ credit standards as applied to approval 
of loans or credit lines to enterprises, households and consumer credit. 
The first hypothesis can be tested by utilising the following reasoning: in the pre-crisis 
sample we expect to establish a direct relationship between the effect of low level of 
interest rates and softening of banks’ credit standards to enterprises, households and 
consumer credit loans. This justification is in line with Maddaloni and Peydro (2011). 
Accordingly, total banks’ credit standards are examined and factors influencing this 
variable originating from cost of funds and balance sheet constraint will be rigorously 
scrutinised. 
                                                 
30 One exception to this is Darracq-Paries and De Santis (2015) which used the BLS data from 2003Q1-
2011Q4 and just the un-published ad-hoc questionnaire of the BLS in February 2012 to estimate a panel 
VAR for the euro area countries. 
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Hypothesis II. The intensity of the relationship between the low level of interest rates and 
softening of banks’ credit standards has modified in response to the expansionary 
monetary policy both during and after the financial crisis. 
It is worthwhile to note the scale of the expansionary monetary policy in both mid- and 
post-crisis periods, characterised by low policy rates, in which 21 successive quarters saw 
the weighted average for Taylor rule residuals remain negative during the 2009:Q4-
2014:Q4. The second hypothesis is established through adopting the similar 
methodological approach as outlined in the first hypothesis; therefore, the potential 
modification to banks’ credit standards can be explored in depth. 
Hypothesis III. The data support excessive risk-taking behaviour by banks in stressed vs. 
non-stressed countries of the EU-9 prior and post financial crisis.  
We regroup the selected countries in our original sample according to the effects as well 
as the severity of the financial crisis into two panels of A and B. Panel A consists of 
Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal, while Panel B contains Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The purpose of this exercise is to evaluate the impact 
of monetary policy rates on banks’ margins concerning riskier loans, particularly for the 
pre- and post-financial crisis periods. On a related note Ciccarelli et al. (2013) imply that 
banks within stressed countries in the euro area relied more on the liquidity offered via 
the Eurosystem. Hence, relative to Panel B countries, Panel A countries are predicted to 
practice more excessive risk-taking behaviour during the pre-crisis period in connection 
with the previously mentioned three categories of loans; this may be deemed a potential 
cause that exacerbated the economic impact of the 2007-8 crisis. Accordingly, this present 
study conducts additional testing to reveal any progress in this respect regarding the 
selection obtained during the post-crisis period. 
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Hypothesis IV. The ECB’s 3 year LTROs liquidity injection into the EU banking system 
translate into a softening of bank lending standards and the demand for loans has risen 
corresponding to enterprises, households and consumer credit. 
Fourth, with the purpose of determining the effectiveness of unconventional monetary 
policies, Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) and Fungáčová et al. (2014) deliberate 
the proxy in their respective investigations, which is specified as a ratio of each central 
total asset to nominal GDP (Assets/GDP ratio). Considering the non-usage of bank level 
data in this study, such a method is not feasible here. Consequently, the BLS quarterly 
data is relied upon, particularly the modification within credit standards and demand 
during the course of implementing these measures.  
The aim of this exercise is to determine whether such processes translated into a softening 
of lending standards/conditions and to ascertain the degree to which the demand for loans 
has risen corresponding to enterprises, households and consumer credit in the nations 
being analysed. 
3.3 Methodology  
3.3.1 The data31 
The primary dataset employed in this present research is sourced from the BLS that is 
directed at senior loan officers of a representative sample of the euro area banks and 
considers the traits of their corresponding national banking structure and in so doing calls 
                                                 
31 The BLS for the euro area was first conducted in 2003. Its main goal is to improve on the Eurosystem’s 
understanding of financing circumstances in the Eurozone. The BLS sheds light on the ECB Governing 
Council’s analysis of monetary and economic developments, with which it formulates it monetary policy. 
The array of banks presented in the sample is demonstrative of the banking segment in each country. This 
suggests that the selected sample highlighted in this study was typically comprised of banks of a varied 
size; however, at an earlier stage of the BLS survey some preferential treatment was issued to address large 
banks (Berg et al., 2005; Ciccarelli et al., 2011 and Maddaloni and Peydro, 2011). The BLS gives balance 
to current data on loans and bank lending rates with rigorous statistical analysis on supply and demand 
conditions in the Eurozone credit markets. It includes data pertaining to lending decision of euro area banks. 
Topics the questionnaire touch upon are the credit standards banks apply whilst approving loans, the terms 
and conditions of new loans to enterprises and households and an analysis when addressing the for bank 
loans. 
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upon them to supply quarterly data regarding the lending standards that banks offer 
borrowers and on the loan demand that banks require.  
The primary directive of the BLS is to increase comprehension with respect to bank 
lending behaviour in the euro area. The queries differentiate between three types of loan: 
loans or credit lines to enterprises, loans to households for house purchase, and consumer 
credit and other lending to households. 
The investigation is conducted as a questionnaire comprising qualitative questions 
regarding modifications to loan conditions and demand logged over the course of the 
preceding three months, and future developmental projections of the same data in the 
period of the subsequent quarter.  
The survey questions outlined in the BLS contain five optional answers. The options span 
from “tightened considerably” to “eased considerably” for the enquires corresponding to 
modifications in credit standards and from “increased considerably” to “decreased 
considerably” for the enquiries corresponding to loan demands. The replies are 
communicated with respect to net percentage, a value calculated as the difference between 
the percentage of banks announcing that credit standards were tightened and the 
percentage of banks indicating that the standards have been eased.  
A positive value for the net percentage shows that a greater share of banks have tightened 
credit standards (“net tightening”), while a negative net percentage means that more banks 
have eased credit standards (“net easing”). Similarly, the expression “net demand” 
represents the difference between the percentage of banks showing a rise in loan demand 
and the percentage of banks experiencing a fall in said demand. Accordingly, net demand 
will thus have a positive value if a higher percentage of banks experience greater loan 
demand, while a negative value for net demand signifies that a higher percentage of banks 
have experienced decreased loan demand.  
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Results from the bank data analysed in the BLS sample are subject to a two-step 
aggregation. In the first step, results from solitary banks are aggregated to that of the euro 
area nations’ national results. Here bank responses are divided into two main categories: 
those that are aggregated to national results via application of implicit weighting to the 
sample or aggregation via explicit weighting derived from the unresolved quantities of 
loans issued to NFCs and households of lone banks in the corresponding samples taken 
from each nation.32  
The second step consists of aggregating the national BLS results to the euro area (BLS) 
results. Accordingly, survey responses from each nation are aggregated to the euro area 
BLS via the application of an explicit weighting scheme founded on the national shares 
in the values of unresolved loans to the aforementioned borrowers.  
Following the weighting schemes, the nations’ results are combined to form the euro area 
aggregate by utilising each nation’s loans from the combined total unresolved loans in 
the area to residents. Conversely, weighting is not applied at the domestic level, 
suggesting that the individual banks are equally considered.33 
In 2015 the selection is made up of 142 participating banks spanning the 19 euro area 
nations; yet, for the purpose of this present empirical study, 9 out 12 nations partaking 
from the beginning of the survey are also tested here.34  
The selected banks are carefully chosen in such a way as to offer an accurate depiction of 
the euro area banking segment, while considering dissimilarities in the banking system 
between nations. Hence, the problem of sample selection bias may be avoided since the 
                                                 
32 In the case that foreign banks are included in the sample, the bank lending standards concern the credit 
policy executed within the national market. 
33 A comprehensive description of the BLS setup was outlined in Berg et al. (2005). Furthermore, Hempell 
and Sørensen (2010) document an updated account of the BLS results until July 2009.    
34 These include a number of nations (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) that introduced the Euro on January 1, 1999.  We exclude Austria, Finland 
and Ireland due to lack of available data. 
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time frame being analysed corresponded with growth in the selection size as a result of 
the expansion of the euro area. Statistics concerning the euro area BLS are accessible 
since the last quarter of 2002.  
The model used in this study is built in a manner to factor in any distinct modification on 
banks’ lending standards for the period before (2002:Q4-2008:Q3), during (2008:Q4-
2010Q4) and after (2011:Q1-2014Q4) the financial crisis, which should be a sufficient 
duration of time considering the fact that an entire cycle of monetary policy is 
encompassed during these periods. In this case it is necessary to sample the 
aforementioned periods for the following reasons.  
The present analysis will first be cut off in 2008:Q3; this point in time serves as a suitable 
closing window for the pre-crisis time frame, and considers the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers which occurred on September 15, 2008, in addition to the initiation of the 
execution of non-standard monetary measures by the ECB. Next this study submits an 
expanded analysis of the GFC duration until the final quarter in 2010, in which the 
Eurosystem instigated non-standard measures of liquidity provision to the euro area 
banking segment. Lastly, the post-crisis sample corresponds to the allotment of the two-
three year LTROs in 2011 and 2012; as a result it terminates in the final quarter of 2014. 
Additionally, the methodology implemented in this case to delineate the period sampled 
corroborates the methodologies accepted in Maddaloni and Peydro (2011/2013) which 
analyse survey data tailored to the U.S and the euro area. 35 
3.3.2 Macroeconomic and financial indicators 
The macro and financial indicators involved in our primary investigation are short-term 
interest rates rates, long term interest rates (10 year government bond), Taylor rule 
residuals, GDP growth rate and inflation rates. Here it is noteworthy to clarify that for 
                                                 
35 The Chow test is also used in order to check for the existence of a structural break. 
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monetary policy, quarterly average of overnight rates (EONIA) are utilised. The effects 
of long term interest rates are assessed, since mortgage loans and consumer credits have 
extended maturity; consequently the credit standards are influenced to a smaller degree 
by short-term interest rates.  
Also, monetary conditions are computed by the Taylor rule residuals (see Taylor, 2009) 
achieved through regressing the EONIA on both GDP growth rate and inflation rates. The 
residuals corresponding to each nation chosen for our selection are estimated with panel 
least squares regressions, thereby applying shared coefficients for all 9 countries, 
considering the shared monetary policy. A negative (positive) Taylor rule residual from 
a given moment in time represents an expansionary (contractionary) monetary policy.36  
Figure 1-3 illustrates that the credit standards for business, mortgage and consumer loans 
exhibited an analogous configuration, particularly mid- (2008:Q4-2010:Q4) and post- 
(2011:Q1-2014:Q4) financial crisis samples; at this point it is worthwhile to note that 
business loans underwent the greatest tightening of credit standards relative to both 
mortgage and consumer loans. The demand for loans underwent moderate growth in the 
pre-crisis sample (2002:Q4-2008:Q3), throughout the three classes of loans, whereas 
there was a significant decrease during the crisis time frame with this decline particularly 
prominent for mortgage loans.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Appendices A1-A3 report the descriptive statistics.  
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Figure 1: Credit Standards and Demand for Business Loans in EU-9 Countries 
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Figure 2: Credit Standards and Demand for Mortgage Loans in EU-9 Countries 
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Figure 3: Credit Standards and Demand for Consumer Loans in EU-9 Countries 
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As shown in Figure 4, substantial discrepancy exists regarding the number of times with 
protraction of low Taylor-rule residuals. Most notably the Taylor rule residuals remained 
negative for 21 consecutive quarters from 2009:Q4 to 2014:Q4, suggesting the scale of 
expansionary monetary policy undertaken in this region; this is similar to that seen in 
EONIA, especially over the course of this time span.  
Figure 4: Taylor-rule residuals and EONIA rates in the EU-9 countries 
Notes: Figure 4 compares the Taylor-rule residuals and the EONIA rates in the EU-9 countries. Taylor-rule residuals 
presented are the residuals of the regressions of EONIA rates on the growth rate of GDP and inflation rate over the period 
spanning from 2002:Q4-2014:Q4. Here the residuals are determined individually for every member of the EU-9, and 
subsequently a weighted mean is determined utilising each nation’s GDP.  The residuals are estimated for 9 euro area 
countries comprising Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
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3.3.3 Model specification 
Considering that the issues addressed in the study are contingent on banks’ credit 
standards and monetary policy stance in the euro area, the disturbance of the model is 
expected to be in violation of traditional assumptions, specifically to be vulnerable to 
heteroscedasticity as well as being correlated throughout the nations selected for this 
research. 
The methodology used to tackle this here is analogous to that employed in Maddaloni and 
Peydro (2011).  In the first part of this present study, the results are collected using 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) panel regressions methodology, largely considered to 
be a more efficient approach as indicated in Wooldridge (2007). GLS permits the 
inclusion of the estimates of the variance and the covariance of the residuals in the EU-9 
sample. Additionally, it permits the imposition of a parametric structure with the purpose 
of amending the residuals for autocorrelation. Furthermore, country fixed effects are 
accounted for in order to guard against any unseen variation occurring within banking 
structure of sampled countries in this present research. 
Given that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is found to be significant when 
analysing the outcomes outlined in Table 1-3, GLS estimation methodology could be 
biased while considering fixed effects. Accordingly, the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimator is employed for the majority of outstanding regressions, which is 
supported by Arellano and Bond (1991), and additionally expanded upon in Blundell and 
Bond (1998) which utilise lags of the dependent variable as instruments. Using this 
method alleviates the endogeneity issues if the instruments are not correlated with the 
variables in question. Consequently, the Arellano and Bond system estimator with 
Windmeijer (2005) corrected coefficient standard errors is employed here. 
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It is important to mention that the BLS data is completely stable for the euro area given 
that the monetary policy stance is common throughout the countries presented in our 
study. Accordingly, while evaluating the EU-9 nations utilising the BLS results, the first 
section focuses on the period pre- (2002:Q4 -2008:Q3), mid- (2008:Q4-2010:Q4) and 
post- (2011:Q1-2014:Q4) financial crisis. 
Our empirical methodology relies on a sequence of panel regressions which have 
baselines of the functional form as follows (1): 
Lending conditions t,i= 𝛼i+ 𝛽𝑆𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠t-1, i+𝛾𝐿𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠t-1,i +𝜆 Taylor-rule residualst-
1,i+𝜃GDPgrowtht-1,i+𝛿Infalion ratet-1, i+𝜌𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 t-1, i+ Lending conditions t-1,i+ 𝜀i,t   
Where Lending conditions t,i are indicative of the methods of lending conditions driven 
directly from the BLS at time t for country i (expressed in net percentage terms). SRatet-
1, i and 𝐿𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠t-1 denote short and long term interest rates, respectively. Taylor-rule 
residuals are the Taylor-rule residuals of the regression of EONIA rates on GDP growth 
and inflation, both of which are included as macroeconomics variables. Finally Demandt-
1, i, represents the demand for loans. In order to consider the endogeneity bias, each 
explanatory variable is lagged by one quarter denoted by t-1. Within this present research 
involving the financial crisis and post-crisis times, additional variables are represented 
originating directing from the BLS. 
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3.4 Estimation results 
Tables 1-3 thoroughly examine the effects of monetary conditions on overall lending 
standards as applied to approval of loans or credit lines specific for business, mortgage 
and consumer in EU-9 countries during the periods including  pre- (2002:Q4-2008:Q3), 
mid- (2008:Q4-2010:Q4) and post- (2011:Q1-2014:Q4) financial crisis. Here it is prudent 
to refer to Question 1 and 8 described within the BLS (see Appendix B for a detailed 
illustration of the survey).  
3.4.1 Short-term interest rates 
The monetary conditions employed in this research include Euro OverNight Index 
Average (EONIA) and Taylor-rule residuals. Additionally, country fixed effects are 
considered in order to guard against unseen variation within the banking structure of the 
designated selection of countries in this present research. When analysing columns 1-5 
illustrated in Tables 1-3, the dependant variable is described through using total lending 
standards calculated using the net percentage of banks detailing tighter credit standards 
for loans to enterprises during the preceding quarter. Next, country fixed effects are added 
and macroeconomic variables are included. Columns 1-3 report the outcome when 
regressing the total lending standards on EONIA. In columns 4-5, EONIA is substituted 
with Taylor-rule residuals and include macroeconomic variables every designated 
column. Columns 6-10 show a repetition of the same groups of regressions for total 
lending standards; however, they correspond to households for house purchase. Lastly, 
columns 11-15 are specific for total lending standards to consumer credit and other 
lending.   
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3.4.2 The impact of monetary conditions on lending standards 
The following section details an analytical evaluation by conducting a thorough review 
of the effects of monetary conditions on total lending standards regarding the previously 
mentioned three categories of loans for the periods pre-, mid- and post-financial crisis in 
Tables 1-3.  Our coefficient corresponding to EONIA exhibits a comparable configuration 
throughout the various specifications in the pre-crisis sample, being statistically 
significant at 1% in most cases, although marginally decreasing following the 
incorporation of further variables; this is a result of macroeconomic factors or country 
fixed effects, developing to 11.00*** in the foremost challenging specification in column 
2 for business loans. The value of the coefficient of EONIA demonstrates a greater effect 
of short-term interest rates on total lending standards for loans to enterprises relative to 
both mortgage and consumer loans; this indicates a creditable hypothesis amid phases of 
too low levels of monetary policy stance preceding the beginning of the financial crisis 
as well as a disproportionate softening of total lending standards by banks as applied to 
approval of loans or credit lines.  During the crisis the coefficient for EONIA underwent 
an additional decline for all three types of loans, as they were hit badly during this time 
frame.  
Considering that EONIA experienced a substantial reduction, our estimation suggests that 
the decrease in the level of short-term interest rates has failed to manifest as a further 
softening of bank’s credit standards as applied to approval loans relative to the selection 
sample pre-crisis. 
Certainly this has applied to the post-crisis sample, in which monetary policy makers 
reacted to the GFC by slashing interest rates to levels approaching zero then maintaining 
those values for a record duration of time in order to facilitate bank lending activity. With 
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respect to such conditions, Keynes (1936) describes monetary policy as analogous to 
‘pushing on a string’ and additionally posits the concept of a ‘liquidity trap’. Our 
estimation proposes that softening of total lending standards for consumer loans has been 
less enhanced from the short-term interest rates reduction. However, it is noteworthy to 
state that the effect of short-term interest rates on total lending standards for loans to 
household for house purchase was marginally enhanced in comparison to the model 
tailored to the crisis period selection.  
While substituting EONIA with Taylor-rule residuals, our estimation upholds the 
previous results obtained by the EONIA particularly in the pre- and post-crisis periods. 
Yet there is some discrepancy, since the results indicate that negative residuals lead only 
to a softening of total lending standards for business loans in the post-crisis time frame. 
At this point it is noteworthy to mention that the coefficient for the growth rate of GDP 
is negative, yet it stays positive for inflation rate. The results indicate that higher rates of 
GDP growth are associated with the softening of total lending standards, most specifically 
in the pre-crisis sample, which supports the justification offered in Maddaloni and Peydro 
(2011) which argue that banks’ credit standards are ‘pro-cyclical’. This present estimation 
additionally indicates that an increase in the inflation rate confers a constriction of total 
lending standards, which may soon come as a result of predicted rises in monetary policy 
rates (these coefficients generally stay statistically significant throughout various 
specifications and maintain a positive value, which is detailed in Tables 1-3).  
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Table 1: Short term monetary policy stance and the lending standards prior to the financial crisis (2002:Q4-2008:Q3) 
 
 
       EU-9 Countries       
   Business Loans     Mortgage Loans     Consumer Loans   
 Total Lending Standards Total Lending Standards Total Lending Standards 
    
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Overnight rates t-1 
10.69 11.00 11.12   4.28 5.17 6.20   3.55 3.86 4.56   
  (7.09)*** (7.43)*** (6.83)***   (3.18)** (3.81)*** (4.31)***   (2.71)** (3.08)** (3.42)***   
Taylor rule residuals t-1 
   10.77 11.12    4.48 6.20    3.39 4.56 
     (6.92)*** (6.83)***    (3.22)** (4.31)***    (2.50)* (3.42)*** 
GDP growth rate t-1 
  -0.46 0.89 1.10   -1.72 0.16 -0.86 
  
-1.46 0.17 -0.83 
    (0.52) (1.33) (1.32)   (2.16)* (0.24) (1.12) 
  
(2.07)* (0.29) (1.20) 
Inflation rate t-1 
  3.25 7.80 7.81   -1.76 1.67 0.80 
 
 -1.01 2.39 0.86 
    (1.95) (5.31)*** (4.71)***   (1.21) (1.36) (0.56) 
 
 (0.75) (2.00)* (0.67) 
Lagged Dependent t-1 0.66 0.63 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.66 0.53 0.49 0.65 0.49 0.61 0.52 0.48 0.60 0.48 
 (16.07)*** (15.04)*** (11.83)*** (12.74)*** (11.83)*** (13.51)*** (9.55)*** (8.35)*** (12.65)*** (8.35)*** (12.65)*** (9.90)*** (8.75)*** (11.81)*** (8.75)*** 
Country  
     Fixed effect 
no yes yes no yes no yes yes no yes no yes yes no yes 
No of  
      observations 
215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 
No of countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Wald  
       Statistics 
500.15*** 527.92*** 506.60*** 484.49*** 506.60*** 224.86*** 250.40*** 262.14*** 224.52*** 262.14*** 188.11*** 211.47*** 216.02*** 187.40*** 216.02*** 
Table 1 illustrates the outcome from the GLS panel regressions in which the dependant variable is specified via total lending standards, estimated through the net percentage from banks from every one of the nations 
belonging to the EU-9 which describes tightening of credit standards when considering the preceding quarter. The net percentages documented within the Bank Lending Survey (BLS) for EU-9 countries reflect the 
approval of loans or credit lines to three elements included in the BLS, which are as follows: enterprises, households and consumer credits. Responses to Question 1 and 8 are outlined in the BLS (see Appendix B for 
a detailed explanation of the questions posed in the survey). The overnight rates is defined here by  the quarterly average of the daily overnight rates (EONIA), the growth rates of GDP are characterised by the annual 
growth rates of real GDP specific for every one of the nations and inflation rates are denoted by the quarterly average of inflation rates, again, specific to each nation. The Taylor residuals are characterised as the 
residuals of the regression of EONIA rates on both the growth rates of GDP and inflation rates encompassing the time frame prior to the financial crisis (2002:Q4-2008Q3). Note that each explanatory variables utilised 
in this case is lagged by one quarter. We have a balanced panel dataset which incorporates 9 Euro-area nations: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. We estimate 
the panel regression over the pre-crisis period from 2002:Q4-2008:Q3. The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively and reported in the brackets.   
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Table 2: Short term monetary policy stance and the lending standards during the financial crisis (2008Q4-2010:Q4) 
 
 
       EU-9 Countries       
   Business Loans     Mortgage Loans     Consumer Loans   
 Total Lending Standards Total Lending Standards Total Lending Standards 
    
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Overnight rates t-1 
4.54 13.13 5.97   2.48 7.77 5.33   -0.98 3.54 2.91   
  (1.39) (5.85)*** (2.17)*   (1.13) (7.39)*** (3.00)**   (0.43) (2.32)* (1.46)   
Taylor rule residuals t-1 
   1.61 5.97    1.13 5.33    -2.68 2.91 
     (0.49) (2.17)*    (0.44) (3.00)**    (1.06) (1.46) 
GDP growth rate t-1   -0.98 -0.18 -0.15   -0.78 0.39 -0.03   -0.27 -1.09 0.14 
    (1.42) (0.18) (0.17)   (1.66) (0.46) (0.06)   (0.52) (1.43) (0.19) 
Inflation rate t-1 
  8.26 7.27 10.71   3.55 3.03 5.74   1.45 2.73 2.64 
    (4.07)*** (2.96)** (5.17)***   (2.36)* (1.77) (4.53)***   (0.90) (1.49) (1.89) 
Lagged Dependent t-1 0.34 0.06 -0.01 0.29 -0.01 0.61 0.11 0.01 0.64 0.01 0.51 -0.02 -0.04 0.49 -0.04 
 (3.28)** (0.85) (0.13) (2.63)** (0.14) (6.50)*** (1.35) (0.09) (6.69)*** (0.09) (4.87)*** (0.17) (0.40) (4.60)*** (0.40) 
Country  
     Fixed effect 
no yes yes no yes no yes yes no yes no yes yes no yes 
No of  
      observations 
80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
No of countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Wald  
       Statistics 
25.74*** 140.74*** 108.96*** 33.31*** 108.94*** 54.92*** 284.67*** 213.08*** 60.82*** 213.20*** 25.19*** 190.00*** 176.02*** 29.49*** 176.08*** 
Table 2 illustrates the outcome from the GLS panel regressions in which the dependant variable is specified via total lending standards, estimated through the net percentage from banks from every one of the nations 
belonging to the EU-9 which describes tightening of credit standards when considering the preceding quarter. The net percentages documented within the Bank Lending Survey (BLS) for EU-9 countries reflect the 
approval of loans or credit lines to three elements included in the BLS, which are as follows: enterprises, households and consumer credits. Responses to Question 1 and 8 are outlined in the BLS (see Appendix B for 
a detailed explanation of the questions posed in the survey). The overnight rates is defined here by  the quarterly average of the daily overnight rates (EONIA), the growth rates of GDP are characterised by the annual 
growth rates of real GDP specific for every one of the nations and inflation rates are denoted by the quarterly average of inflation rates, again, specific to each nation. The Taylor residuals are characterised as the 
residuals of the regression of EONIA rates on both the growth rates of GDP and inflation rates encompassing the time frame during the financial crisis (2008:Q4-2010Q4). Note that each explanatory variables utilised 
in this case is lagged by one quarter. We have a balanced panel dataset which incorporates 9 Euro-area nations: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. We estimate 
the panel regression over the crisis period from 2008:Q4-2010:Q4. The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively and reported in the brackets. 
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Table 3: Short term monetary policy stance and the lending standards after the financial crisis (2011:Q1-2014:Q4) 
       EU-9 Countries       
   Business Loans     Mortgage Loans     Consumer Loans   
 Total Lending Standards Total Lending Standards Total Lending Standards 
    
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Overnight rates t-1 
6.00 6.99 1.69   7.65 8.21 1.22   3.28 4.97 -3.58   
  (2.29)* (2.80)** (0.41)   (2.30)* (2.70)** (0.25)   (1.31) (2.23)* (0.94)   
Taylor rule residuals t-1 
   7.70 1.69    6.87 1.22    2.57 -3.58 
     (2.30)* (0.41)    (1.64) (0.25)    (0.77) (0.94) 
GDP growth rate t-1 
  0.33 0.25 0.57   0.34 -0.04 0.51   1.28 0.09 0.78 
    (0.47) (0.47) (1.00)   (0.38) (0.06) (0.77)   (1.87) (0.19) (1.59) 
Inflation rate t-1 
  2.88 3.21 3.58   3.86 4.44 4.36   3.63 1.77 2.16 
    (2.08)* (2.83)** (3.13)**   (2.44)* (3.21)** (3.23)**   (2.95)** (1.63) (2.14)* 
Lagged Dependent t-1 0.61 0.49 0.41 0.55 0.41 0.46 0.37 0.34 0.39 0.34 0.52 0.35 0.32 0.49 0.32 
 (9.77)*** (6.90)*** (4.81)*** (7.19)*** (4.81)*** (6.09)*** (4.83)*** (3.89)*** (4.66)*** (3.89)*** (7.00)*** (4.36)*** (3.68)*** (6.03)*** (3.68)*** 
Country  
     Fixed effect 
no yes yes no yes no yes yes no yes no yes yes no yes 
No of  
      observations 
143 143 142 142 142 143 143 142 142 142 143 143 142 142 142 
No of countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Wald  
       Statistics 
110.16*** 133.68*** 145.89*** 120.26*** 145.89*** 51.95*** 69.15*** 93.80*** 68.23*** 93.80*** 56.50*** 85.78*** 101.78*** 60.16*** 101.78*** 
Table 3 illustrates the outcome from the GLS panel regressions in which the dependant variable is specified via total lending standards, estimated through the net percentage from banks from every one of the nations 
belonging to the EU-9 which describes tightening of credit standards when considering the preceding quarter. The net percentages documented within the Bank Lending Survey (BLS) for EU-9 countries reflect the 
approval of loans or credit lines to three elements included in the BLS, which are as follows: enterprises, households and consumer credits. Responses to Question 1 and 8 are outlined in the BLS (see Appendix B for a 
detailed explanation of the questions posed in the survey). The overnight rates is defined here by  the quarterly average of the daily overnight rates (EONIA), the growth rates of GDP are characterised by the annual 
growth rates of real GDP specific for every one of the nations and inflation rates are denoted by the quarterly average of inflation rates, again, specific to each nation. The Taylor residuals are characterised as the residuals 
of the regression of EONIA rates on both the growth rates of GDP and inflation rates encompassing the time frame after the financial crisis (2011:Q1-2014Q4). Note that each explanatory variables utilised in this case 
is lagged by one quarter. We have a balanced panel dataset which incorporates 9 Euro-area nations: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. We estimate the panel 
regression over the post-crisis period from 2011:Q1-2014:Q4. The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively and reported in the brackets.   
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Furthermore, a Chow test is conducted in order to learn if the alteration in the relationship 
between banks’ lending standards and Taylor-rule residuals is significantly distinct during 
the following periods: 2002Q4-2008Q3, 2008Q84-2010Q4 and 2011Q1-2014Q4. By 
using similar methodology adopted from Anderson and Fraser (2000), the restricted 
model employed permits every parameter value to differ in each of the three 
aforementioned periods excluding Taylor-rule residuals; the Taylor-rule residuals term 
possesses an identical coefficient value in each of the three spells. The derived null 
hypothesis states that the coefficients of the Taylor-rule residuals from 2002Q4-2008Q3, 
2008Q84-2010Q4 and 2011Q1-2014Q4 are each the same value. However, test outcomes 
support rejecting the null hypothesis, suggesting that the association between the Taylor-
rule residuals and the bank’s lending standards has substantially altered in the time frames 
pre-, mid- and post-crisis.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Total lending standards: Business Loans                                                                                                          
Taylor-rule residuals (2002Q4-2008Q3) = Taylor-rule residuals (2008Q4-2010Q4) = Taylor-rule 
residuals (2011Q1-2014Q4): 3.57** 
Total lending standards: Mortgage Loans                                                                                                        
Taylor-rule residuals (2002Q4-2008Q3) = Taylor-rule residuals (2008Q4-2010Q4) = Taylor-rule 
residuals (2011Q1-2014Q4): 12.41*** 
Total lending standards: Consumer Loans                                                                                                      
Taylor-rule residuals (2002Q4-2008Q3) = Taylor-rule residuals (2008Q4-2010Q4) = Taylor-rule 
residuals (2011Q1-2014Q4): 7.88*** 
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3.4.3 Short- & long-term interest rates 
Tables 4-6 document that the aforementioned results (Tables 1-3) remain the same 
afterwards, including further variables such as changes in demand for loans and 10-year 
government bond rates. Our results support the idea that a reduced monetary policy 
stance characterised by Taylor rule residuals lead to less harsh total lending standards. 
Such a dynamic is especially seen in total lending standards while revealing the elements 
specific to the banks’ balance sheets for all three types of loans pre-crisis.  
In addition, by examining loan demand detailed in approximations 1-8 (see Tables 4-6), 
it can be inferred that this variable has a substantial effect on total lending standards. It 
is statistically significant in a number of cases and has conceivable negative coefficients; 
this conclusion is explained using the rationale that an increase in net percentage of 
banks recording a rise in demand for loans while being associated with an additional 
loosening of total lending standards by banks. Futhermore, this is supported by 
traditional loan demand research that states that the elasticity of the scale factor, 
representing financing requirements, is calculated utilising economic components, such 
as GDP growth rates and inflation rate, for example. 
Moreover, 10-year government bond rates are mostly not quantified as statistically 
significant, highlighting the fact that lending standards are not affected by long-term 
national interest rates. Our results support the previous finding by Maddaloni and Peydro 
(2013) while indicating that monetary policy stance influences the total lending 
standards regarding variations in bank net worth resulting from different levels of banks’ 
liquidity and capital position prior to the financial crisis.38  
Here it is worthwhile to note the scale of the expansionary monetary policy during and 
after the financial crisis, in a period of low policy rates, which saw 21 successive  
                                                 
38 This also applies to bank’s market financing for business loans and the total lending standards from 
balance sheet factors concerning both mortgage and consumer loans. 
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quarters in which the Taylor rule residuals stayed negative from  2009:Q4 to 2014:Q4 
as depicted in Figure 4. The data indicates a significant reduction in the effect of short-
term interest rates concerning their ability to lower banks’ total credit standards, while 
the demand for loan remained relatively unchanged specifically during the crisis period. 
Of particular interest is that despite the labours of the ECB to keep interest rates low and 
inject liquidity into banking systems, banks’ lending standards remain subdued, as 
documented in the selection of EU-9 countries. Such a conclusion is corroborated by the 
crucial analysis of the Japanese economy in Werner (2012) which stresses that 
continuous short-term interest rate reductions for a period spanning over a decade were 
ineffective at stimulating the economy and expanding the money supply.
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Table 4: The effect of monetary policy on bank’s credit standards prior to the crisis (2002:Q4-2008:Q3) 
                Total Lending Standards Total Lending Standards from Balance Sheet Factors 
  Business Loans Mortgage  Loans Consumer Loans 
  Business Loans Mortgage Loans Consumer Loans 
Bank's 
Capital Position 
Bank's 
Market Financing 
Bank's 
Liquidity Position All Factors All Factors 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Taylor rule residuals i,t-1 10.28*** 6.883* 5.677* 4.288*** 7.148*** 4.932*** 3.752* 3.968 
 (4.02) (2.28) (2.54) (4.15) (4.69) (5.31) (2.21) (1.67) 
Demand for Loans i, t-1 0.0261 -0.0416 -0.170* -0.0231 -0.0497 0.0231 -0.0583*** -0.0166 
 (0.39) (-0.92) (-2.19) (-1.12) (-1.04) (0.75) (-3.47) (-0.36) 
10 Year bond Rate i, t-1 6.444 1.093 -0.261 1.453 -3.303 1.920 -3.691 -0.639 
 (1.36) (0.30) (-0.09) (0.91) (-1.51) (0.91) (-1.64) (-0.19) 
Inflation rate i, t-1 8.499** -0.662 1.890 2.728* 2.332 3.851* -2.197 0.388 
 (2.97) (-0.48) (0.91) (2.55) (0.91) (2.01) (-1.33) (0.22) 
GDP growth rate i, t-1 1.593 -0.413 -0.201 0.174 2.483* 1.326** -0.257 -0.209 
 (1.68) (-0.36) (-0.19) (0.32) (2.02) (2.69) (-0.71) (-0.17) 
Lagged Dependent  i, t-1 0.531*** 0.475*** 0.508*** 0.494*** 0.554*** 0.276* 0.527*** 0.626*** 
 (7.23) (3.55) (7.32) (11.93) (4.70) (2.08) (9.58) (9.42) 
Country fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
No of observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
No of countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
AR(2) p-value 0.293 0.101 0.643 0.301 0.340 0.237 0.400 0.149 
p(Sargan) 0.614 0.037 0.250 0.218 0.009 0.061 0.006 0.000 
Table 4 illustrates the results of a GMM dynamic panel estimation in which the dependant variable is specified via total lending standards, estimated through the net percentage from banks from every one of the 
nations belonging to the EU-9 which describes tightening of credit standards when considering the preceding quarter. Responses to Question 1 and 8 are outlined in the BLS presented in column 1-3. Similarly, the 
dependant variable described by total lending standards due to balance sheet factors noted in columns (4-8) is measured by the net percentage of banks reporting a tightening of credit standards as a result of cost 
of funds and balance sheet constraints comprising three components which are as follows: cost related to the bank’s capital position, bank’s ability to access market financing and bank’s liquidity position. These 
are specific for business loans, and all factors related to balance sheet constraints for both mortgage and consumer loans.  Additionally, these are solutions to Questions 2, 9 and 11 detailed within the BLS. The 
Taylor residuals are characterised as the residuals of the regression of EONIA rates on both the growth rates of GDP and inflation rates encompassing the time frame prior to the financial crisis (2002:Q4-2008Q3). 
Additionally the demand for loans is represented via the net percentage of banks documenting a rise in demand regarding business, mortgage and consumer loans (Question 4 and 13 in the BLS). Long term national 
government bond rate is denoted by the 10-year bond interest rate for every nation. Inflation is measured the quarterly average of inflation rates for each country and the growth rate of GDP is represented in the 
real GDP yearly growth rate denoted in each country. Note that each explanatory variables utilised in this case is lagged by one quarter.  The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  Stata 12 was employed in order to obtain results regarding the GMM method through ‘Xtabond 2’ requirement as highlighted by Roodman (2009). 
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Table 5: The effect of monetary policy on bank’s credit standards during the crisis (2008:Q4-2010:Q4) 
                Total Lending Standards Total Lending Standards from Balance Sheet Factors 
  Business Loans Mortgage  Loans Consumer Loans 
  Business Loans Mortgage Loans Consumer Loans 
Bank's 
Capital Position 
Bank's 
Market Financing 
Bank's 
Liquidity Position All Factors All Factors 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Taylor rule residuals i,t-1 3.181 -4.318 4.606 2.803 2.201 0.866 -8.892*** -0.508 
 (0.88) (-0.83) (1.06) (1.54) (1.71) (0.34) (-3.66) (-0.15) 
Demand for Loans i, t-1 0.0963 -0.0207 0.0395 0.0341 0.102 -0.0425 -0.233** 0.100 
 (1.17) (-0.19) (0.27) (0.56) (1.94) (-0.39) (-2.78) (1.41) 
10 Year bond Rate i, t-1 4.648 -5.336 4.237 2.790 1.990 -1.570 -6.352 0.415 
 (0.89) (-0.97) (1.41) (1.08) (0.81) (-0.45) (-1.57) (0.15) 
Inflation rate i, t-1 6.251* 3.986 -2.195 3.253 4.471 6.848*** 0.359 1.012 
 (2.04) (1.31) (-0.77) (1.84) (1.85) (3.33) (0.20) (0.48) 
GDP growth rate i, t-1 0.476 -2.004 2.208 0.219 0.397 1.214 -2.374 1.134 
 (0.50) (-1.76) (1.28) (0.27) (0.44) (0.72) (-1.23) (0.76) 
Lagged Dependent  i, t-1 0.279** 0.346 0.213 -0.0253 0.0839 0.102 0.270*** 0.191 
 (2.58) (1.74) (0.86) (-0.21) (0.77) (1.45) (3.57) (1.65) 
Country fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
No of observations 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 
No of countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
AR(2) p-value 0.071 0.168 0.400 0.764 0.555 0.982 0.312 0.252 
p(Sargan) 0.033 0.279 0.068 0.025 0.036 0.019 0.044 0.386 
Table 5 illustrates the results of a GMM dynamic panel estimation in which the dependant variable is specified via total lending standards, estimated through the net percentage from banks from every one of the 
nations belonging to the EU-9 which describes tightening of credit standards when considering the preceding quarter. Responses to Question 1 and 8 are outlined in the BLS presented in column 1-3. Similarly, the 
dependant variable described by total lending standards due to balance sheet factors noted in columns (4-8) is measured by the net percentage of banks reporting a tightening of credit standards as a result of cost 
of funds and balance sheet constraints comprising three components which are as follows: cost related to the bank’s capital position, bank’s ability to access market financing and bank’s liquidity position. These 
are specific for business loans, and all factors related to balance sheet constraints for both mortgage and consumer loans.  Additionally, these are solutions to Questions 2, 9 and 11 detailed within the BLS. The 
Taylor residuals are characterised as the residuals of the regression of EONIA rates on both the growth rates of GDP and inflation rates encompassing the time frame during the financial crisis (2008:Q4-2010Q4. 
Additionally the demand for loans is represented via the net percentage of banks documenting a rise in demand regarding business, mortgage and consumer loans (Question 4 and 13 in the BLS). Long term national 
government bond rate is denoted by the 10-year bond interest rate for every nation. Inflation is measured the quarterly average of inflation rates for each country and the growth rate of GDP is represented in the 
real GDP yearly growth rate denoted in each country. Note that each explanatory variables utilised in this case is lagged by one quarter.  The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Stata 12 was employed in order to obtain results regarding the GMM method through ‘Xtabond 2’ requirement as highlighted by Roodman (2009). 
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Table 6:  The effect of monetary policy on bank’s credit standards after the crisis (2011:Q1-2014:Q4) 
                Total Lending Standards Total Lending Standards from Balance Sheet Factors 
  Business Loans Mortgage  Loans Consumer Loans 
  Business Loans Mortgage Loans Consumer Loans 
Bank's 
Capital Position 
Bank's 
Market Financing 
Bank's 
Liquidity Position All Factors All Factors 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Taylor rule residuals i,t-1 10.00** 8.645 -2.030 3.911 10.24 9.320 13.08 3.832 
 (2.90) (1.49) (-0.72) (1.27) (1.75) (1.66) (1.71) (0.77) 
Demand for Loans i, t-1 -0.127 -0.0328 -0.0761 0.0358 -0.0389 -0.105 -0.0848 -0.0526 
 (-1.43) (-0.70) (-1.79) (1.13) (-0.79) (-1.57) (-1.05) (-0.87) 
10 Year bond Rate i, t-1 -0.131 -0.276 0.978 1.256 1.596 0.664 0.161 -0.886 
 (-0.12) (-0.30) (1.65) (1.77) (1.80) (0.63) (0.20) (-1.13) 
Inflation rate i, t-1 6.368*** 7.270** 1.512 2.212 1.683 3.754 4.503 1.457 
 (3.49) (2.96) (0.95) (1.86) (0.99) (1.11) (1.81) (1.03) 
GDP growth rate i, t-1 3.252** 1.872 2.655* 1.778 3.361** 3.492* 1.344 0.598 
 (2.90) (1.22) (2.30) (1.81) (2.87) (2.18) (0.98) (0.66) 
Lagged Dependent  i, t-1 0.434** 0.340* 0.475* 0.611*** 0.536*** 0.533** 0.406* 0.765*** 
 (2.70) (2.19) (2.27) (3.94) (4.85) (3.01) (2.47) (5.30) 
Country fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
No of observations 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
No of countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
AR(2) p-value 0.493 0.331 0.815 0.155 0.649 0.656 0.412 0.113 
p(Sargan) 0.063 0.167 0.046 0.193 0.114 0.025 0.088 0.181 
Table 6 illustrates the results of a GMM dynamic panel estimation in which the dependant variable is specified via total lending standards, estimated through the net percentage from banks from every one of the 
nations belonging to the EU-9 which describes tightening of credit standards when considering the preceding quarter. Responses to Question 1 and 8 are outlined in the BLS presented in column 1-3. . Similarly, 
the dependant variable described by total lending standards due to balance sheet factors noted in columns (4-8) is measured by the net percentage of banks reporting a tightening of credit standards as a result of 
cost of funds and balance sheet constraints comprising three components which are as follows: cost related to the bank’s capital position, bank’s ability to access market financing and bank’s liquidity position. 
These are specific for business loans, and all factors related to balance sheet constraints for both mortgage and consumer loans.  Additionally, these are solutions to Questions 2, 9 and 11 detailed within the BLS. 
The Taylor residuals are characterised as the residuals of the regression of EONIA rates on both the growth rates of GDP and inflation rates encompassing the time frame after the financial crisis (2011:Q1-2014Q4). 
Additionally the demand for loans is represented via the net percentage of banks documenting a rise in demand regarding business, mortgage and consumer loans (Question 4 and 13 in the BLS). Long term national 
government bond rate is denoted by the 10-year bond interest rate for every nation. Inflation is measured the quarterly average of inflation rates for each country and the growth rate of GDP is represented in the 
real GDP yearly growth rate denoted in each country. Note that each explanatory variables utilised in this case is lagged by one quarter.  The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  Stata 12 was employed in order to obtain results regarding the GMM method through ‘Xtabond 2’ requirement as highlighted by Roodman (2009). 
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3.4.4 Monetary policy and the “risk-taking channel” 
Tables 7 and 8 highlight the outcomes of the regressions where the dependent variables 
are categorised as banks’ conditions and terms regarding authorising loans or credit lines 
in conjunction with the aforementioned types of loans designed precisely for the time 
frame prior to and also following the financial turmoil. 
Of particular note is that low short-term monetary policy rates exert a substantial 
softening effect on margins (lending rates) specific for both average and riskier loans in 
each of the three loan categories with the most significant effect observed in consumer 
credit and other lending.  
Consequently, this implies that prior to the beginning to the crisis, characterised by 
reduced monetary rates, banks relaxed margins on loans, a practice which unexpectedly 
included borrowers that were perceived as riskier; however, the post-financial crisis 
period reduced the effectiveness of low short-term policy rates, especially concerning the 
margin on riskier loans to enterprises and consumer credit. The aforementioned 
conclusions are supported by the findings in Rajan (2006), and Borio and Zhu (2012) 
clarifying and justifying the risk-taking approach in an environment of low interest rates. 
The policy rates have an additional significant softening impact on the size of the loans 
or credit line and collateral requirements for enterprises loans. Furthermore, the low 
policy stance influence collateral requirements and loan to value ratio (LTV ratio) 
specifically concerning mortgage loans, and ultimately effects collateral requirements for 
consumer credit and other lending.  
The results support that increased credit risk is assumed by banks when approving and 
issuing new loans during periods of low monetary policy rates, especially prior to the 
onset of the crisis within the selection in question. Accordingly, the post-crisis outcomes 
imply that negative Taylor-rule residuals have an additional effect on the size of loans for 
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enterprises loans, a possible result of the scope of expansionary monetary policy carried 
out within the euro area. Moreover, it has increased the maturity of loans for mortgage 
loans.  
108 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Pre Crisis Results 
 Business Loans Mortgage Loans Consumer Credit & Other Lending 
 Margin 
 on 
Average 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Non-
interest 
Rates 
Charges 
Size of 
Loan or/ 
Credit line 
Collateral 
requirements 
Loan  
covenants 
Maturity Margin 
on 
Average 
Loans 
Margin 
on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Collateral 
requirements 
“Loan-to-
value” 
ratio 
Maturity Non-
interest 
rates 
Charges 
Margin  
on 
Average 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Collateral 
requirements 
Maturity Non-
interest 
rates 
Charges 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Taylor rule residuals i,t-1 12.35* 7.920** 0.245 4.534* 6.697* 3.781 5.835 8.640*** 6.287* 2.678* 5.975* 0.224 -3.209 8.235*** 4.412** 3.643* 1.042 -1.047 
 (2.52) (2.90) (0.12) (2.03) (2.39) (1.28) (1.87) (3.36) (2.54) (2.11) (2.56) (0.12) (-1.63) (4.09) (2.97) (2.26) (0.40) (-0.36) 
 
Demand for Loans i, t-1 -0.0673 -0.0978 0.0731 -0.0289 -0.0243 -0.00761 -0.0688 -0.0735 -0.0394 -0.0186 -0.0512* -0.08*** -0.0455 0.0014 -0.0932* -0.0251 0.0148 -0.013 
 (-0.98) (-1.38) (1.47) (-0.84) (-0.35) (-0.16) (-1.48) (-1.56) (-0.99) (-1.65) (-2.00) (-5.91) (-1.52) (0.02) (-2.37) (-0.46) (0.31) (-0.43) 
 
10 Year bond Rate i, t-1 14.62* 11.26* 10.08** 6.632 4.726 8.532* 9.346* 4.828 7.213 1.621 -0.819 1.454 9.559 7.693 8.675* 4.002 5.565 6.848 
 (2.28) (2.54) (3.29) (1.92) (1.29) (2.15) (2.38) (1.01) (1.76) (0.87) (-0.29) (0.65) (1.96) (1.21) (2.18) (1.58) (1.52) (1.73) 
 
Inflation rate i, t-1 9.317*** 8.458*** 2.275 5.237*** 6.061* 5.023** 4.960* 2.115 5.448 1.519* 1.103 0.314 -1.231 6.277* 6.865** 1.800* 2.613* 1.512 
 (3.34) (3.52) (1.72) (5.72) (2.35) (3.21) (2.52) (0.61) (1.87) (2.02) (0.59) (0.16) (-1.21) (2.44) (3.19) (2.05) (2.03) (1.31) 
 
GDP growth rate i, t-1 0.585 -0.370 0.328 -0.696 -0.526 0.0200 -0.189 0.381 -1.321 -0.546 -1.155 -0.505 -0.481 -0.779 -0.831 -1.474 -1.422* 0.409 
 (0.31) (-0.34) (0.29) (-1.02) (-0.74) (0.03) (-0.21) (0.33) (-1.13) (-0.92) (-1.08) (-0.65) (-0.65) (-0.56) (-1.11) (-1.45) (-2.14) (0.88) 
 
Lagged Dependent  i, t-1 0.533*** 0.448*** 0.581*** 0.462*** 0.593*** 0.533*** 0.406*** 0.508*** 0.421*** 0.515*** 0.478*** 0.285*** 0.372** 0.306** 0.369*** 0.311*** 0.272* 0.260* 
 (7.22) (4.74) (7.58) (7.51) (8.41) (11.34) (4.58) (3.94) (3.69) (4.48) (3.75) (5.39) (2.98) (3.05) (3.70) (6.29) (2.34) (2.37) 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
No of countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
AR(2) p-value 0.259 0.273 0.903 0.719 0.704 0.460 0.852 0.704 0.158 0.112 0.215 0.340 0.230 0.369 0.726 0.374 0.313 0.405 
p(Sargan) 0.296 0.304 0.187 0.582 0.245 0.507 0.505 0.025 0.339 0.640 0.394 0.284 0.154 0.029 0.290 0.584 0.091 0.506 
Table 7 illustrates the results of a GMM dynamic panel estimation in which the dependant variable is specified through the net percentage from banks from every one of the nations belonging to the EU-9, reporting a tightening 
of the terms and conditions for approving loans or credit lines to three elements included in the BLS, which are as follows: enterprises (columns 1–7), households (columns 8–13) and consumer credits (columns 14–18), while 
factoring the preceding quarter.  There are the responses to Question 3, 10 and 12 as outlined in the BLS.  We have a balanced panel dataset which incorporates 9 Euro-area nations: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. We estimate the panel regression over the pre-crisis period from 2002:Q3-2008:Q3. The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. 
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Table 8: Post Crisis Results 
 Business Loans Mortgage Loans Consumer Credit & Other Lending 
 Margin 
 on 
Average 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Non-
interest 
Rates 
Charges 
Size of 
Loan or/ 
Credit line 
Collateral 
requirements 
Loan  
covenants 
Maturity Margin 
on 
Average 
Loans 
Margin 
on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Collateral 
requirements 
“Loan-to-
value” 
ratio 
Maturity Non-
interest 
rates 
Charges 
Margin 
 on 
Average 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Collateral 
requirements 
Maturity Non-
interest 
rates 
Charges 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Taylor rule residuals i,t-1 
18.98 10.55* 0.801 12.50** -0.480 3.262 2.067 9.029 10.53 -1.878 5.212 6.126* 1.242 4.111 4.544 -2.065 -1.916 -2.849 
 
(1.87) (2.03) (0.08) (2.76) (-0.11) (0.98) (0.57) (0.78) (1.24) (-0.60) (0.98) (2.47) (0.22) (1.28) (1.49) (-0.48) (-0.47) (-1.24) 
 
Demand for Loans i, t-1 
-0.0640 -0.0275 -0.0116 -0.0366 -0.162** -0.120 0.0146 0.146* 0.0311 0.0175 0.0284 -0.0246 0.0179 -0.149*** -0.0422 0.0628 -0.0390 -0.125 
 
(-0.48) (-0.26) (-0.11) (-0.59) (-2.65) (-1.50) (0.17) (2.43) (0.56) (0.54) (0.48) (-0.64) (0.71) (-3.88) (-0.60) (0.95) (-1.47) (-1.58) 
 
10 Year bond Rate i, t-1 
-0.806 0.152 -0.804 -0.453 -0.419 -0.447 -1.303 -1.371 0.692 0.740 0.192 -0.938 -0.634 0.482 1.129* 0.194 -0.471 -0.164 
 
(-0.76) (0.18) (-1.91) (-0.58) (-1.28) (-0.89) (-1.82) (-1.70) (1.10) (1.05) (0.27) (-1.76) (-1.18) (0.91) (2.12) (0.53) (-1.25) (-0.23) 
 
Inflation rate i, t-1 
8.967** 9.456*** 4.020** 6.734*** 4.932*** 5.949*** 6.241*** 9.516*** 7.588*** 0.836 3.787* 2.710** 2.575** 3.509* 3.136* 0.583 0.379 0.320 
 
(3.05) (6.03) (3.26) (4.40) (3.56) (3.52) (4.39) (3.95) (4.05) (0.60) (2.29) (2.82) (2.61) (2.34) (2.36) (0.41) (0.42) (0.28) 
 
GDP growth rate i, t-1 
4.482*** 2.253* 0.932 0.867 1.689 1.255** 0.964 -0.0829 0.541 -0.303 -0.509 0.906 -0.304 1.944* 1.349 -0.377 0.224 1.476 
 
(3.76) (2.53) (1.03) (1.47) (1.69) (2.67) (1.79) (-0.07) (0.49) (-0.39) (-0.43) (1.82) (-0.67) (2.12) (1.48) (-0.82) (0.50) (1.65) 
 
Lagged Dependent  i, t-1 
0.741*** 0.450*** 0.513*** 0.532*** 0.449*** 0.360*** 0.596*** 0.592*** 0.343** 0.324 0.386 0.502*** 0.541*** 0.397* 0.417* 0.709** 0.514*** 0.526*** 
 
(7.69) (4.31) (3.74) (3.87) (4.73) (4.29) (8.67) (4.55) (3.02) (1.73) (1.79) (3.90) (3.65) (2.17) (2.36) (2.79) (3.56) (12.39) 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
No of countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
AR(2) p-value 0.492 0.574 0.602 0.327 0.624 0.684 0.401 0.277 0.322 0.486 0.612 0.815 0.697 0.285 0.344 0.189 0.835 0.225 
p(Sargan) 0.014 0.147 0.222 0.018 0.068 0.005 0.018 0.041 0.027 0.010 0.353 0.054 0.019 0.159 0.113 0.001 0.020 0.000 
Table 8 illustrates the results of a GMM dynamic panel estimation in which the dependant variable is specified through the net percentage from banks from every one of the nations belonging to the EU-9, reporting a tightening 
of the terms and conditions for approving loans or credit lines to three elements included in the BLS, which are as follows: enterprises (columns 1–7), households (columns 8–13) and consumer credits (columns 14–18), while 
factoring the preceding quarter.  There are the responses to Question 3, 10 and 12 as outlined in the BLS.  We have a balanced panel dataset which incorporates 9 Euro-area nations: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. We estimate the panel regression over the post-crisis period from 2011:Q1-2014:Q4. The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. 
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3.4.5 Bank risk-taking behaviour in core vs. periphery countries 
In Tables 9 and 10, this present investigation is further progressed by estimating twelve 
distinct regressions with the purpose of analysing the concept of ‘excessive’ risk-taking—
naturally factoring in the stipulation that determining excessive risk is an exceedingly 
challenging undertaking, which is supported in Maddaloni and Peydro (2013). The 
objective of this undertaking is to identify potential risk-taking behaviour by banks prior 
to and after the onset of recent crisis. As a result we regroup the designated nations within 
the original sample in line with both the impact and the severity of the financial crisis into 
two panels of A and B. Panel A comprises Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal, whereas 
Panel B consists of Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.  
We first regress banks’ margins as applied to riskier loans on Taylor-rule residuals in 
addition to further macro measurements concerning the three loan types. Then further 
regressions are conducted to control for the variations in lending conditions as a result of 
changes in borrowers’ net worth directly from the BLS and other control variables. It is 
important to mention that banks’ credit standards can be tightened due to a rise in 
perception of risk as a result of the issues outlined here: expectation regarding the 
economic activity, industry or firm specific outlook and risk on collateral demanded with 
reference to enterprises loans (see BLS. Question. 2), housing market prospects for 
household loans (see BLS. Question. 9) and creditworthiness of consumer credit and 
other lending (see BLS. Question. 11). 
When examining the outcome of the pre-crisis selection from stressed and non-stressed 
countries of the EU-9, it can be deduced that the coefficient of Taylor-rule residuals for 
the regression utilising banks’ conditions and terms for approving loans or credit lines 
within the three categories of loans remains significant; this is especially prevalent when 
analysing stressed countries relative to non-stressed countries. The significance of the 
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coefficient implies that prior to the commencement of the crisis, banks surprisingly 
relaxed margins for loans to borrowers perceived as riskier, in an environment of low 
monetary rates. These results uphold the previous findings by Jimenez et al. (2014) and 
Ioannidou et al. (2015). Accordingly, this conclusion is robust to the incorporation of the 
pertinent interest rates, i.e. the 10 year government bond rates, most specifically in the 
non-stressed nation prior to onset of crisis. The selection in the post-crisis sample 
indicates a reduction in the effect of low policy rates on softening household and 
consumer loans in non-stressed nations. However, in stressed nations the data indicates 
that excessive risk-taking in bank lending behaviour occurred, particularly during periods 
of low monetary policy rates both pre- and post-crisis. 
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Table 9: Before and After Crisis (Non-stressed Countries) 
  Before   After  
 Business Loans Mortgage Loans Consumer Credit & Other Lending Business Loans Mortgage Loans Consumer Credit & Other Lending 
 Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Taylor rule residuals i,t-1 12.57*** 10.87** 3.669 4.678* 3.092* 3.602** 22.70** 22.72** 3.137 10.87 3.013 3.541 
 (3.73) (2.92) (1.81) (2.56) (2.14) (2.69) (2.87) (2.89) (0.15) (0.61) (0.37) (0.36) 
Demand for Loans i, t-1 -0.159* -0.0796 -0.110* -0.0965* -0.0718* -0.0368 -0.295*** -0.261*** 0.0240 0.0174 0.0223 0.0257 
 (-2.08) (-1.39) (-2.40) (-2.32) (-2.08) (-1.64) (-3.90) (-3.79) (0.83) (0.56) (0.50) (0.60) 
10 Year bond Rate i, t-1 9.762 12.91 11.34*** 10.58** 12.15*** 11.81*** -2.435 -2.107 0.192 1.295 -4.876 -4.258 
 (1.55) (1.89) (3.42) (2.91) (3.48) (3.34) (-0.51) (-0.42) (0.02) (0.18) (-1.58) (-1.64) 
Inflation rate i, t-1 10.47** 10.41** 4.270 4.132 5.361* 6.521* 15.27*** 15.43*** 5.668 5.964 5.872 5.773 
 (3.09) (2.98) (1.46) (1.41) (2.50) (2.35) (5.17) (3.73) (0.83) (0.86) (1.85) (1.80) 
GDP growth rate i, t-1 -1.313 -0.247 -3.833*** -3.136** -1.494* -0.498 1.217 1.099 -2.219 -0.719 0.263 0.008 
 (-0.89) (-0.16) (-4.05) (-3.09) (-2.18) (-1.04) (0.95) (1.24) (-0.83) (-0.43) (0.25) (0.01) 
Expectations regarding general 
economic activity i, t-1  0.305*  -0.006  0.302 
 
0.237 
 
0.290 
 
-0.0110 
  (2.16)  (-0.05)  (1.89)  (0.89)  (1.36)  (-0.13) 
Industry or firm-specific outlook i, t-1  -0.0769      -0.0666     
  (-0.53)      (-0.30)     
Risk on the collateral demanded i, t-1  0.203    -0.265  -0.0354    0.171 
  (1.86)    (-1.29)  (-0.15)    (0.52) 
Housing market prospects i, t-1    0.168***      0.184   
    (4.36)      (1.10)   
Creditworthiness of consumers i, t-1      0.0687      -0.0853** 
      (0.65)      (-2.96) 
Lagged Dependent  i, t-1 0.337** 0.164 0.128 0.0916 0.139 0.0726 0.252** 0.184 0.207*** 0.197*** -0.256** -0.253* 
 (2.71) (1.41) (1.53) (1.22) (1.37) (0.70) (3.25) (1.78) (11.84) (6.61) (-3.10) (-2.23) 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 114 114 114 114 114 114 78 78 78 78 78 78 
No of countries 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
AR(2) p-value 0.660 0.937 0.139 0.227 0.734 0.963 0.580 0.827 0.088 0.082 0.234 0.111 
p(Sargan) 0.401 0.282 0.058 0.030 0.045 0.022 0.714 0.247 0.087 0.117 0.421 0.350 
Table 9 illustrates the results of a GMM dynamic panel estimation in which the dependant variable is specified through the net percentage from banks from every one of the nations belonging to the EU-9, reporting 
a tightening of the terms and conditions for approving loans or credit lines to three elements included in the BLS. We have a balanced panel dataset which incorporates 5 Euro-area nations: Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg and Netherlands. We estimate the panel regression over both pre and post crisis period .The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 10: Before and After Crisis (Stressed Countries) 
  Before   After  
 Business Loans Mortgage Loans Consumer Credit & Other Lending Business Loans Mortgage Loans Consumer Credit & Other Lending 
 Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Taylor rule residuals i,t-1 6.722*** 5.956** 11.95*** 13.47*** 6.380* 8.758*** 6.738 13.11 20.56* 22.27 17.05*** 21.56*** 
 (3.58) (3.07) (3.71) (4.47) (2.49) (5.45) (0.74) (1.46) (2.07) (1.92) (3.59) (9.74) 
Demand for Loans i, t-1 -0.0476 0.0351 0.0307 0.0314 -0.102* -0.0362 0.127 0.0744 -0.0129 0.0573 -0.0926*** -0.234*** 
 (-0.46) (0.42) (0.62) (0.51) (-2.04) (-1.20) (1.56) (1.18) (-0.13) (0.35) (-4.67) (-4.27) 
10 Year bond Rate i, t-1 8.656* 7.303 6.914 6.338 6.868 2.051 0.708 0.824 0.633 1.050** -0.726 0.0882 
 (2.10) (1.74) (1.03) (0.98) (0.95) (0.37) (0.58) (0.78) (0.98) (3.00) (-1.20) (0.14) 
Inflation rate i, t-1 7.202** 5.456* 9.081 8.786 9.990* 12.07*** 13.48*** 10.58* 16.25*** 15.71*** 12.76*** 9.106*** 
 (3.09) (2.00) (1.54) (1.48) (2.15) (3.44) (3.71) (2.18) (6.48) (8.53) (3.58) (5.57) 
GDP growth rate i, t-1 0.699 0.815 0.668 0.371 -0.110 -1.101 3.674* 3.667** 4.362*** 4.821*** 2.199* 4.496** 
 (0.69) (0.63) (0.41) (0.21) (-0.08) (-0.75) (2.50) (2.96) (4.68) (5.92) (2.44) (2.86) 
Expectations regarding general 
economic activity i, t-1  0.109  0.0725  0.544** 
 
0.340 
 
0.0169 
 
-0.0253 
  (1.47)  (1.10)  (2.77)  (1.23)  (0.12)  (-0.10) 
Industry or firm-specific outlook i, t-1  0.0131      -0.311     
  (0.09)      (-1.88)     
Risk on the collateral demanded i, t-1  0.171*    -0.0177  0.201    0.299*** 
  (2.44)    (-0.12)  (1.13)    (4.06) 
Housing market prospects i, t-1    -0.0431      0.320*   
    (-1.96)      (2.39)   
Creditworthiness of consumers i, t-1      -0.372**      0.176 
      (-2.99)      (0.78) 
Lagged Dependent  i, t-1 0.542*** 0.413*** 0.454*** 0.398*** 0.408** 0.139 0.346** 0.336** 0.142 0.0152 0.255** -0.104 
 (8.15) (3.34) (4.09) (5.04) (3.00) (0.77) (2.82) (2.62) (0.80) (0.15) (2.85)   (-0.54) 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 96 95 96 95 96 95 64 63 64 63 64 63 
No of countries 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
AR(2) p-value 0.219 0.232 0.749 0.544 0.305 0.443 0.473 0.203 0.618 0.672 0.652 0.489 
p(Sargan) 0.431 0.393 0.097 0.052 0.424 0.368 0.011 0.025 0.017 0.016 0.172 0.117 
Table 10 illustrates the results of a GMM dynamic panel estimation in which the dependant variable is specified through the net percentage from banks from every one of the nations belonging to the EU-9, reporting 
a tightening of the terms and conditions for approving loans or credit lines to three elements included in the BLS. We have a balanced panel dataset which incorporates 4 Euro-area nations: Greece, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain. We estimate the panel regression over both pre and post crisis period. The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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3.4.6 The effectiveness of the ECB’s 3 year LTROs 
In this section an analytical investigation of the outcomes for the BLS in EU-9 is 
conducted, encompassing the period 2012Q1 to 2014Q4. The basis of this approach is to 
determine the effectiveness of the ECB’s 3 year LTROs with the purpose of learning if 
the measurements exerted the impact they were intended to. 
As illustrated by Figure 5, banks’ credit standards for business loans were relaxed in EU-
9 countries following the execution of these LTROs. In particular this observation applies 
to the first quarter of 2012, in which out of the total bank participants in the survey, just 
17% noted a constriction in the accessibility of loans or credit lines to enterprises in 
contrast to a significantly higher proportion of 36% seen in the preceding quarter.  
Although this measure stays constricted till the final quarter in 2013, it is substantially 
more gradual in its development than previous quarters. Accordingly, this progress is 
probably propelled through more moderate demand on banks stemming from the cost of 
funds and balance sheet constraints, reflected in Figure 7. Here it can be inferred that 
costs related to a bank’s capital position in addition to a bank’s ability to access market 
financing show significant constrictions before 2012Q1. However, the ECB’s €1 trillion 
cheap loan scheme has achieved its anticipated impact in substantially aiding the 
relaxation of the previously mentioned issues.  
Furthermore, banks’ liquidity positions saw additional progress within the course of this 
period. Here it is crucial to highlight that the pattern of credit standards for business loans 
reflects further relaxation in nearly all EU-9 countries. The country analysis indicates that 
particularly Italy, Portugal and Greece experienced a marked elevation of bank credit. 
Net tightening of banks’ credit standards as applied to the approval of loans available in 
the two components to households for house purchase and consumer credit and other 
lending also experienced a substantial decline within same period. Even though the 
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progressive decrease in bank credit constriction is reassuring and necessary in order to 
dilute the devastating impact of the latest financial turmoil, the benefits of such action 
can only be experienced in the EU-9 economy with a concurrent increase in net demand. 
Correspondingly, research by Popov and Van Horen (2015) details that the reduced rate 
of lending persisted, following the ECB’s LTRO in December 2011 and these measures 
evidently failed to stop the total reduction in bank lending in the euro area. An analysis 
of Figures 6 and 8-9 indicates a substantial decline in the demand for loans to enterprises, 
households and consumer credit. Certainly the net percentage of banks announcing 
decreased demand from enterprises in EU-9 fell from -6% in 2011Q4 to -42% in 2012Q4. 
Such a significant fall in demand is justified through enterprises being reluctant to invest 
while the Eurozone crisis progressed with increasing concerns of falling into a recession; 
this was especially the case in strained EU-9 nations. However, banks’ credit demand 
eventually began to increase starting from 2013Q1 to the final quarter of 2014, which 
implies that the inclination of enterprises to invest, housing market outlook and consumer 
confidence are largely increasing, especially in the EU-9 periphery countries this progress 
is comparable to the banks’ credit standards within the analogous period. 
Figure 5: Credit Standards for Business Loans 
 
Source: (BLS, 2015) 
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Figure 6: Net Demand for Business Loans 
 
Source: (BLS, 2015) 
 
 
Figure 7:  Factors influencing Credit standards for Business Loans 
 
Source: (BLS, 2015) 
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Figure 8: Credit Standards vs Net Demand for Mortgage Loans 
 
Source: (BLS, 2015) 
 
Figure 9: Credit Standards vs Net Demand for Consumer Credit 
 
Source: (BLS, 2015) 
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3.5 Conclusion  
The 2007-8 financial turmoil has exerted a negative influence on bank lending within the 
primary industrialised nations, in addition to the euro area. As a result this has brought 
attention to the issue concerning the proclivity of economic entities to take on further risk 
especially during periods of low interest rates. Moreover, when considering the practice 
of cautious lending in banks which are reluctant to intensify lending activity and volume 
regardless of the monetary policy stance, with the purpose of enabling bank lending, the 
ECB initiated a 3 year LTROs in which a combined sum of €1 trillion cheap loans was 
injected into the EU banking system. In this chapter these topics are extensively examined 
in 9 countries of the euro area.  
We find robust supporting data that low-short term interest rates prior to the crisis induced 
an inconsistent loosening of credit standards regarding enterprises, household and 
consumer loans. From the data analysis it can be determined that higher rates of GDP 
growth are connected with the softening of total lending standards, particularly in the pre-
crisis sample, verifying the position taken in Maddaloni and Peydro (2011) which 
characterises banks’ credit standards as ‘pro-cyclical’. Moreover, 10-year government 
bond rates are mainly statistically insignificant, highlighting that lending standards are 
unaffected by long-term national interest rates. Despite the scope of expansionary 
monetary policy reported mainly in the post-crisis sample, this analysis indicates that 
negative Taylor-rule residuals resulted solely in softening of total lending standards for 
enterprises loans.  
The implementation of the 3 years LTRO by the ECB caused a decrease of the 
development of banks’ credit constriction, which is reassuring and necessary in order to 
avoid the likely damaging outcomes of the latest financial crisis. Nevertheless, the 
benefits of this scheme have yet to be experienced within the EU-9 real economy 
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considering the disadvantageous decline in demand for all three types of loans. However, 
the demand eventually began to increase in 2013Q1 till the final quartering of 2014, 
indicating an encouraging inclination by enterprises to invest. In addition, housing market 
outlook and consumer confidence are starting to increase, which has not occurred since 
the commencement of the credit crunch. Additionally, the recent TLTRO scheme 
implemented by the ECB is geared towards enabling increased access to cheap financing 
for SME lending.  
Especially noteworthy are the results from before the onset of the crisis, which indicate 
that banks unexpectedly relaxed margins for loans to borrowers considered as riskier, in 
an environment of low monetary rates within stressed and non-stressed nations of the 
sample investigated. Yet, in stressed nations the data suggests that excessive risk-taking 
in bank lending behaviour transpired, especially during periods of low monetary policy 
rates both pre- and post-crisis. Such recklessness should be an important issue for policy 
makers to note and should be comprehensively tackled in the formulation of future 
policies.  
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Appendices to Chapter 3 
Appendix A 
Table A1: Summary Statistics: Bank Lending Survey Indicators and Financial Indicators 
Before the Start of the Financial Crisis (2002:Q4-
2008:Q3) 
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs 
Lending Standards: 
     
Business Loans 17.75 31.28 -50 100 216 
Mortgage Loans 4.61 27.98 -66.67 100 216 
Consumer Credit Loans 6.95 24.22 -35.71 100 216 
Demand for Loans: 
     
Business Loans 2.89 30 -83.33 71.43 216 
Mortgage Loans 5.17 45.98 -100 100 216 
Consumer Credit Loans 6.34 30.48 -100 100 216 
Lending Standards Due to Balance Sheet Factors: 
     
Bank Capital Position 12.51 17.50 -25 80 216 
Bank Liquidity Position 4.25 13.37 -33.33 51.20 216 
Bank Market Financing  6.92 18.92 -40.00 100 216 
All Balance Sheet Factors for Mortgage Loans 4.96 15.30 -66.67 80 216 
All Balance Sheet Factors for Consumer Credit Loans 4.37 16.98 -33.33 100 216 
Perception of Risk:      
Expectations regarding general economic activity 23.52 33.45 -42.86 100 216 
Industry or firm-specific outlook 29.16 33.45 -28.57 100 216 
Risk on the collateral demanded 12.52 19.75 -20 80 216 
Expectations regarding general economic activity 12.83 24.20 -40 100 216 
Housing market prospects 14.80 26.59 -33.33 100 216 
Expectations regarding general economic activity 11.86 24.38 -33.33 100 216 
Creditworthiness of consumers 16.94 22.44 -25   100 216 
Risk on the collateral demanded 7.65 16.97 -33.33 80 216 
Loans terms and conditions:      
Margin on average for Business Loans 5.80 44.40 -100 100 216 
Margin on riskier Business Loans 38.73 34.61 -50 100 216 
Margin on average for Mortgage Loans -9..236 35.27 -100 100 216 
Margin on riskier for Mortgage Loans 13.43 25.48 -33.33 100 216 
Margin on average for Consumer Credit Loans -3.97 26.95 -66.67 80 216 
Margin on riskier for Consumer Credit Loans 13.54 23.13 -33.33 90 216 
Non-interest rate charges 8.55 21.17 -40 100 216 
Size of the loan or credit line 11.06 20.32 -33.33 75 216 
Collateral requirements 14.92 25.97 -46.5 100 216 
Loan covenants 10.81 21.85 -33.33 83.33 216 
Maturity 7.40 24.44 -50 80 216 
Financial factors:      
EONIA 2.84 0.82 2.02 4.25 216 
Taylor-rule Residuals 0.74 0.85 -0.99 2.46 216 
10-year Government bond rates 3.99 0.50 2.20 4.97 216 
Growth rate of GDP 2.36 1.92 -2.20 8.10 216 
Inflation rate 2.62 0.94 0.80 5.60 216 
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Table A2: Summary Statistics: Bank Lending Survey Indicators and Financial Indicators 
During the  Financial Crisis (2008:Q4-2010:Q4) Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs 
Lending Standards: 
     
Business Loans  26.06 33.16 -14.29 100 81 
Mortgage Loans 22.14 30.03 -26.4 100 81 
Consumer Credit Loans 21.37 25.78 -17 100 81 
Demand for Loans: 
     
Business Loans -13.64 33.23 -86 50 81 
Mortgage Loans -6.37 48.02 -100 83.5 81 
Consumer Credit Loans -19.62 31.45 -100 50 81 
Lending Standards Due to Balance Sheet Factors: 
     
Bank Capital Position 17.26 23.51 -25 80 81 
Bank Liquidity Position 4.09 24.68 -40 80 81 
Bank Market Financing  13.01 26.65 -40 100 81 
All Balance Sheet Factors for Mortgage Loans 12.96 24.92 -60 100 81 
All Balance Sheet Factors for Consumer Credit Loans 13.32 22.23 -25 100 81 
Financial factors:      
EONIA 0.86 0.87 0.34 3.15 81 
Taylor-rule Residuals -0.16 1.21 -2.37 2.14 81 
10-year Government bond rates 4.14 1.47 2.42 11.03 75 
Growth rate of GDP -1.37 3.66 -9.60 6.30 81 
Inflation rate 1.31 1.41 -1.50 5.60 81 
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Table A3: Summary Statistics: Bank Lending Survey Indicators and Financial Indicators 
After the  Financial Crisis (2011:Q1-2014:Q4) Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs 
Lending Standards: 
     
Business Loans 8.46 24.73 -50 100 144 
Mortgage Loans 12.78 25.12 -50 100 144 
Consumer Credit Loans 7.80 21.29 -27.5 100 144 
Demand for Loans: 
     
Business Loans -12.90 29.08 -80 75 144 
Mortgage Loans -14.48 44.70 -100 100 144 
Consumer Credit Loans -14.76 32.85 -100 75 144 
Lending Standards Due to Balance Sheet Factors:      
Bank Capital Position 8.52 20.18 -25 80 144 
Bank Liquidity Position 0.39 25.01 -75 80 144 
Bank Market Financing  6.55 21.28 -25 100 144 
All Balance Sheet Factors for Mortgage Loans 10.18 22.41 -33.33 100 144 
All Balance Sheet Factors for Consumer Credit Loans 7.22 19.83 -27.5 100 144 
Perception of Risk:      
Expectations regarding general economic activity 15.94 28.89 -40 100 144 
Industry or firm-specific outlook 18.13 28.88 -50 100 144 
Risk on the collateral demanded 10.39 19.06 -25 80 144 
Expectations regarding general economic activity 13.87 27.06 -40 100 144 
Housing market prospects 14.68 24.91 -25 100 144 
Expectations regarding general economic activity 10.45 25.53 -40 100 144 
Creditworthiness of consumers 13.95 27.47 -20 100 144 
Risk on the collateral demanded 7.79 20.56 -12.5 100 144 
Loans terms and conditions:      
Margin on average for Business Loans 2.94 39.41 -80 100 144 
Margin on riskier Business Loans 25.53 29.72 -25 100 144 
Margin on average for Mortgage Loans 4.07 31.51 -66.67 100 144 
Margin on riskier for Mortgage Loans 18.26 26.28 -28.57 100 144 
Margin on average for Consumer Credit Loans 2.89 22.36 -50 100 144 
Margin on riskier for Consumer Credit Loans 10.49 22.01 -25 100 144 
Non-interest rate charges 4.94 20.37 -60 100 144 
Size of the loan or credit line 6.91 25.37 -80 100 144 
Collateral requirements 10.87 25.46 -25 100 144 
Loan covenants 6.74 22.59 -50 100 144 
Maturity 10.82 26.47 -60 100 144 
Financial factors:      
EONIA 0.32 0.34 -0.02 1.04 144 
Taylor-rule Residuals -1.02 0.52 -2.20 0.76 144 
10-year Government bond rates 4.63 4.49 0.70 25.40 144 
Growth rate of GDP -0.37 2.66 -10.40 6.00 144 
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Appendix B 
Table B1:Detailed illustrations of questions posed in the BLS survey and variables used in this analysis 
Bank Lending Survey Questions39  Definition  Measures 
Bank’s credit standards 
Over the past three months, how have your bank’s 
credit standards as applied to the approval of loans 
or credit lines to ….  changed? 
 
Loans or credit lines to enterprises (Qs1) 
Loans for house purchase (Qs8) 
Consumer credit and other lending (Qs8) 
Total lending Standards for: 
Business Loans 
Mortgage Loans 
Consumer Loans 
Net percentage of banks 
reporting a tightening over the 
previous quarter. 
Factors affecting bank credit standards: 
 Over the past three months, how have the following 
factors affected your bank’s credit standards as 
applied to the approval of loans or credit lines to 
…….? 
A) Cost of funds and balance 
sheet constraints  
 
C) Perception of risk  
 
Loans or credit lines to enterprises  (Qs2) 
A.1) Bank’s cost of capital 
A.2) Access to market financing 
A.3) Bank’s liquidity position      
 
All factors for house purchase (Qs9) 
All factor for consumer credit and other lending (Qs11) 
 
Expectations regarding general economic activity (Qs2) 
Industry or firm-specific outlook (Qs2) 
Risk on the collateral demanded (Qs2) 
 
Expectations regarding general economic activity (Qs9) 
Housing market prospects (Qs9) 
Expectations regarding general economic activity(Qs11) 
Creditworthiness of consumers (Qs11) 
Risk on the collateral demanded (Qs11) 
Total lending Standards for: 
Business Loans 
 
 
 
Mortgage Loans 
Consumer Loans 
 
Business Loans 
Business Loans 
Business Loans 
 
Mortgage Loans 
Mortgage Loans 
Consumer Loans  
Consumer Loans 
Consumer Loans 
Net percentage of banks 
reporting a tightening over the 
previous quarter. 
Loans terms and conditions: 
Over the past three months, how have your bank’s 
conditions and terms for approving loans or credit 
lines to ….   changed? 
 
A) Price 
B) Other conditions and terms 
A) Qs(3), Qs(10) and Qs(12) 
Your bank’s margin on average loans  
Your bank’s margin on riskier loans 
 
 
B) Qs(3) 
 
 
 
 
Business Loans 
Mortgage Loans 
Consumer Loans 
 
 
Business Loans 
Non-interest rate charges 
Size of the loan or credit line 
Collateral requirements 
Loan covenants 
Net percentage of banks 
reporting a tightening over the 
previous quarter. 
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39 For a complete summary of the survey carried out by the ECB, refer to Appendix C. 
 
 
B) Qs(10) 
 
 
 
 
B) Qs(12) 
 
Maturity 
 
Mortgage Loans 
Collateral requirements  
“Loan-to-value” ratio  
Maturity 
Non-interest rate charges 
Consumer Loans 
Collateral requirements 
Maturity 
Non-interest rate charges 
Demand for Loans 
Over the past three months, how has the demand for 
loans or credit lines to …..changed at your bank, 
apart from normal seasonal fluctuations? 
 
Demand for loans to enterprises (Qs4) 
Demand for loans for house purchase (Qs13) 
Demand for loans for consumer credit (Qs13) 
Demand  
Business Loans 
Mortgage Loans 
Consumer Loans 
Net percentage of banks 
reporting an increase in loan 
demand over the previous 
quarter. 
Table B2: Data Sources    
Macroeconomic variables Definition Data Source Sample 
EONIA Quarterly average of the EONIA  overnight interest rate Eurostat 2002:Q4-2014:Q4 
Taylor-rule Residuals Residuals of a panel regression of EONIA on growth rate of GDP 
and inflation rates 
Eurostat, ECB 2002:Q4-2014:Q4 
10-year government bond yield Quarterly average of daily government bond yields Datastream 2002:Q4-2014:Q4 
Growth rate of GDP Quarterly growth rate of real GDP Eurostat 2002:Q4-2014:Q4 
Inflation rate Quarterly rate of inflation OECD 2002:Q4-2014:Q4 
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Appendix C 
BANK LENDING SURVEY FOR THE EURO AREA 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
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I. Loans or credit lines to enterprises  
  
1. Over the past three months, how have your bank’s credit standards as applied to the 
approval of loans or credit lines to enterprises changed?   
  Overall  Loans to small and 
medium-sized 
enterprises  
Loans to large 
enterprises  
Short-term 
loans  
Long-term 
loans  
Tightened 
considerably  
          
Tightened 
somewhat  
          
Remained 
basically 
unchanged   
          
Eased somewhat            
Eased 
considerably  
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2. Over the past three months, how have the following factors affected your bank’s credit 
standards as applied to the approval of loans or credit lines to enterprises (as described in question 
1)? Please rate the contribution of the following factors to the tightening or easing of credit 
standards using the following scale:  
– – = contributed considerably to tightening of credit standards  
– = contributed somewhat to tightening of credit standards  
 ○ = contributed to basically unchanged credit standards  
 + = contributed somewhat to easing of credit standards  
 + + = contributed considerably to easing of credit standards  
NA = not applicable  
  
  
  
  Overall   Loans to small and 
medium-sized  
enterprises  
Loans to large enterprises  
--  -  0  +  ++  NA  --  - 0 +  ++  NA  --  -  0  +  ++  NA  
A) Cost of funds and balance 
sheet constraints  
□ Costs related to your bank’s 
capital position (1)  
□ Your bank’s ability to access 
market financing (e.g. money or 
bond market financing, incl. 
true-sale securitisation (2))  
□ Your bank’s liquidity 
position  
B) Pressure from competition  
□ Competition from other banks   
□ Competition from non-banks  
□ Competition from market 
financing   
C) Perception of risk  
□ Expectations regarding 
general economic activity  
□ Industry or firm-specific 
outlook  
□ Risk on the collateral  
demanded  
                                    
D) Other factors, please specify  
  
                                    
(1) Can involve the use of credit derivatives, with the loans remaining on the bank’s balance sheet.  
(2) Involves the sale of loans from the bank’s balance sheet, i.e. off-balance sheet funding.  
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3.  Over the past three months, how have your bank’s conditions and terms for approving loans 
or credit lines to enterprises changed? Please rate each factor using the following scale:  
– – = tightened considerably  
– = tightened somewhat  
 ○ = remained basically unchanged  
 + = eased somewhat  
 + + = eased considerably  
NA = not applicable  
  
  
  
 Overall   Loans to small and 
medium-sized  
enterprises  
 Loans to large 
enterprises  
--  -  0 + ++  NA  --  - 0 + ++  NA  --  -  0  +  ++  NA  
A) Price  
□ Your bank’s margin on 
average loans (wider margin = 
tightened, narrower margin = 
eased)  
□ Your bank’s margin on riskier 
loans  
  
B) Other conditions and 
terms □ Non-interest rate 
charges  
□ Size of the loan or credit line  
□ Collateral requirements  
□ Loan covenants  
□ Maturity  
                                    
C) Other factors, please specify  
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4. Over the past three months, how has the demand for loans or credit lines to enterprises 
changed at your bank, apart from normal seasonal fluctuations?   
  Overall   Loans to small 
and medium-sized 
enterprises  
Loans to large 
enterprises  
Short-term 
loans  
Long-term 
loans  
Decreased considerably            
Decreased somewhat            
Remained basically 
unchanged   
          
Increased somewhat            
Increased considerably            
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5. Over the past three months, how have the following factors affected the demand for loans 
or credit lines to enterprises (as described in question 4 in the column headed “Overall”)? Please 
rate each possible factor using the following scale:  
– – = contributed considerably to lower demand  
– =contributed somewhat to lower demand  
 ○ =contributed to basically unchanged demand  
 + =contributed somewhat to higher demand  
 + + =contributed considerably to higher demand  
NA = not applicable  
  
   – –  –  ○  +  + +  NA  
A) Financing needs  
□ Fixed investment  
□ Inventories and working capital  
□ Mergers/acquisitions and corporate 
restructuring  
□ Debt restructuring  
B) Use of alternative finance  
□ Internal financing  
□ Loans from other banks  
□ Loans from non-banks  
□ Issuance of debt securities  
□ Issuance of equity  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
            
C) Other factors, please specify  
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6. Please indicate how you expect your bank’s credit standards as applied to the approval of 
loans or credit lines to enterprises to change over the next three months.   
  Overall   Loans to small  
and 
mediumsized 
enterprises  
Loans to 
large 
enterprises  
Short-term 
loans  
Long-term 
loans  
Tighten considerably            
Tighten somewhat            
Remain basically unchanged             
Ease somewhat            
Ease considerably            
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7. Please indicate how you expect demand for loans or credit lines to enterprises to change 
at your bank over the next three months (apart from normal seasonal fluctuations)   
  Overall   Loans to small and 
medium-sized 
enterprises  
Loans to 
large 
enterprises  
Shortterm 
loans  
Long-term 
loans  
Decrease considerably            
Decrease somewhat            
Remain basically unchanged            
Increase somewhat            
Increase considerably            
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II. Loans to households  
  
8. Over the past three months, how have your bank’s credit standards as applied to the 
approval of  loans to households changed?   
  Loans for house purchase  Consumer credit and other lending  
Tightened considerably      
Tightened somewhat      
Remained basically unchanged       
Eased somewhat      
Eased considerably      
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9. Over the past three months, how have the following factors affected your bank’s credit 
standards as applied to the approval of loans to households for house purchase (as described in 
question 8)? Please rate the contribution of the following factors to the tightening or easing of 
credit standards using the following scale:  
– – = contributed considerably to tightening of credit standards  
– = contributed somewhat to tightening of credit standards  
 ○ = contributed to basically unchanged credit standards  
 + = contributed somewhat to easing of credit standards  
 + + = contributed considerably to easing of credit standards  
NA = not applicable  
  
  – –  –  ○  +  + +  NA  
A) Cost  of  funds  and 
 balance  sheet  
constraints  
B) Pressure from competition  
□ Competition from other banks   
□ Competition from non-banks  
C) Perception of risk  
□ Expectations regarding general economic 
activity  
□ Housing market prospects  
  
            
D) Other factors, please specify  
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10.  Over the past three months, how have your bank’s conditions and terms for approving 
loans to households for house purchase changed? Please rate each factor using the following 
scale:  
– – = tightened considerably  
– = tightened somewhat  
 ○ = remained basically unchanged  
 + = eased somewhat  
 + + = eased considerably  
NA = not applicable  
  
  – –  –  ○  +  + +  NA  
A) Price  
□ Your bank’s margin on average loans (wider 
margin = tightened, narrower margin = eased)  
□ Your bank’s margin on riskier loans  
B) Other conditions and terms  
□ Collateral requirements  
□ “Loan-to-value” ratio  
□ Maturity  
□ Non-interest rate charges  
            
C) Other factors, please specify  
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11.  Over the past three months, how have the following factors affected your bank’s credit 
standards as applied to the approval of consumer credit and other lending to households (as 
described in question 8)? Please rate the contribution of the following factors to the 
tightening or easing of credit standards using the following scale:  
– – = contributed considerably to tightening of credit standards  
– = contributed somewhat to tightening of credit standards  
 ○ = contributed to basically unchanged credit standards  
 + = contributed somewhat to easing of credit standards  
 + + = contributed considerably to easing of credit standards  
NA = not applicable  
  
  – –  –  ○  +  + +  NA  
A) Cost  of funds and balance sheet  
constraints  
B) Pressure from competition  
□ Competition from other banks   
□ Competition from non-banks  
C) Perception of risk  
□ Expectations regarding general economic 
activity  
□ Creditworthiness of consumers  
□ Risk on the collateral demanded  
            
D) Other factors, please specify  
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12.   Over the past three months, how have your bank’s conditions and terms for approving 
consumer credit and other lending to households changed? Please rate each factor using the 
following scale:  – – = tightened considerably  
 – = tightened somewhat  
 ○ = remained basically unchanged  
 + = eased somewhat  
 + + = eased considerably  
NA = not applicable  
  
  – –  –  ○  +  + +  NA  
A) Price  
□ Your bank’s margin on average loans (wider 
margin = tightened, narrower margin = eased)  
□ Your bank’s margin on riskier loans  
B) Other conditions and terms  
□ Collateral requirements  
□ Maturity  
□ Non-interest rate charges  
            
C) Other factors, please specify  
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13. Over the past three months, how has the demand for loans to households changed at 
your bank, apart from normal seasonal fluctuations?   
  Loans for house purchase  Consumer credit and other lending  
Decreased considerably      
Decreased somewhat      
Remained basically unchanged       
Increased somewhat      
Increased considerably      
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14. Over the past three months, how have the following factors affected the demand for 
loans to households for house purchase (as described in question 13)? Please rate each factor 
using the following scale:  
– – = contributed considerably to lower demand  
– = contributed somewhat to lower demand  
 ○ =contributed to basically unchanged demand  
 + = contributed somewhat to higher demand  
 + + = contributed considerably to higher demand  
NA = not applicable  
  
  – –  –  ○  +  + +  NA  
A) Financing needs  
□ Housing market prospects  
□ Consumer confidence  
□ Non-housing related consumption 
expenditure  
B) Use of alternative finance  
□  Household savings  
□ Loans from other banks  
□ Other sources of finance  
            
C) Other factors, please specify  
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15.  Over the past three months, how have the following factors affected the demand for 
consumer credit and other lending to households (as described in question 13)? Please rate 
each factor using the following scale:  
– – = responsible for considerable decrease  
– = responsible for decrease  
 ○ = responsible for neither decrease nor increase  
 + = responsible for increase  
 + + = responsible for considerable increase  
NA = not applicable  
  
  – –  –  ○  +  + +  NA  
A) Financing needs  
□ Spending on durable consumer goods, such 
as cars, furniture, etc.  
□ Consumer confidence  
□ Securities purchases  
B) Use of alternative 
finance □ Household savings  
□ Loans from other banks  
□ Other sources of finance  
            
C) Other factors, please specify  
  
            
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
141 
 
16. Please indicate how you expect your bank’s credit standards as applied to the approval 
of loans to households to change over the next three months.   
  Loans for house purchase  Consumer credit and other lending  
Tighten considerably      
Tighten somewhat      
Remain basically unchanged       
Ease somewhat      
Ease considerably      
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17. Please indicate how you expect demand for loans to households to change over the next 
three months at your bank (apart from normal seasonal fluctuations).   
  Loans for house purchase  Consumer credit and other lending  
Decrease considerably      
Decrease somewhat      
Remain basically unchanged       
Increase somewhat      
Increase considerably      
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III. Open-ended question  
  
18. Over the past three months, have there been any other issues of importance for bank 
lending behaviour in the euro area or in your country which are not covered by this survey?  
  
  
  
  
[IV. Additional ad-hoc questions on specific topics of interest]  
 
 
 
 
144 
 
Chapter 4: Finance constraints and the use of alternative sources in 
Europe 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have great significance in the euro area 
corporate sector. They comprise 99.8% of all the firms in the euro area, 60% of turnover 
and 70% of employment. Additionally, SMEs are more than only “scaled-down” types 
of large enterprises. It appears that the monetary policy transmission mechanism differs 
in the case of SMEs relative to large companies due to the SMEs’ greater reliance on bank 
financing.   
In the subsequent aftermath of the 2007-8 financial crisis, lending to SMEs became the 
number one priority to consider for governing authorities worldwide, given that they are 
commonly referred to as the backbone of the European Union (EU) economy; this is 
particularly the case within the context of cautious lending when banks are disinclined to 
increase lending activity and volume irrespective of the monetary policy stance.  
In this economic background, several studies have concentrated on analysing the impact 
and determinants of bank lending constraints on firms from the beginning of the financial 
turmoil (de la Torre et al., 2010; Ferrando and Griesshaber, 2011; Freel et al., 2012; 
Popov and Udell, 2012; Kremp and Sevestre, 2013; Popov, 2013;  Öztürk and Mrkaic, 
2014; Casey and O’Toole 2014; Beck et al., 2014; Andrieu et al., 2015; Lawless et al., 
2015a; Ferrando et al., 2015; Ferrando and Mulier, 2015; Thomadakis, 2015; Cole and 
Sokolyk, 2016; Cowling et al., 2016; Mac an Bhaid et al., 2016; among others).  
The aim of this chapter is to examine whether bank lending constrained SMEs 
demonstrate relatively more usage or requests for alternative financing; additionally, we 
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offer a comprehensive evaluation by revealing the impact and determinants involved in a 
broad range of financing constraints and further outlining the important concept of 
discouraged borrowers, which is originally described by Kon and Storey (2003) as “a 
good firm, requiring finance that chooses not to apply to the bank because it feels its 
application will be rejected”. This study concentrates on 11 countries in the euro area: 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Portugal, hereafter EU-11, and uses data from the European Central 
Bank (ECB)/European Commission (EC) Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises 
(SAFE) for twelve waves spanning the time frame 2009 to 2014.   
In this chapter the following points will be looked at in detailed: (1)  first it investigates 
whether bank lending constraints SMEs demonstrate relatively more usage or requests 
for alternative financing such as grants or subsidised bank loans, trade credit, informal 
lending, leasing, hire purchase or factoring, market financing comprised of equity, issued 
debt securities or subordinated loans, and internal funds; (2) furthermore, it offers a 
comprehensive evaluation through revealing the impact and determinants involved in the 
different financing constraints such as credit lines, bank loans, trade credit and other 
lending40 on EU-11 firms; (3) thirdly, it attempts to add to the current research through 
analysing the concept of discouraged borrowers by evaluating the key determinants of 
discouragement using firm-specific traits as well as banking and macroeconomic 
indicators; (4) finally, the sampled EU-11 nations are grouped with respect to the severity 
of the impact of the financial crisis into two panels of A and B. Panel A comprises Greece, 
Spain, Italy, Portugal and Ireland whereas Panel B is composed of Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands.  
                                                 
40 It can be supplied from the subsequently outlined resources: loans from a related company, shareholders 
or family and friends, leasing, factoring, grants, subordinated debt instruments, participating loans, peer to-
peer lending, crowdfunding, and issuance of equity and debt securities.  
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The objective here is to ascertain the existence of significant variation between the 
stressed vs. non-stressed countries of the EU-11 relative to the findings derived from the 
main findings for EU-11 and the subsequent deduction as a result.   
Measures of credit constraints differentiate between five categories of constrained firms 
according to the following forms: a) credit constrained firms b) credit rationed firms c) 
credit rejected firms d) self-rationed firms and lastly e) discouraged firms (see Table 3 for 
a detailed description). Moreover, this research attempts to determine if these outcomes 
vary by factoring in the following firm characteristics: age, ownership status and size, 
along with quality, and risk and creditworthiness factors. The methodology used to tackle 
endogeneity here is analogous to that employed in Casey and O’Toole (2014) which 
recommends that the first lagged of bank lending constraints are used, whereas firm-level 
heterogeneity regulated via a panel prohibit specification with random effects.  
Within the period of this present evaluation no effect between the different credit-
constrained measures regarding the utilisation of trade credit was identified; this result is 
robustly demonstrated in stressed and non-stressed countries of the Eurozone. It is clear 
that small- and medium- sized firms are more likely to use trade credit. Yet, we do not 
find any statistically significant results supporting the idea that older firms tend to utilise 
trade credit more than younger firms.  
An unexpected inverse significant relationship between constrained measures and the 
demand for grant financing has been found. Firms experiencing rejected credit 
applications are 6% less likely to utilise grant financing. Stressed Eurozone countries are 
less likely to use grant financing when compared with non-stressed countries. Younger 
firms are 8% more likely to use this source of financing; however, this observation only 
holds true for non-stressed countries.  
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According to the evidence credit-constrained, rationed and discouraged firms 
demonstrate a greater tendency to utilise informal lending. Moreover, younger firms are 
10% more likely to use informal lending while older firms are not as likely to do so. 
Medium-sized firms show a higher tendency to utilise informal lending as a further 
component of their financing alternatives, relative to small-sized firms.  
Moreover, firms who experience rejected credit applications are 2% less likely to use 
market financing; this statistic is solely applicable to stressed countries of the Eurozone. 
Yet, no corroborating evidence for additional constrained measures is detected.  
Focusing on utilisation of internal funds41 and leasing, hire purchase and factoring, the 
results fail to establish a relationship between credit-constrained measures and the 
utilisation of the aforementioned financing types. From the data analysis it can be 
determined that both small- and medium-sized firms are more inclined to utilise leasing, 
hire purchase and factoring by approximately 26% and 40%, respectively. Older firms 
also show a higher tendency to utilise this kind of financing. Crucially no relationship 
between firm’s ownership types and the utilisation of internal funds is detected. 
It can be determined that micro and younger firms are comparatively more prone to 
having applications for bank loans and credit line rejected; this result corroborates the 
majority of prior empirical research on SMEs’ access to finance (Beck et al., 2006; 
Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009; Brown et al., 2011; Holton et al., 2014; among others). 
Similar corroborating evidence regarding firm’s size and trade credit rejection is detected; 
yet no conclusive finding is established regarding the association between firm’s age and 
our constrained indicators for trade credit.  
                                                 
41 There is limited evidence to support the utilisation of internal funds by credit-constrained firm in non-
stressed countries of the Eurozone. As a result, the primary discussion remains intact. 
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Furthermore, micro and small firms operating in industry sector are more likely to be 
rejected for other financing; however, this outcome is only valid when reflecting the main 
sample and the sub-sample specific to the periphery countries of the Eurozone.  
In line with our prior expectation, based on the results smaller, younger firms are more 
likely to get discouraged for bank loans. When examining stressed countries of the EU-
11, there is substantial evidence to assert that micro firms are more likely to be 
discouraged; however, no corroborating data regarding the impact of firms’ ages on the 
level of discouragement is found, which is in contrast to the pattern seen in the whole 
sample. Both micro and small firms in non-stressed countries experience somewhat lower 
discouragement rates compared with stressed countries.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents a review of 
the empirical literature. Section 4.3 describes the data and the methodology. Section 4.4 
discusses the empirical results, while section 4.5 concludes with a brief synopsis of the 
main results.   
4.2 Literature review 
With the purpose of constructing a comprehensive understanding of the concepts 
addressed in this chapter, a concise analysis of the fundamentals involved in the key terms 
of this subject is necessary.42 Considering that this study is most heavily related to current 
research concerning the connection between bank lending constraints and alternative 
finance utilisation, it provides a critical evaluation of the empirical studies that analysed 
this connection between bank lending and trade credit, grants or subsidised bank loans, 
                                                 
42 Table A1 provides a thorough review of recent studies that adopted survey data in the Eurozone (see 
Appendix A).   
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informal lending, market financing comprised of equity, issued debt securities or 
subordinated loans, leasing, hire purchase or factoring and internal funds. Lastly, we 
evaluate the concept of ‘discouraged borrowers’ with reference to the US and the EU 
countries.   
4.2.1 Trade credit  
Several studies serve to highlight the impact of a firm’s specific risk and quality on the 
utilisation of trade credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1995 and 1997; Ng et al., 1999; Klapper et 
al., 2012; Aktas et al., 2012; among others).  
Petersen and Rajan (1997) concentrate on small firms with potentially limited access to 
capital markets. The authors conclude that firms utilise additional trade credit during 
period of unavailable credit offered by the financial institution and propose that suppliers 
lend to constrained firms since they have the upper hand in relative terms when acquiring 
information concerning buyers, may liquidate assets efficiently and possess an implicit 
equity stake in the firms.   
A seminal paper by Ng et al. (1999) offers a comprehensive evaluation of current industry 
trade credit practice. The study analyses determinants of differences in interfirm credit 
terms and credit policies throughout industries, offering results which mainly corroborate 
theories that describe credit terms as legally binding resolutions concerning information 
issues relating to merchandise quality and buyer creditworthiness. Furthermore, the 
results fail to offer proof for liquidity of the seller as a chief motivating factor involved 
in the process of deciding whether to extend credit.   
Accordingly, Klapper et al. (2012) utilise a new data set in nearly 30,000 trade credit 
contracts in the US and Europe with the purpose of characterising the extensive traits of 
the parties involved in contracts as well as the important terms commonly associated with 
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such contracts. The results show that the largest and most creditworthy borrowers are 
awarded contracts with maturities of the longest durations (calculated using net days) by 
smaller suppliers; moreover, discounts for early payment show a tendency to be extended 
to riskier borrowers.  
Utilising US data, Aktas et al. (2012) develop a model which forecasts a direct 
relationship between utilisation of trade credit and the quality of the firm’s investments. 
By employing numerous proxies for firm’s investment quality calculated using Z-score, 
return on assets and long-run abnormal returns, the researchers demonstrated that this 
forecast is well supported by a significant sample of US firms from 1992 to 2007.  
In this study, we examine the demand for trade credit by constrained firms both during 
and after the financial crisis. Empirical literature addressing these topics is well 
documented (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004; Fabbri and Menichini, 
2010; among others).  Biais and Gollier (1997) suggest an indicative model that the 
availability of trade credit indicates the creditworthiness of the customer, considering that 
exclusive information is stored by suppliers regarding customers in comparison with 
banks, which leads to reduced credit rationing. Comparably, Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) 
posit that the supplier possesses an informational edge over the banks; therefore, suppliers 
could lend less prudently, yet this edge is solely applicable to input transactions. Fabbri 
and Menichini (2010) foil these earlier studies since collateralised bank and trade credit 
are factored into the model. The researchers maintain that suppliers are more capable of 
obtaining value as a result of the liquidation of assets in default and possess an 
information advantage through their provision of finance; significantly, the incentive to 
accept trade credit differs between economic branches, as stated in their study. Whether 
firms request trade credit to take advantage of the suppliers’ liquidation edge or to ease 
credit constraints is contingent on the particular traits of the inputs bought on credit. The 
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previously discussed theories are supported by studies in the empirical literature (Ng et 
al., 1999; Petersen and Rajan, 1997).    
Mateut (2005) offers a comprehensive survey of the influence of trade credit in the 
Monetary Transmission Mechanism (MTM). A study by Huang et al. (2011) investigates 
the substitution connection between trade credit and bank credit, by utilising a balanced 
panel data set derived via listed Chinese companies. The study highlights systematic proof 
of the substitution effect as well as its counter-cyclic pattern. Additionally, they 
characterise the substitution as demonstrating counter-cyclical behaviour concerning the 
concurrent macroeconomic proxy, specifically GDP.  
Concentrating on the euro area countries, Ferrando and Mulier (2013) demonstrate that 
firms utilise trade credit channel in order to maintain control over growth. Nations in 
which the trade credit channel shows greater presence report reduced marginal effect, yet 
the overall effect remains greater. Moreover, firms with greater susceptibility to financial 
market imperfections show greater dependence on the trade credit channel in order to 
control growth.   
Love et al. (2007) examine the impact of financial crises on trade credit in a number of 
emerging East Asian nations. The researchers measure growth of trade credit during the 
height of the financial crises, then succeeded by a breakdown of origin of the financing 
immediately following crisis events. Particularly noteworthy was the revelation that prior 
to a crisis, firms possessing a large percentage of short-term debt are important suppliers 
of trade credit; however, post-crisis, such firms distinctly reduce the credit offered to 
borrowers while relying more on credit from suppliers. The notion that firms with more 
liquidity also extend higher credit to borrowers and receive lower credit via suppliers is 
supported in the available literature.  
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4.2.2 Grants or subsidies bank loans  
Many studies analyse the effectiveness of the policy measures aimed at SME credit coined 
as credit guarantee schemes (Green, 2003; Honohan, 2010; Beck et al., 2008 and 2010; 
Cowling, 2010; among others).  
Beck et al. (2008) theorise that banks perceive “partial credit guarantee schemes” as 
showing the highest prevalence and efficiency out of all of the government aid schemes 
specific to SME lending. Additionally, Beck et al. (2010) examine various organisational 
characteristics pertaining to credit guarantee schemes as well as the inherent differences 
throughout 46 developed and developing nations. Their research demonstrates that a 
government is a significant factor concerning funding and management, yet this influence 
is reduced in risk assessment and recovery.  
A study by Cowling (2010) stresses the significance of credit rationing as a crucial 
component of the UK small business sector. The investigation focuses on the UK Small 
Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme (SFLGS) from 1993 to 1998, revealing data that suggest 
that this scheme has achieved its main goals.  Honohan (2010) notes that credit guarantees 
exist in accordance with the nature of the market; however, in situations in which these 
guarantees are unavailable when required, expertly constructed government-sponsored 
schemes could serve as a necessary component of a “welfare-improving policy of 
government intervention” with the purpose of refining financial intermediation function  
regarding SMEs.  
4.2.3 Other loans (e.g. from related company or shareholders)  
There is a need for additional development of research directed at investigating the 
connection between informal lending and bank lending, which mainly concentrates on 
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emerging economies (Guirkinger, 2008; Giné 2011; Xiaoa and North 2012; among 
others).                                                                                                                                
The scope of this present research comprises informal origins of finance obtained straight 
from related company and shareholders loans. With reference to the data set, it is 
worthwhile to mention here that it is impossible to divide other loans into distinct, dual 
groups of loans from related companies’ and shareholders’ loans.  
Chavies et al. (2011) use the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) in their investigation 
of the function of various financing sources with respect to new and young firms. The 
authors demonstrate that younger firms don’t rely as much on bank financing compared 
with informal financing. Their research documents an obvious substitution effect: there 
is a positive correlation between firm maturity and tendency to switch from informal 
finance to bank finance, whereas the overall percentage of firms employing external 
finance stays practically constant. Additionally, the authors posit that information 
asymmetry exerts a significant function in reducing the capability of a young firm to be 
granted bank-sourced capital.   
Allen et al. (2012) characterise family and friends as sources of very crucial, inexpensive 
funding to Indian SME’s during the start-up and growth stages. Comparable supporting 
results are documented concerning the non-listed firms in China (see Allen et al., 2005). 
Ayyagari et al. (2010) complement earlier research while additionally implying that 
although comparably few firms use bank loans in China, bank financing is linked to 
greater growth rates unlike informal financing. Casey and O’Toole (2014) reason that 
smaller firms could signal more risk, as well as unpredictable development patterns and 
bank loans, accordingly, present a greater challenge to observe; this shows the risks 
associated with this specific class of firms as well as the inaccessibility of traditional 
banking in broader terms.   
154 
 
4.2.4 Market financing  
A study by Kashyap et al. (1993) demonstrated that although bank loans decrease during 
monetary contraction periods, commercial paper volume rises. These findings imply that 
instead of an inward change in load demand, an inward shift in loan supply occurs. The 
conclusions made in Kashyap et al. (1993) may be explained by the fact that larger firms 
are demonstrated to issue the majority of commercial paper. Denis and Mihov (2003) 
evaluate determinants from public debt, bank debt, and non-bank private debt, 
demonstrating that the main influence in determining the origin of debt is the credit 
quality of the issuer. Businesses possessing high credit quality clearly favour public debt, 
whereas firms with middle-ranking credit tend to borrow from banks, and entities 
possessing the lowest credit ratings borrow from non-bank private lenders. Furthermore, 
Leary (2009) determines that bank-dependent firms move to equity in backgrounds of 
low bank debt. Rauh and Sufi (2010) demonstrate that in comparison to greater 
creditquality firms, lesser credit-quality firms show a greater tendency to possess several 
tiers in their capital structure including two components: secured bank debt with 
restrictive covenants and subordinated non-bank debt with relaxed covenants.   
4.2.5 Leasing/factoring  
Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006) show that particular financing (e.g. leasing and 
factoring) may offer value by allowing more access to finance, despite the presence of 
poorly-developed institutions. A banking system with greater competition and a credit 
information sharing system can also offer value in their implementation.  
Factoring includes buying accounts receivable by a financier, recognised as the factor 
defined by (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006); therefore, factoring is not considered to be 
a lending method, elevating its appeal to nations with inadequate legal framework.  
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Additionally, factoring is independent of information regarding the ‘‘borrower’’, yet 
instead dependent on the obligor, qualifying it as an appealing financing instrument 
employed by comparably opaque SMEs (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). Furthermore, 
a study by Klapper (2006) characterises factoring as helping a supplier with more 
associated risk to hand over its credit risk to buyer with greater quality.  The author reports 
that factoring is greater in nations with more economic progress and growth, as well as 
established credit information bureaus.   
In contrast to bank credit, leasing immediately supplies the asset rather than financial 
means required to purchase it, reducing the likelihood of changes to the direction of funds 
for uses other than what were conceived.  Leasing contracts are associated with less 
administrative input as well as less restrictive credit standards, facilitating shorter waiting 
times compared with bank loans (Beck and Cull, 2014). In a similar vein Berger and Udel 
(2006) report that leasing is associated with buying fixed assets as ‘‘lender’’ called a 
lessor. The authors characterise leasing as a rather prevalent technique of financing 
equipment, motor vehicles, and real estate practiced by financial institutions in numerous 
nations. The lessor buys the fixed assets while at the same time agreeing to a rental 
contract between the lessor and the lessee outlining a payment timetable. Leasing may be 
utilised in order to offer financing to opaque firms since an underwriting judgement is 
mainly founded on the value of a leased asset. Furthermore, it is reported that leasing may 
diminish an adverse selection issue in the second-hand equipment market as a result of 
promoting greater quality of goods sold “off-lease” (Berger and Udel, 2006).  Tax 
benefits are also frequently involved and leasing facilitates recovery in the instant that 
precise legal system is present (Beck, 2013).   
Moreover, Beck and Cull (2014) posit that cutting-edge companies and businessmen ask 
for traditional bank lending and commercial credit as a result of absent credit history and 
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insufficient guarantees may discover a novel financing option regarding the leasing 
market.   
4.2.6 Internal funds  
Myers and Majluf (1984) show that financing alternatives for mature companies may be 
comprehended using the pecking order theory.  On a related note, Chavies et al., (2011) 
suggest that these firms tend to possess additional internal funds (retained earnings) as a 
result of increased profitability and decreased development prospects; thus the firms 
could preferably utilise internal funds over bank loans. Comparable empirical 
observations are detailed in Vanacker and Mangigart (2010) who report that successful 
companies opt for financial investments including retained earnings, irrespective of the 
presence of unused debt potential. Furthermore, Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011) suggest 
that particularly young firms lacking a track record and as unpredictable prospects are 
ranked quite poorly, bank loans are generally costly for such firms. Given that new 
businesses also can’t depend on retained earnings as a consequence of cash inflow 
sourced from previous product sales, financing restrictions can also be more limiting for 
these companies (Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Ritter, 1991). Vanacker and Mangigart 
(2010) reason that if internal funds are not enough to cover financing requirements, 
managers’ resort to more expensive external funds.  As a result, mature firms may be 
more capable of getting loans with improved financial terms than their younger 
competitors (Bulan and Yan, 2009; Carpenter and Rondi, 2000). Moreover, well reputed-
firms with extensive credit histories have less problems with adverse selection issues 
between debtors and creditors (Chavies et al., 2011).  
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4.2.7 Discouraged borrowers 
An integral issue that is currently less examined that has garnered the attention of 
researchers and policy makers alike, is the notion of ‘discouraged borrowers’ which was 
described in Kon and Storey (2003); this term is defined as “a good firm, requiring 
finance, that chooses not to apply to the bank because it feels its application will be 
rejected”. The Stiglitz and Weiss empirical model (1981) excludes these borrowers on 
account of the fact that they do not submit bank applications. Kon and Storey (2003) 
suggest that, in the background of a variety of suppositions, the degree of discouragement 
in an economy is contingent on the screening error of the banks, the scope of application 
costs and the degree to which banks interest rates vary relative to those charged by the 
money lenders.  According to Kon and Storey (2003), one of the most important 
contributing factors to discouragement is the quality of borrowers which cannot be 
observed. In an ideal scenario, creditors would prefer to attract good borrowers and 
discourage bad borrowers; yet the borrower’s quality cannot be precisely quantified due 
to information asymmetries. Imperfect information is fundamental to the idea of 
discouraged borrowers and obtaining credible data from informationally non-transparent 
small business borrowers is an issue that influences lending institutions (Han et al., 2009).  
Empirical studies utilise credit lines as a proxy to estimate information transparency in 
businesses since creditworthiness is evaluated in the external financing market (Petersen 
and Rajan, 2002; Cole, 2013; Han et al., 2009).  
Levenson and Willard (2000) suggest that small businesses show a greater tendency to 
disclose discouragement compared with rejection, similar to the findings derived from 
Freel et al. (2012).43 Kon and Storey (2003) estimate that levels of discouragement are 
                                                 
43
 Freel et al. (2012) suggest that family firms are more cautious and less inclined to resort to bank loans; 
additionally firms lacking well-developed banking relationships show a higher tendency to document 
158 
 
greater in developing countries. Furthermore, the authors classify “unobservable quality 
of borrowers” as a considerably significant determinant of discouragement.  When 
examining the US Han et al. (2009) utilise data from the 1998 US Survey of Small 
Business Finances (SSBF) from 1998. The research concludes that riskier borrowers 
show a greater likelihood of discouragement; this tendency to be discouraged is positively 
correlated with the duration of the relevant financial relationship, potentially classifying 
discouragement as an effective self-rationing mechanism. 
These findings are in keeping with Cowling et al. (2016), a study that evaluates a sample 
of 3089 SMEs in the UK following the onset of GFC. The study notes that smaller and 
younger firms show higher tendencies to be discouraged. Furthermore, discouraged 
borrowers seem to be riskier firms which apply for bank loans; however, they are also 
aware of their riskiness; accordingly, their hesitation to take on loans and application costs 
are well-founded.   
Moreover, a study by Mac an Bhaid et al. (2016) stresses that the financial strain, which 
arises as a result of decreasing turnover, reducing capital and a higher debt to assets ratio 
eventually leads to a rise in discouragement. Comparatively, Cole and Sokolyk (2016) 
argue that discouraged, smaller firms have relatively worse credit histories and show a 
higher tendency to be situated in urban regions. Discouraged firms utilise less financial 
support (both bank and non-bank). Furthermore, firms suffering from worsening financial 
conditions show a higher tendency to be discouraged for loan applications (Mac an Bhaid 
et al., 2016) 
                                                 
discouragement. They argue that various industrial sectors should reflect varied asset and capital 
frameworks more often, and also experience varied competitive backgrounds. Accordingly, it can be 
predicted that specific sector would influence funding goals and behaviour. 
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The inclusion of legal, judicial and bankruptcy frameworks is considered crucial when 
evaluating the efficiency of the external financing market (Beck et al., 2011). The authors 
determine that small companies are especially adversely impacted by poor legal and 
monetary mechanism. Additionally, increased sovereign bonds yields cause more 
rejection of bank loans as outlined in Holton et al. (2014). Accordingly, one could predict 
a higher level of borrowers’ discouragement as a result of higher government bonds yields 
particularly in the Eurozone stressed countries.  
Han et al. (2009) rationalise that discouragement is influenced by the level of 
concentration in domestic banking markets, which is partially caused attributed to 
screening error of the banks as shown by Kon and Storey (2003). If the bank industry is 
concentrated this should result in reduced frequency of errors because less banks are 
likely to have centralized, comprehensive and constant data regarding possible borrowers 
in an economy. Following Kon and Storey (2003), Han et al. (2009), Thomadakis, 2015, 
and Mac an Bhaid et al. (2016), the performance of the banking industry environment 
should also be contemplated; as a result, the market power is determined via Lerner index 
which is also includes the advantage inherent in a separate, dynamic gauge of market 
power (Brämer et al., 2013).44 
4.3 Data and model specification  
  4.3.1 The data  
A study conducted by the ECB and the EC demonstrated that comparable, suitable and 
constant data is not available for SMEs in the EU. In order to compensate for this, the 
ECB and the EC agreed to cooperate in producing a survey examining the access to 
                                                 
44 Only banks designated as commercial, cooperative and savings are included in our evaluation. Central 
banks and investment banks are omitted since they do not directly participate in lending to SMEs (see 
Appendix D for further information). 
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finance of enterprises in the EU. This present study utilises the SAFE data gathered by 
the ECB on a half-yearly basis in addition to data gathered by the EC every two years in 
order to increase the scope of the sample.  
As of 2009, the SAFE is intended to encapsulate well-timed, exact data regarding the 
financing of firms in addition to their employment of and interaction with financing 
technologies. The primary objective of the survey is to influence and guide the ECB 
monetary policy selections, while guaranteeing constructive observation of transmission 
mechanisms throughout the euro area.45  
The survey includes micro, small, medium-sized and large firms and offers empirical data 
concerning the financing conditions that SMEs are confronted with, in contrast to the 
large firms within the previous half-year.  This study concentrates on 11 countries in the 
euro area with a heterogeneous depiction of SMEs and utilises the biannual SAFE data 
for twelve waves spanning the time frame 2009 to 2014.46  
Of particular note is that each firm was surveyed again when practicable, which facilitated 
the provision of a panel dataset in firms from the different waves of the SAFE survey of 
the euro area SMEs.    
As evidenced from Table 1, Germany, Spain, France and Italy combine to make up the 
majority of the total sample at nearly two thirds of the total euro area SMEs. Accordingly, 
the smaller euro area countries and their SMEs are analysed in a more limited capacity 
within the panel sample data. 
 
                                                 
45 For a complete summary of the survey carried out by the ECB and EC (see Appendix F). 
46 The six smallest nations (Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia) are excluded here 
given that these nations comprise just 2% of the euro area GDP and less than 3% of all employees in the 
euro area.  
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Table 1 details the 11 nations selected to be evaluated as well as the quantity of firm 
observations for every nation, which permits the determination of a combined quantity of 
observations during the 12 time periods selected from 19180 firms. Moreover, Table 1 
organises the groups of firms by size and illustrates that 32% of firms can be termed micro 
enterprises, consisting of 1-9 employees; of particular note here is that Greece and Ireland 
possess the largest portions at 42.1% and 38.1% respectively. A further third of firms are 
classified as small enterprises (between 10 and 49 employees), which are more prevalent in 
Belgium, Finland and Ireland. Furthermore, marginally greater than a quarter of firms are 
considered medium enterprises (50 to 249 employees) with the rest of the enterprises being 
classified as larger firms possessing at least 250 employees. 
Firms are requested to assess the availability of various categories of external financing. 
Such questions are especially practical since they facilitate the recognition of possibly 
reluctant borrowers. Questions are posed concerning bank loans, trade credit, equity, debt 
Table 1: Analysis of SAFE data 
      % Micro  % Small  % Medium  % Large  Firms  Obs  
Austria (AT)    33.2%  34.5%  24.3%  8.0%  1171  3253  
Belgium  (BE)  35.4%  39.5%  20.4%  4.7%  1045  2765  
Germany (DE)  27.6%  32.6%  29.9%  9.9%  2642  7463  
Spain (ES)  30.5%  31.0%  28.7%  9.8%  2857  7477  
Finland (FI)  38.0%  39.5%  18.4%  4.1%  994  2414  
France (FR)  28.8%  31.2%  30.0%  10.0%  2727  7741  
Greece (GR)  42.1%  35.7%  18.6%  3.6%  1255  3190  
Ireland (IE)  38.1%  38.9%  18.9%  4.1%  1139  3427  
Italy (IT)  29.1%  31.4%  30.5%  9.0%  2811  8059  
Netherlands (NL)    32.6%  35.8%  24.5%  7.1%  1255  3273  
Portugal (PT)  32.3%  36.3%  24.9%  6.5%  1284  3629  
Total     31.9%  33.8%  26.4%  7.9%  19180  52691  
Source: author’s own estimations utilising ECB SAFE data.  
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securities issued, other external financing47 and bank overdrafts; one example of such a 
question is:  
“Would you say that their availability has improved, remained unchanged, deteriorated 
for your firm over the past 6 months?”  
In order to adequately capture the cross-country dimension of the SAFE data, Figure 1 
illustrates the manner in which the proportion of firms indicating deterioration in the 
availability of various finance types has adjusted from 2009H1 to 2014H2 in Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and in the EU-11. The figure suggests heterogeneity 
throughout the EU-11 economies. Initially, the deterioration rates are comparatively 
elevated, adhering to a volatile trend. Greece and Ireland exhibit the greatest deterioration 
rates concerning finance options relative to the EU-11 average and most nations 
documented here; however, it is worth noting that German firms exhibit the lowest rates. 
These trends suggest that reluctant borrowers influence the rate of external financing 
requests or that funding is being issued for lesser quantities that initially requested.  
Overall, the percentage of enterprises documenting deterioration in the availability of 
external financing are reduced in successive waves when compared with prior waves of 
the SAFE survey, which coincided with the post-financial crisis period.  
                                                 
47 The choice “other” presented here is in reference to loans issued by a related company or shareholders 
and from family and friends, leasing and factoring, and derived from grants.  
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Figure 1: Percentage of firms reporting a deterioration of financing  
Source: author’s own estimations utilising ECB SAFE data. 
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Crucial for this study is the interest in investigating the utilisation of different financing 
by bank lending constrained SMEs and the SAFE survey reports specific data concerning 
this. Table 2 depicts the percentage of firms from each nation which utilise various 
sources of financing, including: internal funds, grants or subsidies, trade credit, other 
loans (informal lending), leasing, hire purchase or factoring, debt securities, subordinated 
loans and equity. Given that firms can utilise several suppliers of finance, the percentages 
in the rows may not actually amount to 100 (see Table 2). Our investigation here is limited 
to the following six groups, a) trade credit, b) grants or subsidies bank loans, c) informal 
lending, d) market financing, e) leasing/hire purchase/factoring, f) internal funds. It is 
noteworthy to point out that every variable is binary; thus, each variable assumes the 
value of 1 if a firm employed them in the previous half-year and 0 otherwise. Yet, this 
rule does not apply when categorising market financing which is comprised of equity, 
issued debt securities or subordinated loans.  
Ireland scores the highest in documented utilisation of trade credit at 58%, a nation that 
severely affected by the 2007-8 financial turmoil, whereas the nation with the least 
documented trade credit utilisation is Germany scoring only 14.5%, followed by France 
and Austria at 15.6% and 19.2%, respectively. Grants or subsidised bank loans financing 
are greatest in Spain and the Netherlands has the least amount. In terms of informal 
lending, the Netherlands has the highest utilisation at 17%, then Germany and Belgium 
at approximately 15% and 14%, respectively. Greece represented the lowest utilisation of 
these financing sources. Regarding market financing, Greek firms demonstrate the 
greatest utilisation rates, the second highest usage rates is reported by German firms while 
lowest rates are documented in Portuguese and Spanish firms. The country with the 
highest leasing/hire purchase/factoring financing is Germany while the lowest usage 
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occurred in Greece. Lastly, in terms of internal funds, Finland scores the highest usage at 
36.1% with Portugal reporting the lowest at 4.9%. 
Table 2: Sources of financing adopted by firms in EU-11 
  
Trade 
credit  
Grants  
  
Informal 
lending  
Market 
financing  
Leasing /hire 
purchase/factoring  
Internal 
funds  
Austria (AT)  19.2%  13.2%  11.1%  6.8%  44.7%  30.2%  
Belgium  (BE)  20.0%  10.9%  14.3%  8.6%  25.7%  17.0%  
Germany (DE)  14.5%  12.7%  14.9%  10.0%  51.5%  34.7%  
Spain (ES)  32.6%  17.2%  12.4%  5.5%  29.6%  22.5%  
Finland (FI)  40.0%  8.2%  12.5%  8.7%  43.4%  36.1%  
France (FR)  15.6%  10.4%  8.2%  6.4%  39.2%  17.2%  
Greece (GR)  39.4%  10.4%  4.0%  17.1%  18.3%  15.6%  
Ireland (IE)  58.0%  9.7%  13.3%  9.1%  28.6%  31.6%  
Italy (IT)  39.4%  14.6%  7.7%  5.8%  29.2%  21.4%  
Netherlands (NL)  25.5%  4.5%  17.0%  9.6%  39.6%  17.6%  
Portugal (PT)  27.0%  16.9%  8.2%  2.8%  27.1%  4.9%  
Total  28.7%  12.5%  11.0%  7.7%  35.3%  22.7%  
Source: author’s own estimations utilising ECB SAFE data.  
Direct survey questions are utilised with the purpose of classifying bank lending 
constrained firms, which is well supported by several investigations which utilise a firm’s 
view of credit to ascertain constrained firms in addition to its track record of being 
approved for external credit (Beck et al., 2006; Holton et al., 2013 and 2014; Casey and 
O’Toole, 2014; Lawless et al., 2015a; among others). Measures of credit constraints are 
divided into five categories of constrained firms as defined in Table 3. The primary 
questions which arise concern bank loan, credit line, bank overdraft and credit cards 
overdraft and are derived directly from the SAFE survey. Firms are questioned whether 
they applied for the aforementioned financing source. If they answer yes additional 
questions include if they: 1) received below 75% (rationed), 2) rejected completely 
(rejected) or 3) refused because the cost associated with terms and conditions was too 
high. We make an additional indicator by combining the previously mentioned three 
variables to derive a credit constrained indicator. Additionally, firms that did not apply 
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for bank loan and credit line are considered because of possible rejection (discouraged 
firm). 
As outlined in Table 4, the most credit constrained firms are in Greece, the Netherlands 
and Spain, whereas the least-constrained are in Austria, Finland and Germany. Focusing 
on credit rationed firms, similarly Greece indicates the highest at 26.1% with Finland 
reporting the lowest at 4.3%. The results for credit applications rejected is in a similar 
configuration as credit rationed in term of the spread over the countries. Particularly 
noteworthy here is that periphery countries of the EU-11 reflect the greatest amounts 
throughout all the different constrained measures with the Netherlands as the only 
exception to this. Looking at self-rationed firms, 4.9% of firms are constrained in the 
Netherlands followed by Greece and Ireland at 2.6%, and 2.2%, respectively. Firms in 
Austria and Finland are less likely to self-ration. Lastly, discouraged firms are more 
prevalent in Greece and Ireland, with Finland and Austria reporting the lowest level of 
discouraged firms. 
 
  
Table 3: Description of credit constraints measures 
Constraint   Description   
Credit constrained  Firms are classified as constrained if they applied for bank loan, 
credit line, bank overdraft and credit cards overdraft but were 
rejected, rationed or self-rationed.   
Credit rationed  Firms are classified as rationed if they applied for bank loan, credit 
line, bank overdraft and credit cards overdraft but were rationed 
by receiving between 1% and 74%.  
Credit application rejected  Firms are classified as rejected if they applied for bank loan, credit 
line, bank overdraft and credit cards overdraft but were rejected 
completely.   
Self-rationed (refused because the cost was too 
high)  
Firms are classified as self-rationed if they applied for bank loan, 
credit line, bank overdraft and credit cards overdraft but were 
refused because the cost associated with terms and conditions was 
too high.   
Discouraged from applying  Firms are classified as discouraged if they did not apply for bank 
loan, credit line, bank overdraft and credit cards overdraft because 
of possible rejection.   
Source: author’s own estimations utilising ECB SAFE data.  
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Similar to Holton et al. (2014), this present study comprises GDP, the ratio of private 
sector credit to GDP and the yield on the 10-year sovereign bond.  Beck et al. (2006) 
demonstrate that firms in nations with greater GDP per capita communicate less financing 
obstacles. However, there is mixed data concerning the level of private sector to GDP. 
Holton et al. (2014) demonstrate that, in nations with higher levels of private sector, small 
firms experience greater loan application rejection rates. Yet, these findings are in 
contrast with Mac an Bhaid et al. (2016) in which the authors stress that a greater ratio of 
private sector credit to GDP decreases the degree of discouragement. Additionally, 
increased sovereign bonds yields cause more rejection of bank loans as outlined in Holton 
et al. (2014). Accordingly, one could predict a higher level of borrower discouragement 
as a result of higher government bonds yields.  
Following Mac an Bhaid et al. (2016) the bank recovery rate of credit must be factored 
in, since its rates are shown to be greater in firms with more collateral and therefore differ 
according to firm size and sector. Brown et al. (2011) reports that high level of interest 
rates appears to deter firms; this relationship is more pronounced in Eastern Europe 
relative to Western Europe. The increased proportion of discouraged firms in Eastern 
Table 4: Analysis of various credit constraints measures by country  
 Credit 
constrained  
Credit 
rationed   
Credit application 
rejected  
Refused because the 
cost was too high  
Discouraged 
from applying   
Austria (AT)  9.7%  7.2%  1.6%  0.9%  3.0%  
Belgium  (BE)  16.9%  7.2%  8.2%  2.0%  6.6%  
Germany (DE)  10.8%  5.0%  4.6%  1.3%  4.7%  
Spain (ES)  26.4%  15.9%  9.9%  2.1%  7.8%  
Finland (FI)  9.3%  4.3%  4.3%  1.0%  1.5%  
France (FR)  16.9%  6.8%  9.3%  1.3%  7.4%  
Greece (GR)  45.4%  26.1%  19.6%  2.6%  18.8%  
Ireland (IE)  24.6%  13.8%  9.7%  2.2%  14.3%  
Italy (IT)  21.9%  13.0%  8.3%  1.5%  6.0%  
Netherlands (NL)  36.1%  13.6%  18.1%  4.9%  10.6%  
Portugal (PT)  23.9%  13.4%  9.1%  2.0%  7.0%  
Total  21.8%  11.8%  9.0%  1.8%  7.6%  
Source: author’s own estimations utilising ECB SAFE data. 
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Europe is a consequence of a greater disinclination from smaller and more monetarily-
opaque firms to seek loans when compared with Western Europe, and indeed many such 
firms accurately predict that their loan applications will be turned down.   
As outlined in Table 5, there are substantial cross-country differences among the EU-11 
countries. Most notably, the level of discouragement stands at 45.6% in Ireland followed 
by the Netherlands and Greece at 41% and 36.4% respectively. Discouraged firms are 
less prevalent among the non-stressed countries of the EU-11, i.e. Finland and Austria.  
In Table 6 the rate of discouragement among EU-11 States are presented. The time frame 
examined in this study reveals modest growth specifically in the case of the periphery 
nations. For instance, the discouragement rates among Greek firms saw a 35% growth 
from 2009H1 to 2014H2. However, it is crucial to note that for the majority of the EU-
11 core nations, the discouragement rate experiences a moderate decline within the time 
frame sampled, except for the Netherlands and France. 
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Table 5: Analysis of dependent variable by country (discouraged borrowers) 
Country Austria Belgium Germany Spain Finland France Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Total 
Discouraged from applying 
for bank loans % 
11.90% 15.70% 18.20% 17.50% 7.30% 15.40% 36.40% 45.60% 14.00% 41.00% 24.30% 20.40% 
Source: author’s own estimations utilising ECB SAFE data 
Table 6: Analysis of discouragement rate within the EU-11 countries 2009H1-2014H2 
 
Source: author’s own estimations utilising ECB SAFE data.
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8 Wave 9 Wave 10 Wave 11 Wave 12
AT 25.0% 8.0% 12.2% 18.4% 14.7% 10.1% 6.1% 5.0% 5.1% 6.9% 16.0% 18.0%
BE 19.7% 46.9% 20.9% 14.7% 16.3% 15.6% 16.7% 15.5% 20.8% 12.0% 8.9% 8.8%
DE 20.1% 19.9% 21.4% 36.2% 24.8% 15.5% 13.9% 7.0% 12.3% 7.1% 19.7% 17.4%
ES 9.5% 16.3% 16.6% 18.9% 19.9% 19.6% 19.6% 21.8% 18.6% 14.1% 19.1% 16.6%
FI 12.5% 12.5% 6.3% 8.7% 5.4% 2.4% 3.9% 4.3% 4.5% 15.6% 10.5% 7.3%
FR 10.0% 11.2% 16.1% 14.7% 18.4% 17.2% 17.0% 19.9% 18.3% 16.4% 13.0% 12.4%
GR 12.4% 8.8% 24.0% 17.2% 21.9% 37.6% 51.3% 36.1% 40.8% 43.7% 52.5% 48.8%
IE 30.4% 18.5% 21.7% 45.3% 50.0% 46.3% 47.0% 54.5% 51.4% 48.5% 39.4% 31.3%
IT 10.9% 8.6% 11.2% 10.6% 6.6% 15.5% 12.4% 15.5% 14.2% 15.2% 21.5% 19.8%
NL 40.5% 46.2% 35.9% 39.8% 45.4% 42.0% 39.6% 43.7% 39.6% 43.0% 31.9% 44.2%
PT 17.3% 8.3% 16.1% 20.0% 28.5% 34.6% 26.4% 24.6% 26.7% 22.3% 31.3% 22.8%
EU-11 14.8% 15.6% 17.0% 20.9% 21.6% 22.5% 21.7% 21.1% 21.9% 20.0% 22.2% 21.8%
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Table 7: A synopsis of the predicted signs on discouraged borrowers  
 
Variables Description Expected sing on  
discouragement 
Data Source 
 
  
 
 
Firm size 
10 (Micro). 
 50 10 (Small). 
Defined by number of employees. 
 
- SAFE 
Firm age 
10 years or more 
5 to 9 years 
2 to 4 years 
Defined in years: 
10 years or more. 
5 years or more, but less than 10 years. 
2 years or more, but less than 5 years. 
- SAFE 
Turnover decreased Decrease in the level of turnover over the past 6 months. - SAFE 
Debt to assets ratio increased Increase in the ratio of all kinds of debt to total assets over the past 6 months. ? SAFE 
Credit history deteriorated Deteriorated credit history (perception) over the past 6 months. - SAFE 
Capital position deteriorated Deteriorated own capital provided by the owners or shareholders (perception) over the past 6 months. - SAFE 
Deteriorated prospects Deteriorated outlook with reference to sale/profitability and business plan (perception) over the past 6 months. - SAFE 
Deteriorated general economic outlook  Deteriorated general economic outlook, insofar as it affects the availability of external financing over the past six months. - SAFE 
Deterioration on willingness of banks to provide loans Willingness of banks to provide credit to your enterprise deteriorated over the past six months. - SAFE 
Deterioration on willingness of partners to provide 
trade credit 
Willingness of business partners to provide trade credit deteriorated over the past six months. - SAFE 
Deterioration on willingness of investors to invest Willingness of investors to invest in your enterprise deteriorated over the past six months. - SAFE 
Increased need for bank loans Firms need for bank loans increased over the past six months. ? SAFE 
Access to finance If firm owner considers access to finance as the most important problem in the past six months. + SAFE 
Credit line/credit cards overdraft usage Whether the firm used credit line, bank overdraft or credit cards overdraft. - SAFE 
Interest expenses increased Increase in interest expenses over the past six months. - SAFE 
Banking & macroeconomic variables 
  
 
GDP The percentage change in GDP over half year period - Eurostat 
Private sector credit t to GDP Ratio of private sector credit to GDP ? World Bank 
10 year bond yield Six month average of 10 year government bond yield  + ECB SDW 
Insolvency  Average recovery rate of credit under insolvency. - WBDB 
Bank rate Bank overdraft for new business, NFCs, average of 6 months + Bloomberg 
Lerner index Measured using balance sheet data from Bankscope. - Bankscope 
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Regulatory variables 
Control of corruption Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Estimate of governance (ranges 
from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance) 
_ The WGI 
Regulatory quality Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development. Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 
(strong) governance performance) 
_ The WGI 
Rule of law Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights. Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 
2.5 (strong) governance performance) 
_ The WGI 
Control of Corruption Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Estimate of governance (ranges 
from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance) 
_ The WGI 
Source: Kon and Storey, 2003;  Han et al., 2009; Popov, 2013;  Ferrando et al., 2015; Cowling et al., 2016; Mac an Bhaid et al., 2016, among others.   
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4.3.2 Model specification  
Crucial for this research is the interest in investigating the utilisation of different financing 
by bank lending constrained SMEs following the onset of financial crisis. As a result a 
panel probit specification is utilised here, on the premise of a normal distribution for the 
functional form.48 The methodology utilised in this study is analogous to that employed 
in Casey and O'Toole (2014). Given the qualitative attributes of the inquiries posed by 
the SAFE in addition to the fact that the dependent variables are entirely in binary, a 
probability choice model is an appropriate option here.   
1. The equation given below represents our first model:  
Pr (Alternative financing (Variable)ijt) =λ (θ Credit constraints ijt-1+ζ Firm controlsijt + 
χFirm quality and creditworthinessijt + εij)   
Dependant variables (Alternative financing (Variable)ijt consist of six distinct parameters: 
grants or subsidised bank loans, trade credit, informal lending, leasing, hire purchase or 
factoring, market financing comprised of equity, issued debt securities or subordinated 
loans, and internal funds. Credit constraints indicates our five categories of constrained 
firms as defined in Table 4, the methodology employed to tackle endogeneity here is 
analogous to that used in Casey and O’Toole (2014) which recommends that the first 
lagged of bank lending constraints are used. Firm control is the vector of following firm 
level indicators: firm age, size, ownership types and subsidiary status. Firm quality and 
creditworthiness vector represents a wide range of variables (as outlined in Appendix. B 
and Table B3). Note that the country, time, sector and firm fixed-effects are present across 
all regressions.  
Here the empirical approach consists of investigating the elements that influence firms’  
                                                 
48 The utilisation of a logistic has also been tested in order to verify that the data is not vulnerable to the 
sampling of the distributional estimations. 
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external financing constraints for bank loans, trade credit, other financing and credit line.   
This present research hypothesis concerns the coefficient θ on the constraint variable. It 
can be deduced that a positive influence (θ > 0) exists; accordingly, if bank financing 
constraints grow, firms could resort to non-bank finance.49 
2. The equation given below indicates our second model:  
Pr (External financing constraintsijt) = θ+ φ Firm controlsijt + χ Firm quality and 
creditworthinessijt + εij  
Dependant variables (External financing constraints ijt) consist of four distinct parameters: 
bank loans constraints, trade credit constraints, other financing constraints and credit line 
constraints (see Appendix. B, Table B2). Several explanatory control variables are 
employed with the purpose of determining a firm’s age, turnover, subsidiary status and 
size. In addition, other variables are used to estimate a firm’s quality and creditworthiness 
using the following measures: profit, net interest expenses, general economic outlook, 
access to public financial support, outlook with respect to sales and profitability 
(prospects), capital position, credit history, level of interest rates and level of the cost of 
financing as depicted in Appendix. B.  
3. The equation given below indicates our third model:  
Pr (External financing constraintsijt) = θ+ φ Firm controlsijt + χ Banking+ ζ 
Macroeconomic + Industry+ Country + Year+ εij 
Dependant variables (‘External financing constraints ijt’) denotes bank loans 
discouragement and is coded as one if the firm is discouraged from applying for bank 
                                                 
49 The firm-level controls variables are chosen based on prior evidences which approximate the major 
factors firm financing decisions (Beck et al., 2006; O'Toole, 2014; Casey and O’Toole 2014; among others). 
Additionally, several macroeconomic factors are included; these components could influence the credit 
market and the decision of the firm to source alternative finance and include factors such as the growth rate 
of GDP and the 10-year government bond rates.  
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loans; zero otherwise. While macroeconomic indicators contain the change in GDP, 10 
year government bond yields and private sector to GDP, we also include country, time 
and sector dummies in every regression in our analysis similar to Beck et al. (2006).50 
Several explanatory control variables are employed with the purpose of determining the 
age and size of a firm. Additionally, other variables are used to estimate a firm’s quality 
and creditworthiness using the following measures: turnover, debt to asset ratio, outlook 
with respect to sales and profitability (prospects), capital position and credit history, 
which are all taken from the SAFE survey.  Banking variables includes the rate of 
recovery in the background of insolvency, and. bank overdraft rates for new businesses, 
a major barometer of lending. While macroeconomic indicators contain the change in 
GDP, 10-year government bond yields and private sector to GDP, we also include 
country, time and sector dummies in every regression in our analysis.  
Our analysis is further augmented by the inclusion of additional variables concerning 
firms’ ownership status, regulatory variables, the Lerner index. Moreover, the problems 
are addressed here through also considering the image of willingness of banks/business 
partners/investors to provide credit, counting appearance of access to finance as the 
primary important issue, the utilisation of credit lines as a proxy to estimate information 
transparency. The aforementioned factors are included in Table 21. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 While some of the explanatory indicators could be connected, analysis to access multicollinearity show 
that this is not an issue because VIF factor values are <5 in every case. 
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4.3.3 Research hypotheses 
In this research, a detailed analysis is conducted by analysing the following outlined 
research hypotheses in the EU-11 countries:  
Hypothesis I. Bank lending constrained SMEs show a greater tendency to demonstrate 
relatively more usage or requests for alternative financing.51 
Hypothesis II.  Older SMEs demonstrate a greater tendency to utilise trade credit whereas 
younger SMEs more often opt for informal lending.  
Hypothesis III. Smaller, younger firms are more likely to be discouraged than rejected for 
bank loans.   
Hypothesis IV.  Smaller, younger firms are faced with a higher level of discouragement 
in the periphery countries of the euro area in contrast to the Eurozone’s core economies.   
The study builds on existing literature regarding the possible substitution effect between 
traditional bank financing and other financing options. Considering that SMEs are largely 
heterogeneous, it is reasonable to assume that their financing needs vary in different 
company life cycle stages. In line with Beck et al. (2006), distinct firm traits (e.g. firm 
size, age and ownership) are detailed with the purpose of determining if the substitution 
effect between the aforementioned two financing sources change a result of these firm 
traits. Our hypotheses, derived from the available literature on firm financing, state that 
firm’s size and age are crucial determining factors of the scope and the kind of funding 
that can be accessed by the firms (Beck et al., 2006; Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009; Brown 
et al., 2011; Albareto and Russo, 2012; Holton et al., 2014; among others). 
                                                 
51 Alternative sources of financing used in this chapter take on the following forms: trade credit, informal 
lending, leasing, hire purchase or factoring, market financing comprised of equity, issued debt securities or 
subordinated loans, and internal funds).   
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4.4 Empirical results   
Tables 8-13 depict the marginal effects acquired via a random effects model 
encompassing the panel of 11 euro area countries. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that 
every standard error here is robust to heteroscedasticity and is appropriately clustered at 
the country-wave level. The opening columns contain the outcomes of the influences of 
various measures of bank lending constrained including (a) credit-constrained, (b) credit 
rationed, (c) credit-rejected, (d) self-rationed and lastly (e) credit-discouraged on firm’s 
usage or requests for alternative financing such as trade credit, grants or subsidised bank 
loans, informal lending, , market financing comprised of equity, issued debt securities or 
subordinated loans, leasing, hire purchase or factoring and internal funds. For the sake of 
clarity, the terms “discouraged” and “self-rationed” are employed here to signal which 
sets of firms did not apply for loan due to possible rejection fear and firms that denied the 
loan because the cost tied to it was too high. When considering the primary groupings 
concerning the firm controls, manufacturing is viewed as the omitted category for firm’s 
sector variables, more than ten years for age and publicly listed firms regarding 
ownership. Each of the variables utilised for this analysis is in period t data apart from 
constraint indicators that are incorporated into the model containing one periodic lag 
denoted by t-1.  
4.4.1 The impact of financing constraints on the utilisation of alternative 
finance    
Beginning with an assessment of trade credit, we do not identify any effect between our 
various credit-constrained measures concerning the utilisation of this financing source; 
this outcome is robust in both stressed and non-stressed countries of the Eurozone.  
Focusing on the whole sample, it is worth mentioning that the results imply that firms 
with prospects of deteriorating credit history show a greater tendency to utilise trade credit 
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provisions, similar to firms which saw a rise in net interest expenses over the previous 
half a year. Similar corroborating evidence is found in the case of firms which saw an 
increase in the level of debt to asset ratio. Concentrating on firm controls variables, it is 
evident that small- and medium- sized firms show a greater tendency to utilise trade credit 
at a rate of 7% and 18%, respectively. However, we do not find statistically significant 
results to suggest that older firms are more likely to use trade credit relative to younger 
firms. 
Columns 9(a) to 9(e) investigate the effect of constraints on utilisation of grants or 
subsidies bank loans. A study conducted by Honohan (2010) highlights the establishment 
of a broad variety of policy measures globally to supplement SMEs financing after the 
GFC. Such policies include different credit guarantees and financing schemes. In order 
to sustain the effectiveness of these policies, one would predict the discovery of tendency 
for more requests and utilisation of these schemes in firms which are categorised as 
constrained in our research.   
In contrast with prior expectations, an inverse significant relationship between 
constrained measures and the request for grant financing is determined. Such noteworthy 
results could imply that the contemporary provision of policy measures potentially 
accessible by the SMEs at the euro area level are insufficiently aimed at firms with 
challenging prospects for securing credit via traditional bank lending. On a related note, 
Casey and O'Toole (2014) document a negative association between credit rationing and 
usage of grant. We find that firms who experience rejected credit applications are 6% less 
likely to use grants financing. Stressed Eurozone countries are on average less likely to 
use grant financing relative to non-stressed countries. Younger firms are 8% more likely 
to use this source of financing, yet this outcome only holds true in the case of non-stressed 
countries.   
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Concentrating on informal lending, significant proof exists to corroborate that credit 
constrained, rationed and discouraged firms show a greater tendency to utilise such 
financing. We find that medium-sized firms are more likely to use informal lending as 
another aspect of their financing toolkit, compared with small-sized firms. It would be 
especially helpful if the SAFE data permitted the division of informal lending into dual 
categories of lending with the purpose of evaluating activity of a constrained firm; 
however, data is submitted on an aggregate basis, yet it is apparent that credit-constrained, 
rationed and discouraged firms have a greater tendency to use either of these financing 
options. When examining firm quality variables, we find that firms facing worsening 
credit history and capital position are more likely to utilise informal lending technique, 
similar to firms that saw deteriorating market conditions in terms of availability of 
finance. Additionally, it is determined that younger firms are 10% more likely use 
informal lending whereas older firms are less likely to.   
Progressing to columns 11(a) to 11(e) and concentrating market financing, we find that 
firms who experience rejected credit applications are 2% less likely to use this source; 
this statistical observation only applies to stressed countries of the Eurozone. However, 
there is no corroborating data regarding further constrained measures. The utilisation of 
market financing is more prevalent in mature and medium-sized firms. We find that 
family or entrepreneurs and sole trader owned firms are less likely to use market 
financing, these findings are statistically significant at 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.  
 Table 12 and 13 examine the effect of constraints on utilisation of internal funds; in 
addition to leasing, hire purchase and factoring. The results show no direct influence 
between our credit-constrained measures and using the previously mentioned financing 
types; however, credit-constrained and rejected firms in stressed countries are less likely 
to utilise leasing, hire purchase and factoring. We also find that both small- and medium-
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sized firms are more likely to use leasing, hire purchase and factoring by approximately 
26% and 40%, respectively. Older firms are more likely to use this type of financing. 
Furthermore, firms whose turnover decreased in the past six months are less likely to use 
this source of finance; this finding is statistically significant at the 1% level. It is also 
worth noting that no link between firm’s ownership types and the utilisation of internal 
funds is determined. Our results show that firms in the age group of 2 to 4 years are 4% 
less likely to use internal funds while our firm quality variables are insignificant in most 
cases.  
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Table 8: The impact of financing constraints on the utilisation of alternative finance - panel probit model with random effects–marginal effects. 
  Trade credit (Main results) Trade credit (Stressed countries) Trade credit (Non-stressed countries) 
  8(a) 8(b) 8(c) 8(d) 8(e) 8(a) 8(b) 8(c) 8(d) 8(e) 8(a) 8(b) 8(c) 8(d) 8(e) 
 Credit constrained t-1 0.003     -0.014     0.020     
 Credit rationed t-1  0.013     0.010     0.012    
 Credit application rejected t-1   -0.004     -0.020     0.019   
 Refused because the cost was too high t-1    0.015     0.003     0.028  
 Discouraged from applying t-1     0.002     -0.017     0.018 
 Control for firm quality                
 Capital position deteriorated 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.018 
 
-0.016 
 
-0.018 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.033 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.033 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.002 
 Credit history deteriorated 0.031* 0.035* 0.039* 0.035* 0.032* 0.008 0.008 0.015 0.009 0.008 0.055** 0.062** 0.059** 0.062** 0.056** 
 Debt compared to assets increased 0.030* 0.026 0.035* 0.026 0.029* 0.030 0.036 0.043* 0.036 0.030 0.023 0.013 0.023 0.014 0.023 
 Increased net interest expenses 0.048*** 0.060*** 0.056*** 0.060*** 0.048*** 0.056*** 0.076*** 0.072*** 0.076*** 0.056*** 0.021 0.020 0.017 0.020 0.022 
 Profit decreased -0.014 -0.018 -0.020 -0.018 -0.014 -0.019 -0.031 -0.035 -0.031 -0.019 -0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.003 
 Turnover decreased -0.034* -0.040** -0.042** -0.040** -0.034* -0.055** -0.062** -0.066** -0.062** -0.055** 0.007 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.007 
 Deteriorated general economic outlook 0.070*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.070*** 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.110*** 0.113*** 0.114*** 0.007 0.012 0.015 0.012 0.008 
 Deteriorated public fund access -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.006 -0.011 -0.014 -0.015 -0.014 -0.010 
 Deteriorated prospects 0.026 0.020 0.023 0.020 0.026 0.029 0.022 0.027 0.022 0.029 0.022 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.022 
 Firm controls variables                
 Family or entrepreneurs 
 
0.077* 
 
0.045 
 
0.044 
 
0.045 
 
0.077* 
 
0.081 
 
0.056 
 
0.065 
 
0.056 
 
0.081 
 
0.049 
 
0.009 
 
0.000 
 
0.009 
 
0.048 
 Other enterprises or business associates 0.093* 0.073 0.067 0.073 0.093* 0.105* 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.105* 0.053 0.027 0.017 0.027 0.053 
 VC or business Angels 0.054 0.050 0.030 0.049 0.054 0.085 0.113 0.089 0.112 0.086 0.025 -0.008 -0.019 -0.009 0.025 
 Sole Trader 0.014 -0.012 -0.009 -0.012 0.014 -0.013 -0.037 -0.021 -0.036 -0.013 0.018 -0.016 -0.023 -0.016 0.017 
 Other -0.044 -0.067 -0.077 -0.067 -0.044 -0.031 -0.063 -0.083 -0.062 -0.031 -0.044 -0.062 -0.061 -0.062 -0.046 
 5 to 9 years -0.047** -0.044* -0.040* -0.044* -0.047** -0.051* -0.058* -0.057* -0.058* -0.051* -0.030 -0.021 -0.014 -0.021 -0.029 
 2 to 4 years -0.002 -0.012 -0.006 -0.011 -0.002 0.018 -0.013 -0.001 -0.013 0.018 -0.015 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.014 
 Less than 2 years -0.068 -0.072 -0.073 -0.072 -0.068 -0.111 -0.102 -0.117 -0.102 -0.111 -0.043 -0.053 -0.046 -0.053 -0.042 
 Small 0.076*** 0.081*** 0.076*** 0.081*** 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.084*** 0.080*** 0.084*** 0.077*** 0.055** 0.056** 0.052** 0.056** 0.055** 
 Medium 0.187*** 0.189*** 0.186*** 0.189*** 0.187*** 0.189*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.189*** 0.140*** 0.135*** 0.131*** 0.135*** 0.139*** 
 Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 N 15262 12872 12013 12872 15262 8242 6836 6264 6836 8242 7020 6036 5749 6036 7020 
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country-wave level. Country, time and sector dummies are present in every regressions, yet are not depicted. Time varying country controls are comprised of the growth of 
GDP and the 10 year sovereign bond yield.  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. 
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Table 9: The impact of financing constraints on the utilisation of alternative finance - panel probit model with random effects–marginal effects. 
  Grants or subsidies bank loans (Main results) Grants or subsidies bank loans  (Stressed countries) Grants or subsidies bank loans (Non-stressed countries) 
  9(a) 9(b) 9(c) 9(d) 9(e) 9(a) 9(b) 9(c) 9(d) 9(e) 9(a) 9(b) 9(c) 9(d) 9(e) 
 Credit constrained t-1 -0.039***     -0.043***     -0.034***     
 Credit rationed t-1  -0.015     -0.013     -0.022    
 Credit application rejected t-1   -0.063***     -0.074***     -0.050***   
 Refused because the cost was too high t-1    -0.071***     -0.090**     -0.047  
 Discouraged from applying t-1     -0.027***     -0.025*     -0.028** 
 Control for firm quality                
 Capital position deteriorated 
 
-0.023** 
 
-0.022* 
 
-0.027** 
 
-0.022* 
 
-0.024** 
 
-0.041** 
 
-0.047** 
 
-0.053*** 
 
-0.046** 
 
-0.042*** 
 
-0.005 
 
0.003 
 
-0.001 
 
0.002 
 
-0.005 
 Credit history deteriorated 0.010 0.012 0.020 0.012 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.022 0.008 0.005 0.016 0.016 0.019 0.016 0.015 
 Debt compared to assets increased 0.051*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.052*** 0.063*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.064*** 0.034*** 0.035** 0.037*** 0.035** 0.034*** 
 Increased net interest expenses 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.052*** 0.058*** 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.063*** 0.057*** 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
 Profit decreased -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.001 -0.009 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.008 
 Turnover decreased -0.009 -0.016 -0.014 -0.017 -0.009 -0.012 -0.021 -0.018 -0.022 -0.012 -0.009 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.009 
 Deteriorated general economic outlook -0.008 -0.017* -0.015 -0.016 -0.008 -0.006 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.007 -0.008 -0.012 -0.008 -0.012 -0.009 
 Deteriorated public fund access 0.015 0.016 0.022* 0.016 0.014 0.007 0.007 0.013 0.007 0.006 0.024* 0.027* 0.033** 0.027* 0.022* 
 Deteriorated prospects -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.010 -0.012 -0.006 -0.008 -0.005 -0.013 -0.006 -0.008 -0.011 -0.009 -0.006 
 Firm controls variables                
 Family or entrepreneurs 
 
0.026 
 
0.034 
 
0.035 
 
0.034 
 
0.027 
 
0.038 
 
0.036 
 
0.042 
 
0.036 
 
0.038 
 
0.013 
 
0.033 
 
0.028 
 
0.034 
 
0.014 
 Other enterprises or business associates -0.011 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.011 0.013 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 0.013 -0.022 -0.008 -0.014 -0.008 -0.022 
 VC or business Angels 0.025 0.058 0.080 0.060 0.026 -0.016 -0.008 0.027 -0.005 -0.016 0.062 0.127* 0.120* 0.129* 0.063 
 Sole Trader -0.006 -0.003 0.001 -0.004 -0.006 -0.008 -0.013 0.002 -0.015 -0.010 -0.005 0.011 0.005 0.011 -0.004 
 Other 0.102** 0.104* 0.106* 0.103* 0.104** 0.063 0.049 0.057 0.047 0.063 0.130** 0.168** 0.155** 0.170** 0.134** 
 5 to 9 years 0.011 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.034* 0.038* 0.041* 0.038* 0.032* -0.007 -0.015 -0.018 -0.015 -0.008 
 2 to 4 years -0.003 -0.004 0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.039 -0.052* -0.042 -0.052* -0.039 0.029 0.038* 0.037 0.037* 0.027 
 Less than 2 years 0.078* 0.074* 0.068 0.075* 0.077* -0.039 -0.028 0.002 -0.029 -0.040 0.102** 0.087* 0.071* 0.089* 0.101** 
 Small 0.045*** 0.051*** 0.045*** 0.051*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.045** 0.036* 0.045** 0.047*** 0.040*** 0.052*** 0.050*** 0.052*** 0.040*** 
 Medium 0.104*** 0.109*** 0.100*** 0.108*** 0.106*** 0.109*** 0.113*** 0.103*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.092*** 0.102*** 0.096*** 0.102*** 0.093*** 
 Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 N 15262 12872 12013 12872 15262 8242 6836 6264 6836 8242 7020 6036 5749 6036 7020 
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country-wave level. Country, time and sector dummies are present in every regressions, yet are not depicted. Time varying country controls are comprised of the growth of 
GDP and the 10 year sovereign bond yield.  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. 
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Table 10: The impact of financing constraints on the utilisation of alternative finance - panel probit model with random effects–marginal effects. 
  Other loan  (Main results) Other loan (Stressed countries) Other loan (Non-stressed countries) 
  10(a) 10(b) 10(c) 10(d) 10(e) 10(a) 10(b) 10(c) 10(d) 10(e) 10(a) 10(b) 10(c) 10(d) 10(e) 
 Credit constrained t-1 0.024***     0.019**     0.031***     
 Credit rationed t-1  0.016*     0.009     0.035**    
 Credit application rejected t-1   0.030***     0.018*     0.055***   
 Refused because the cost was too high t-1    0.001     0.004     -0.003  
 Discouraged from applying t-1     0.013*     0.013     0.013 
 Control for firm quality                
 Capital position deteriorated 0.020** 0.019** 0.018** 0.019** 0.020** 0.018* 0.020* 0.019* 0.020* 0.018* 0.020* 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.020* 
 Credit history deteriorated 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.029** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.064*** 0.055*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.066*** 
 Debt compared to assets increased 0.019*** 0.018** 0.017** 0.017** 0.019*** 0.017* 0.016* 0.015* 0.015* 0.016* 0.020* 0.018* 0.018* 0.018* 0.020* 
 Increased net interest expenses 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.041*** 
 Profit decreased -0.003 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.003 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.008 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.007 
 Turnover decreased 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.007 
 Deteriorated general economic outlook 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.010 
 Deteriorated public fund access 0.013* 0.013* 0.015* 0.013* 0.013* 0.013 0.012 0.017* 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.015 0.014 
 Deteriorated prospects 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 Firm controls variables                
 Family or entrepreneurs 
 
-0.041** 
 
-0.039** 
 
-0.043** 
 
-0.039** 
 
-0.041** 
 
-0.046** 
 
-0.050** 
 
-0.058** 
 
-0.050** 
 
-0.046** -0.038 
 
-0.030 
 
-0.029 -0.029 
 
-0.040* 
 Other enterprises or business associates 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.006 -0.007 0.001 0.004 0.002 -0.008 
 VC or business Angels -0.018 -0.027 -0.026 -0.027 -0.018 -0.007 -0.013 -0.006 -0.013 -0.007 -0.029 -0.035 -0.036 -0.036 -0.030 
 Sole Trader -0.052*** -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.048*** -0.051*** -0.043** -0.040** -0.043** -0.040** -0.042** -0.064*** -0.056** -0.057** -0.056** -0.065*** 
 Other -0.019 -0.020 -0.022 -0.019 -0.020 -0.006 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 -0.032 -0.029 -0.031 -0.029 -0.033 
 5 to 9 years 0.016* 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.017* 0.020* 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.020* 0.008 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.010 
 2 to 4 years 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.037* 0.046** 0.037* 0.046** 0.037* 0.046** 0.042** 0.046** 0.043** 0.049** 
 Less than 2 years 0.104*** 0.086** 0.100*** 0.086** 0.104*** 0.130** 0.090 0.085 0.089 0.131** 0.099** 0.089** 0.117** 0.091** 0.099** 
 Small 0.017** 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.016** 0.016 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.015 0.019* 0.012 0.014 0.012 0.018* 
 Medium 0.049*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.047*** 0.040*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.060*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.057*** 
 Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 N 15262 12872 12013 12872 15262 8242 6836 6264 6836 8242 7020 6036 5749 6036 7020 
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country-wave level. Country, time and sector dummies are present in every regressions, yet are not depicted. Time varying country controls are comprised of the growth of 
GDP and the 10 year sovereign bond yield.  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. 
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Table 11: The impact of financing constraints on the utilisation of alternative finance - panel probit model with random effects–marginal effects. 
  Market financing (Main results) Market financing (Stressed countries) Market financing (Non-stressed countries) 
  11(a)  11(b)  11(c)  11(d)  11(e)  11(a)  11(b)  11(c)  11(d)  11(e)  11(a)  11(b)  11(c)  11(d)  11(e)  
 Credit constrained t-1 0.001     -0.002     0.002     
 Credit rationed t-1  0.011     0.011     0.007    
 Credit application rejected t-1   -0.007     -0.018*     0.012   
 Refused because the cost was too high t-1    0.004     0.007     -0.003  
 Discouraged from applying t-1     0.002     0.005     -0.003 
 Control for firm quality                
 Capital position deteriorated 
  
0.010  
  
0.016**  
  
0.016*  
  
0.016**  
  
0.010  
  
0.002  
  
0.008  
  
0.005  
  
0.008  
  
0.002  
  
0.019*  
  
0.023*  
  
0.025*  
  
0.023*  
  
0.019*  
 Credit history deteriorated 0.014*  0.008  0.006  0.008  0.014*  0.015*  0.010  0.006  0.010  0.014*  0.017  0.008  0.011  0.008  0.017  
 Debt compared to assets increased 0.008  0.007  0.006  0.007  0.008  0.000  -0.002  -0.003  -0.002  0.000  0.018*  0.019*  0.018*  0.019*  0.018*  
 Increased net interest expenses 0.019***  0.019***  0.020***  0.019***  0.019***  0.017**  0.017**  0.017**  0.017**  0.017**  0.020**  0.020**  0.023**  0.020**  0.020**  
 Profit decreased -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.004  -0.002  -0.004  -0.001  -0.002  0.002  -0.001  0.002  -0.002  
 Turnover decreased -0.007  -0.009  -0.009  -0.009  -0.007  -0.009  -0.008  -0.010  -0.008  -0.009  -0.005  -0.008  -0.006  -0.008  -0.005  
 Deteriorated general economic outlook -0.007  -0.006  -0.006  -0.006  -0.007  -0.004  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.004  -0.010  -0.013  -0.013  -0.013  -0.010  
 Deteriorated public fund access 0.020***  0.020***  0.021***  0.020***  0.020***  0.016*  0.014  0.016*  0.015  0.016*  0.025**  0.026**  0.025**  0.026**  0.025**  
 Deteriorated prospects 0.006  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.006  0.002  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005  0.002  0.013  0.017*  0.020*  0.018*  0.013  
 Firm controls variables                
 Family or entrepreneurs -0.039*** -0.038** -0.040** -0.038** -0.038*** -0.029* -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.028* -0.045** -0.049** -0.054** -0.049** -0.046** 
 Other enterprises or business associates -0.021* -0.019 -0.020 -0.019 -0.021* -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.032* -0.033* -0.035* -0.033* -0.032* 
 VC or business Angels -0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.017 -0.023 -0.022 -0.023 -0.018 0.005 0.009 0.013 0.009 0.004 
 Sole Trader -0.045*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.045*** -0.031* -0.027* -0.023 -0.027 -0.031* -0.059*** -0.058*** -0.062*** -0.058*** -0.059*** 
 Other -0.005 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.005 -0.014 -0.003 -0.013 -0.003 -0.014 0.000 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.000 
 5 to 9 years 0.014* 0.014* 0.015* 0.014* 0.014* 0.019* 0.018 0.020* 0.018 0.019* 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.011 
 2 to 4 years 0.019* 0.017 0.015 0.017 0.019* 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.031* 0.026 0.024 0.026 0.031* 
 Less than 2 years 0.037 0.035 0.044 0.035 0.037 -0.042 -0.048 -0.042 -0.048 -0.042 0.074** 0.073* 0.082** 0.074* 0.073** 
 Small 0.016** 0.016** 0.014* 0.016** 0.016** 0.019** 0.019* 0.014 0.019* 0.020** 0.012 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.011 
 Medium 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.037*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.033** 0.032*** 0.030*** 
 Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 N 15262 12872 12013 12872 15262 8242 6836 6264 6836 8242 7020 6036 5749 6036 7020 
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country-wave level. Country, time and sector dummies are present in every regressions, yet are not depicted. Time varying country controls are comprised of the growth of 
GDP and the 10 year sovereign bond yield.  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. 
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Table 12: The impact of financing constraints on the utilisation of alternative finance - panel probit model with random effects–marginal effects. 
  Internal funds (Main results) Internal funds (Stressed countries) Internal funds (Non-stressed countries) 
  12(a)  12(b)  12(c)  12(d)  12(e)  12(a)  12(b)  12(c)  12(d)  12(e)  12(a)  12(b)  12(c)  12(d)  12(e)  
 Credit constrained t-1 0.013     -0.006     0.042**     
 Credit rationed t-1  0.015     -0.002     0.045    
 Credit application rejected t-1   0.011     -0.001     0.039   
 Refused because the cost was too high t-1    0.052     0.045     0.050  
 Discouraged from applying t-1     0.011     0.006     0.023 
 Control for firm quality                
 Capital position deteriorated 0.011 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.011 0.009 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.008 0.015 0.014 0.008 0.014 0.015 
 Credit history deteriorated -0.014 -0.026* -0.025 -0.026* -0.014 -0.037** -0.049** -0.047** -0.049** -0.037** 0.022 0.012 0.008 0.013 0.024 
 Debt compared to assets increased 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.005 0.016 0.012 0.016 0.012 0.016 -0.015 -0.020 -0.010 -0.020 -0.016 
 Increased net interest expenses 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.002 
 Profit decreased -0.01 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.006 -0.032* -0.033 -0.031 -0.033* -0.032* 
 Turnover decreased -0.018 -0.014 -0.016 -0.014 -0.018 -0.034** -0.035* -0.035* -0.035* -0.034** 0.004 0.014 0.006 0.013 0.004 
 Deteriorated general economic outlook 0.027** 0.031** 0.032** 0.031** 0.027** 0.035** 0.028* 0.027 0.028* 0.035** 0.019 0.034* 0.039* 0.034* 0.020 
 Deteriorated public fund access 0.008 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.009 0.002 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.004 
 Deteriorated prospects 0.023* 0.028* 0.028* 0.028* 0.023* 0.032* 0.041** 0.046 0.041** 0.032* 0.007 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.007 
 Firm controls variables                
 Family or entrepreneurs 0.020 0.010 0.003 0.010 0.020 -0.001 -0.021 -0.030 -0.021 -0.001 0.062 0.064 0.060 0.064 0.060 
 Other enterprises or business associates 0.001 -0.017 -0.024 -0.018 0.001 0.003 -0.019 -0.028 -0.020 0.003 0.023 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.022 
 VC or business Angels 0.052 0.040 0.044 0.039 0.052 -0.024 -0.009 0.014 -0.009 -0.024 0.159* 0.121 0.103 0.120 0.158** 
 Sole Trader -0.004 -0.022 -0.026 -0.022 -0.004 -0.024 -0.059 -0.061 -0.059 -0.024 0.039 0.042 0.039 0.042 0.038 
 Other 0.113* 0.089 0.059 0.090 0.112* 0.114 0.088 0.049 0.089 0.114 0.142* 0.130 0.109 0.128 0.138 
 5 to 9 years -0.024 -0.034* -0.026 -0.034* -0.024 -0.009 -0.018 -0.007 -0.019 -0.009 -0.038 -0.050 -0.046* -0.050* -0.037 
 2 to 4 years -0.04* -0.031 -0.026 -0.030 -0.040* -0.068** -0.051 -0.048 -0.051 -0.068** -0.001 0.001* 0.007 0.003 0.002 
 Less than 2 years -0.015 0.002 0.010 0.002 -0.015 -0.085 -0.029 -0.008 -0.028 -0.085 0.003 -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 0.003 
 Small 0.059*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.059*** 0.04** 0.053** 0.060*** 0.054*** 0.041** 0.085*** 0.080*** 0.075*** 0.080*** 0.084*** 
 Medium 0.118*** 0.122*** 0.126*** 0.123*** 0.118*** 0.079*** 0.094*** 0.104*** 0.095*** 0.080*** 0.174*** 0.162*** 0.160*** 0.162*** 0.171*** 
 Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 N 15262 12872 12013 12872 15262 8242 6836 6264 6836 8242 7020 6036 5749 6036 7020 
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country-wave level. Country, time and sector dummies are present in every regressions, yet are not depicted. Time varying country controls are comprised of the growth of 
GDP and the 10 year sovereign bond yield.  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. 
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Table 13: The impact of financing constraints on the utilisation of alternative finance - panel probit model with random effects–marginal effects. 
  Leasing or hire purchase or factoring (Main results)  Leasing or hire purchase or factoring (Stressed countries)  Leasing or hire purchase or factoring (Non-stressed countries) 
  13(a)  13(b)  13(c)  13(d)  13(e)  13(a)  13(b)  13(c)  13(d)  13(e)  13(a)  13(b)  13(c)  13(d)  13(e)  
 Credit constrained t-1 -0.021     -0.024*     -0.009     
 Credit rationed t-1  -0.016     -0.013     -0.019    
 Credit application rejected t-1   -0.040*     -0.048*     -0.007   
 Refused because the cost was too high t-1    -0.015     0.017     -0.072  
 Discouraged from applying t-1     -0.007     -0.010     0.002 
 Control for firm quality                
 Capital position deteriorated -0.011 0.002 0.006 0.002 -0.012 -0.020 -0.016 -0.018 -0.016 -0.021 0.005 0.027 0.041 0.026 0.005 
 Credit history deteriorated 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.009 
 Debt compared to assets increased 0.059*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.059*** 0.042** 0.044** 0.042** 0.044** 0.043** 0.077** 0.094*** 0.090*** 0.094*** 0.077** 
 Increased net interest expenses 0.059*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.055*** 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.054*** 0.060** 0.057* 0.049* 0.057* 0.060** 
 Profit decreased -0.005 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.005 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.011 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 -0.011 
 Turnover decreased -0.060*** -0.067*** -0.061*** -0.067*** -0.060*** -0.051*** -0.065*** -0.057*** -0.064*** -0.051*** -0.078** -0.069* -0.067* -0.069* -0.078** 
 Deteriorated general economic outlook 0.020 0.015 0.017 0.015 0.019 0.012 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.012 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.024 
 Deteriorated public fund access 0.019 0.018 0.012 0.018 0.018 0.027 0.036* 0.035* 0.036* 0.026 0.005 -0.011 -0.026 -0.011 0.004 
 Deteriorated prospects -0.011 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.011 -0.015 -0.013 -0.011 -0.014 -0.015 -0.007 -0.003 -0.009 -0.003 -0.007 
 Firm controls variables                
 Family or entrepreneurs -0.016 -0.010 -0.005 -0.010 -0.015 -0.008 -0.019 -0.004 -0.019 -0.008 -0.026 0.022 -0.003 0.022 -0.025 
 Other enterprises or business associates 0.009 -0.003 0.010 -0.003 0.009 -0.026 -0.053 -0.034 -0.053 -0.026 0.063 0.094 0.077 0.094 0.064 
 VC or business Angels 0.076 0.051 0.058 0.051 0.077 0.013 -0.021 -0.024 -0.021 0.013 0.160 0.167 0.163 0.168 0.161 
 Sole Trader -0.040 -0.039 -0.032 -0.039 -0.040 -0.033 -0.049 -0.029 -0.050 -0.034 -0.039 0.007 -0.019 0.007 -0.039 
 Other -0.007 -0.041 -0.030 -0.042 -0.006 -0.002 -0.048 -0.029 -0.049 -0.001 -0.012 -0.012 -0.030 -0.011 -0.011 
 5 to 9 years 0.039* 0.026 0.031 0.025 0.038* 0.061** 0.045* 0.051* 0.045* 0.060** -0.006 -0.010 -0.007 -0.010 -0.007 
 2 to 4 years 0.038 0.036 0.032 0.035 0.037 0.021 0.005 -0.005 0.005 0.020 0.057 0.068 0.068 0.067 0.056 
 Less than 2 years 0.058 0.046 0.050 0.046 0.058 0.029 0.024 0.037 0.025 0.030 0.088 0.067 0.069 0.068 0.088 
 Small 0.259*** 0.258*** 0.254*** 0.258*** 0.260*** 0.216*** 0.205*** 0.198*** 0.205*** 0.217*** 0.299*** 0.312*** 0.307*** 0.312*** 0.300*** 
 Medium 0.393*** 0.397*** 0.393*** 0.396*** 0.395*** 0.337*** 0.336*** 0.329*** 0.336*** 0.338*** 0.443*** 0.448*** 0.444*** 0.447*** 0.444*** 
 Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 N 15262 12872 12013 12872 15262 8242 6836 6264 6836 8242 7020 6036 5749 6036 7020 
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country-wave level. Country, time and sector dummies are present in every regressions, yet are not depicted. Time varying country controls are comprised of the growth of 
GDP and the 10 year sovereign bond yield.  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. 
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4.4.2 The determinants of external financing obstacles 
Table 14-17 contain the influences of (a) firm controls and (b) firm quality and 
creditworthiness on external financing constraints for bank loans, trade credit, other 
financing and credit line. Here different age classifications are utilised according to the 
SAFE data, which are grouped according to the number of active years; these are: 1) 10 
years or more, 2) 5 to 9 years and 3) 2 to 4 years. The availability of external financing is 
contingent on several contributing elements. With this in mind, the effects of a substantial 
variety of supplemental variables are considered.  
Table 14 demonstrates that micro and younger firms are relatively more prone to having 
applications for bank loans rejected; this outcome supports the results from the seminal 
research conducted by Beck et al. (2006) which corroborates the practicality of using a 
firm’s size and age as inferable estimations of financing constraints. Comparably, Holton 
et al. (2013) determine that micro firms and firms recording low turnover show a greater 
tendency to be rejected in the Eurozone. Furthermore, a study by Andrieu et al. (2015) 
indicates that age and size are directly proportional to debt capacity. Young and small 
firms are more likely to be rejected given the greater moral hazard they pose for a bank. 
Brown et al. (2011) additionally propose that smaller firms could endure more restricted 
investment prospects relative to the large firms. These findings are robust in both stressed 
and non-stressed countries of the Eurozone. When examining variables representing firm 
quality and creditworthiness, firms that have reported deteriorated credit history, capital 
position and prospect with respect to sales, profitability or business plan are additionally 
more prone to be rejected and self-rationed. This deduction is in keeping with a study by 
Ferrando and Mulier (2015) demonstrating that low-profit firms show a greater tendency 
to experience actual financing constraints. We find similar evidence in our research 
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concerning both stressed and non-stressed countries of euro area. Moreover, firms 
reporting a reduction in turnover are also more likely to face bank loans rejection. 
Table 15 upholds the previous findings for bank loans rejection and suggests that micro 
firms are more likely to be rejected for a trade credit when compared with small firms. 
Yet, there are no concrete findings to indicate significant differences between various 
categories of a firm’s age and our various constrained measures for trade credit. This 
deduction is in contrast to the conclusions in Andrieu et al. (2015) derived from Flash 
Eurobarometer Survey on access to finance from the EC, which implies that just the very 
young firms experience more constraints for trade credit. We find that firms in 
construction sector are more likely to face trade credit rejection. Furthermore, our results 
suggest that firms that reported deteriorating credit history and capital position are more 
likely to be rationed and rejected for trade credit; however, this outcome is more relevant 
to the periphery countries of the Eurozone. On a related note, Biais and Gollier (1997) 
offers an analytical model demonstrating that the supply of trade credit shows the 
creditworthiness of the customer. 
Focusing on other external financing which encompass wide range of financing 
possibilities such as peer-to-peer lending, crowdfunding and loans from a related 
company (see footnotes: 35), there is no significant evidence for the prevalence of firm’s 
ages unlike the trend for bank loans. Additionally, micro and small firms operating in 
industry sector are more prone to experience rejection for other financing, these findings 
only hold true when reflecting the whole sample and the sub-sample designated for 
stressed countries of euro area. 
As for credit line, the data indicates that smaller and younger firms are approximately 3% 
more likely to face rejection for a credit line. The results for firm’s size and age are 
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corroborated with bank loans, as these categories are statistically significant. The turnover 
here is inversely proportional to credit line rejection, which means that as firms’ turnovers 
decrease the percentage of firms reporting a rejection for credit lines increases. When 
taking further factors concerning firm quality into account, the outcomes documented in 
Table 17 are in keeping Table 14; consequently, these results will not be additionally 
elaborated upon. 
Utilising Germany as a reference nation, the country dummies in the bank loans 
regression are significant in addition to being positive for Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands and Portugal; this demonstrates an increased likelihood of firms in the 
aforementioned countries having loans being constrained. Other financing and credit lines 
dummies adhered to a format comparable with bank loans regressions, with France and 
Belgium being the exceptions in which dummies are significant and positive. Finally, 
trade credit dummies are significant and positive in nearly every case apart from Austria 
and Finland. Crucially, the country time dummies for these regressions are not illustrated, 
yet are basically all statistically significant. 
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Table 14: Baseline specification on external financing usage- panel probit model with random effects–marginal effects. 
Bank loans 
(excluding overdraft and credit lines)  
Main results Stressed countries Non-stressed countries 
Rationed Rejected Self-rationed Rationed Rejected Self-rationed Rationed Rejected Self-rationed 
Firm size 
   
      
10 (Micro) -0.009* 0.044*** 0.013*** -0.043*** 0.064*** 0.010*** 0.009* 0.015*** 0.019*** 
 50 10 (Small) -0.003 0.010** 0.007*** -0.012 0.017* 0.005* 0.003 0.002* 0.012* 
Firm age 
   
      
10 years or more 0.003 -0.009 0.000 -0.011 -0.031 0.003 0.005 0.000 -0.002 
5 to 9 years 0.000 0.010 0.000 -0.014 -0.001 0.004 0.004 0.006* -0.001 
2 to 4 years 0.011 0.031*** 0.001 -0.010 0.039 0.004 0.013 0.011** 0.002 
Controls for firm quality 
   
      
Turnover decreased 0.001 0.008** -0.003 0.001 0.011 -0.002 0.001 0.002* -0.004 
Debt to assets ratio increased 0.011** -0.005* -0.004* 0.020* -0.005 -0.004 0.003 -0.002* -0.004 
Credit history deteriorated 0.028*** 0.044*** 0.004* 0.040*** 0.069*** 0.004 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.004 
Capital position deteriorated 0.017*** 0.024*** 0.005* 0.022* 0.041*** 0.005 0.011*** 0.006*** 0.007 
Deteriorated prospects 0.021*** 0.009** 0.002 0.038*** 0.027*** 0.002 0.008** 0.000 0.000 
Industry  -0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.000 
Construction  0.007 0.007 0.003 0.012 0.022 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.001 
Trade  -0.004 -0.003 -0.004* -0.006 -0.007 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.008* 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 13177 16100 16100 6673 8359 8359 6504 7741 7741 
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country-wave level. . Country and time dummies are present in every regressions, yet are not depicted. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0:05, 
*** p < 0:01.p < 0:01. 
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Table 15: Baseline specification on external financing usage- panel probit model with random effects–marginal effects. 
Trade credit 
 
Main results Stressed countries Non-stressed countries 
Rationed Rejected Self-rationed Rationed Rejected Self-rationed Rationed Rejected Self-rationed 
Firm size 
 
 
 
      
10 (Micro) -0.019* 0.013*** 0.003 -0.023* 0.011*** 0.002 -0.006 0.005*** 0.006 
 50 10 (Small) -0.002 0.004*** 0.007* -0.008 0.004* 0.005 0.009 0.001** 0.010 
Firm age          
10 years or more -0.008 0.002 -0.003 -0.02 0.004 -0.003 0.006 0.000 -0.006 
5 to 9 years 0.009 0.006 -0.001 0.013 0.011 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.004 
2 to 4 years 0.019 0.008 -0.001 0.01 0.017 -0.003 0.024 0.000 0.002 
Controls for firm quality          
Turnover decreased 0.004 0.003** 0.004 0.005 0.004* 0.003 0.001 0.001* 0.011 
Debt to assets ratio increased 0.027*** 0.002 0.000 0.030** 0.004* -0.001 0.013 0.000 0.005 
Credit history deteriorated 0.059*** 0.016*** 0.002 0.066*** 0.020*** 0.003 0.032** 0.001*** -0.003 
Capital position deteriorated 0.021* 0.004** 0.003 0.023* 0.007*** 0.002 0.013 0.000 0.004 
Deteriorated prospects 0.021** 0.002* -0.002 0.032** 0.004* -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.003 
Industry  0.010 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.028** 0.000 -0.005 
Construction  0.015 0.004* -0.002 0.014 0.006* 0.000 0.013 0.000 -0.003 
Trade  0.001 -0.003* -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.004 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 9631 10898 10560 6916 7893 7893 2715 3005 2667 
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country-wave level. . Country and time dummies are present in every regressions, yet are not depicted. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0:05, 
*** p < 0:01.p < 0:01. 
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Table 16: Baseline specification on external financing usage- panel probit model with random effects–marginal effects. 
Other external financing 
 
Main results Stressed countries Non-stressed countries 
Rationed Rejected Self-rationed Rationed Rejected Self-rationed Rationed Rejected Self-rationed 
Firm size 
 
 
 
      
10 (Micro) -0.001 0.015*** 0.002 -0.005 0.028** 0.001 -0.001 0.011** 0.004 
 50 10 (Small) -0.005 0.006* 0.001 -0.014 0.025** 0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.001 
Firm age          
10 years or more 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.036 0.008 0.000 -0.005 -0.002 0.007 
5 to 9 years 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.081 0.028 0.001 -0.006 -0.002 0.011 
2 to 4 years 0.015 0.005 0.004 0.032 0.026 0.002 0.011 0.001 0.008 
Controls for firm quality          
Turnover decreased -0.001 0.005* -0.001 -0.006 0.011 -0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.004 
Debt to assets ratio increased 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.009 0.008 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
Credit history deteriorated 0.023*** 0.02*** 0.000 0.039** 0.04*** 0.000 0.019* 0.016*** -0.001 
Capital position deteriorated 0.015* 0.011*** 0.002 0.034* 0.016 0.001 0.010 0.012** 0.008 
Deteriorated prospects 0.002 0.007** 0.002 0.018 0.025** 0.002 -0.005 0.001 0.001 
Industry  -0.002 0.007* -0.001 -0.001 0.027** 0.000 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 
Construction  0.008 0.005 0.002 0.015 0.025 0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.002 
Trade  0.002 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.012 0.000 0.003 0.001 -0.003 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 6115 7010 7010 2425 2943 2943 3690 4067 4067 
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country-wave level. . Country and time dummies are present in every regressions, yet are not depicted. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0:05, 
*** p < 0:01.p < 0:01. 
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Table 17: Baseline specification on external financing usage- panel probit model with random effects–marginal effects. 
Credit line, bank overdraft or credit cards overdraft  
 
Main results Stressed countries Non-stressed countries 
Rationed Rejected Self-rationed Rationed Rejected Self-rationed Rationed Rejected Self-rationed 
Firm size 
 
 
 
      
10 (Micro) -0.007 0.029*** 0.007*** -0.023 0.027** 0.005** 0.008 0.026*** 0.008** 
 50 10 (Small) -0.006 0.011* 0.004** -0.016 0.010 0.003* 0.003 0.010* 0.005* 
Firm age          
10 years or more 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.019 -0.004 -0.002 0.013 0.000 0.002 
5 to 9 years 0.011 0.017 -0.001 -0.006 0.017 -0.002 0.025 0.013 0.000 
2 to 4 years 0.016 0.031* 0.001 -0.026 0.047 -0.001 0.046* 0.017 0.005 
Controls for firm quality          
Turnover decreased 0.001 0.009* -0.001 0.003 0.015* 0.000 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 
Debt to assets ratio increased 0.031*** -0.003 -0.001 0.038*** 0.003 -0.002 0.024** -0.007* -0.001 
Credit history deteriorated 0.051*** 0.043*** 0.003* 0.064*** 0.056*** 0.002 0.038*** 0.028*** 0.003 
Capital position deteriorated 0.030*** 0.017*** 0.001 0.035** 0.022** 0.002 0.023* 0.012** 0.000 
Deteriorated prospects 0.014 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.024* 0.000 -0.001 
Industry  0.006 0.004 0.000 0.012 0.015 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.004 
Construction  0.006 0.012 0.001 0.026 0.026* -0.001 -0.007 0.004 0.007* 
Trade  -0.004 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.010 0.000 -0.007 -0.005 0.002 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 10811 10811 10811 5805 5805 5805 5006 5006 5006 
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country-wave level. . Country and time dummies are present in every regressions, yet are not depicted. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0:05, 
*** p < 0:01.p < 0:01. 
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 4.4.3 The determinants of “discouraged borrowers” 
In line with our prior expectation, the data suggests that smaller, younger firms show a 
greater tendency to be discouraged for bank loans (see Table 18). A firm’s size apparently 
is a significant element when compared with its age across our various specification. 
Focusing on the whole sample of the EU-11, the data suggests that older firms are more 
equipped to dilute the problem of information asymmetry, probably a result of more 
successful financial relationships in line with results obtained in Mac an Bhaid et al. 
(2016). When examining variables related to the financial profile of firms, the results 
indicate that firms with the prospect of deteriorating credit history and capital position 
show a greater tendency to be discouraged at a rate of 2% and 7%, respectively. 
Moreover, decreasing turnover and rising debt compared to asset ratio produces 
increasing discouragement. Concentrating on macrocosmic factors, there is evidence to 
support that greater bond yields facilitates discouragement. We also find that firms in 
trade sector are less likely to be discouraged for bank loans. 
Considering the unbalanced panel nature of the dataset52, the scope of our analysis is 
augmented by also looking at firms’ survival rates, considering firms with less than 3 
times frequency as opposed to those with greater than 4 frequency rates. Overall, the 
general results deducted from this exercise are in line with the full sample of the EU-11 
and demonstrate that a higher mean recovery rate under bankruptcy decreases the  
                                                 
52 Analysis of various credit constraints measures as depicted in Table 4 suggest that firms in the 
Netherlands are experiencing a higher than expected rate of credit constraint among our different measures. 
Also, the rate of discouraged borrowers as shown in Table 5 are somewhat elevated in the Netherlands. It 
is possible that the integrity of our findings could be affected by this anomaly which warrants future studies 
in order to further scrutinise the issue of ‘discouraged borrowers’, especially in the case of the Eurozone. 
One way of dealing with this anomaly is to exclude the Netherlands from the chosen sample in order to see 
how regressions alter before and after this exercise. If future studies opt out to exclusively compare the core 
vs. periphery countries of the Eurozone, they may well relocate the Netherlands to the periphery pool due 
to the anomalous statistics exhibited in our study. Furthermore, particular attention has to be given to the 
nature of SMEs and the government policies that have transmuted into a potentially hazardous financing 
environment for Dutch firms to operate in. 
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probability of discouragement solely in firms with frequency<=3, even though marginal 
effects of this parameter are comparatively small.  There is also slight variation within 
the firms’ age category of 5-9 years, as our estimates point to an insignificant effect of 
this category for the level of discouragement in firms with frequency>=4.   
Concentrating on stressed countries of the EU-11, significant proof exists to corroborate 
that micro firms are more likely to be discouraged; yet, there is no supporting evidence 
for the effects of firms’ ages on the level of discouragement, unlike the trend shown for 
the whole sample. It can be deducted that micro firms face a higher discouragement and 
this is more prevalent when limiting the sample to frequency<=3, where 20% of firm are 
indeed likely to face discouragement. Firm-specific characteristics produce a comparable 
effect on discouragement in line with EU-11 whole sample with the variable 
corresponding to a decreasing turnover of firms as the only exception to this pattern.   
As for banking and macroeconomic indicators, it is valuable to mention that higher 
government bonds yield produce discouragement in stressed countries, implying that 
financial pressure within the sector has a negative effect on firms requests for external 
financing via banks. However, this pattern fails to hold true for firms with frequency<=3 
survival rate.   
Focusing on non-stressed countries, the results suggest that micro and younger firms are 
relatively more prone to be discouraged for bank loans. Yet, it should be noted here that 
both micro and small firms face moderately lower discouragement rates relative to the 
stressed countries. The significant impact of firm’s age can be deemed as a difference 
between stressed vs. non stressed countries. Unlike the trend for government bond yields 
in the case of stressed countries, the indicators are not linked with discouragement here. 
Additionally, the bank overdraft rates seem to have an unexpected positive impact on 
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discouragement solely in non-stressed countries; this may be explained by a fluctuation 
observed during the time under inspection from 2009H1-2014H2.  The positive 
significant relationship of the change in GDP can be considered somewhat unexpected; 
however, when limiting the sample to frequency>=4 or survival rate, the impact of GDP 
on discouragement becomes less pronounced. In the context of the positive impact of 
private sector credit the results are supported by Holton et al. (2014).  
196 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 18: Determinants of borrower discouragement - panel probit model with random effects–marginal effects. 
  Main results Main results (Frequency<=3) Main results (Frequency>=4) 
  Firm 
specific 
Banking Macroeconomic All Firm 
specific 
Banking Macroeconomic All Firm 
specific 
Banking Macroeconomic All 
Firm controls variables                         
10 (Micro) 0.183*** 0.183*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.176*** 0.177*** 0.176*** 
 50 10 (Small) 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 
10 years or more -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 
5 to 9 years 0.032* 0.032* 0.032* 0.032* 0.035* 0.035* 0.035* 0.036* 0.017 0.018 0.016 0.016 
2 to 4 years 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.080*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.078*** 0.082* 0.080* 0.081* 0.080* 
Controls for firm quality                         
Turnover decreased 0.017** 0.017** 0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 0.014 0.013 0.015 0.014 
Debt to assets ratio increased -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043*** 
Credit history deteriorated 0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 0.016* 0.017* 0.016* 0.016* 0.020 0.019 0.020 0.020 
Capital position deteriorated 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 
Deteriorated prospects 0.018** 0.018** 0.016** 0.016** 0.014* 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.023* 0.022* 0.022* 0.022* 
Banking & macro factors                         
Insolvency    -0.003   -0.002   -0.005**   -0.004*   0.007*   0.008* 
Bank rate   -0.001   -0.002   -0.001   -0.002*   0.000   -0.001 
GDP     0.008*** 0.009***     0.009*** 0.009***     0.006 0.009* 
10 year bond yield     0.012*** 0.012***     0.014*** 0.014***     0.006* 0.005 
Private sector credit     0.000 0.000     0.000 0.000     0.000 0.000 
Industry  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Construction  0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 
Trade  -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.018 -0.018 -0.017 -0.017 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 20123 20123 20123 20123 15189 15189 15189 15189 4934 4934 4934 4934 
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country-wave level. Country and time dummies are present in every regressions, yet are not depicted * p < 0.1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. 
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Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country-wave level. Country and time dummies are present in every regressions, yet are not depicted * p < 0.1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. 
 
 
 
 
Table 19: Determinants of borrower discouragement - panel probit model with random effects–marginal effects. 
  Stressed countries Stressed countries (Frequency<=3) Stressed countries (Frequency>=4) 
  Firm 
specific 
Banking Macroeconomic All Firm 
specific 
Banking Macroeconomic All Firm 
specific 
Banking Macroeconomic All 
Firm controls variables                         
10 (Micro) 0.204*** 0.203*** 0.204*** 0.203*** 0.206*** 0.205*** 0.206*** 0.205*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.175*** 
 50 10 (Small) 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.072*** 0.078*** 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.075*** 0.055** 0.055** 0.055** 0.055** 
10 years or more -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.030 -0.033 -0.033 -0.034 -0.032 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 
5 to 9 years -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.026 -0.025 -0.027 -0.026 
2 to 4 years 0.034 0.032 0.033 0.032 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.072 0.073 0.073 0.075 
Controls for firm quality                         
Turnover decreased 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.013 
Debt to assets ratio increased -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.059*** -0.059*** 
Credit history deteriorated 0.031** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.028* 0.029** 0.028** 0.030** 0.039* 0.038* 0.039* 0.039* 
Capital position deteriorated 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 
Deteriorated prospects 0.027** 0.026** 0.025** 0.025** 0.026* 0.025* 0.023* 0.024* 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.025 
Banking & macro factors                         
Insolvency    -0.010***   -0.011***   -0.014***   -0.016***   0.003   0.001 
Bank rate   0.000   -0.001   0.000   -0.001   -0.002   -0.003 
GDP     0.006* 0.001     0.008** 0.001     0.000 0.000 
10 year bond yield     0.009*** 0.009***     0.010*** 0.009***     0.006 0.006 
Private sector credit     0.001 0.000     0.001 -0.001     0.000 0.000 
Industry  -0.022* -0.021* -0.022* -0.020* -0.024* -0.022 -0.023* -0.022 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
Construction  0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 0.037 0.036 0.037 0.037 
Trade  -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.036** -0.033 -0.034 -0.033 -0.033 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 10669 10669 10669 10669 8035 8035 8035 8035 2634 2634 2634 2634 
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Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country-wave level. Country and time dummies are present in every regressions, yet are not depicted * p < 0.1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. 
Table 20: Determinants of borrower discouragement - panel probit model with random effects–marginal effects. 
  Non-stressed countries Non-stressed countries (Frequency<=3) Non-stressed countries (Frequency>=4) 
  Firm 
specific 
Banking Macroeconomic All Firm 
specific 
Banking Macroeconomic All Firm 
specific 
Banking Macroeconomic All 
Firm controls variables                         
10 (Micro) 0.155*** 0.157*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.143*** 0.144*** 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.170*** 0.171*** 0.165*** 0.166*** 
 50 10 (Small) 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.049** 0.047** 0.047** 0.046** 
10 years or more 0.006 0.009 -0.001 -0.001 0.007 0.011 0.002 0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.014 -0.012 
5 to 9 years 0.063*** 0.069*** 0.055** 0.056** 0.059** 0.066*** 0.054** 0.054** 0.063 0.067 0.051 0.053 
2 to 4 years 0.104*** 0.112*** 0.094*** 0.095*** 0.108*** 0.116*** 0.102*** 0.101*** 0.077* 0.076* 0.065 0.063 
Controls for firm quality                         
Turnover decreased 0.019* 0.020** 0.019* 0.019* 0.022** 0.022** 0.021* 0.021* 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.010 
Debt to assets ratio increased -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.028* -0.027* -0.029** -0.028** 
Credit history deteriorated 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 
Capital position deteriorated 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.089*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.054** 0.054** 0.054** 0.054** 
Deteriorated prospects 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.016 
Banking & macro factors                         
Insolvency    0.003   0.000   0.001   -0.002   0.008*   0.008 
Bank rate   0.056***   0.067**   0.050**   0.053*   0.079*   0.102* 
GDP     0.027*** 0.018***     0.024*** 0.018**     0.023* 0.011 
10 year bond yield     -0.008 0.014     -0.020 0.000     0.033 0.054 
Private sector credit     0.008*** 0.009***     0.007*** 0.008***     0.007* 0.008* 
Industry  0.011 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.024 
Construction  0.007 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.042 0.040 0.041 
Trade  -0.018* -0.018* -0.018* -0.017* -0.020* -0.019* -0.020* -0.019* -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 9454 9454 9454 9454 7154 7154 7154 7154 2300 2300 2300 2300 
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4.4.4 Extensions and robustness tests 
The ultimate test of robustness entails assessing the influence of additional variables on 
borrower discouragement in the EU-11. As shown in Table 21, the results generally 
support the previous findings most specifically in the case of firm-specific characteristics. 
The association between credit lines, bank overdrafts or credit card overdrafts, and bank 
loans is supported by the concept that a good quality borrower can indicate 
creditworthiness by demonstrating validation from other creditors. In contrast firms 
which cannot indicate this show a higher tendency to be discouraged. Our findings 
suggest that firms that use the aforementioned source of external financing are 
approximately 6% less likely to be discouraged for bank loans, the findings in this present 
study are comparable with prior investigations that obtained results supporting an inverse 
relationship between credit cards usage and discouragement in the US (Han et al., 2009). 
Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that family or entrepreneurs are not as likely to 
be discouraged for bank loans; this finding is in line with Freel et al. (2012) where the 
study determine that in family firms, more financial dependency brings low levels of 
discouragement. This advantage could be a result of the extensive track records in 
business usually associated with family firms and their capacity to have established 
relationships with banks in the long term. 
Moreover, contrary to the conclusions in Mac an Bhaid et al. (2016), there is no evidence 
to substantiate an inverse link between bank loans needs and discouragement. However, 
businesses considering access to finance as the most significant issue demonstrate a 
greater tendency to be discouraged at rate of 4.9%. Similar corroborating data concerning 
a firm’s deteriorating opinion of the willingness of banks to provide loans/ willingness of 
partners to provide trade credit and willingness of investors to invest and discouragement 
are determined.   
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Focusing on regulatory variables, improvements in the degree of government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption are anticipated to 
be positively correlated with borrower discouragement. Yet, our analysis suggests 
conflicting evidence when addressing these linkages. Theoretically, a more developed 
regulatory framework should discourage moral hazard, and therefore deter ‘bad’ 
borrowers. Increased discouragement of ‘bad’ borrowers could lead to less adverse 
selection. In contrast this should mean a more effective transmission of funds and reduced 
interest rates for ‘good’ borrowers. Our mixed findings53 can be explained by relatively 
weak performance in stressed countries of the EU-11 in terms of our various regulatory 
indicators and as a result the negative unexpected sign is driven by the previously 
mentioned economies.54 Lastly, our measure of competition in the banking sector has a 
negative effect, showing that more concentration in the banking industry decreases the 
chances of discouragement. Our results indicate that 23% reduction in the possibility of 
businesses being discouraged from applying for bank loans. The data upholds the 
previous seminal results obtained by Han et al. (2009). The researchers conclude that 
discouragement is an effective self-rationing mechanism. Furthermore, low risk 
borrowers are deemed less prone to be “discouraged in concentrated markets than in 
competitive markets”, and also that, in the background of concentrated markets, high risk 
borrowers are more prone to be discouraged in more protracted financial relationships.  
                                                 
53 We think the reason behind the statistical negative relationship is due to the level heterogeneity presented 
especially in the euro area stressed countries relative to the core economies of the Eurozone as shown in 
the Appendix E. Accordingly, future studies ought to consider this anomaly in greater detail in order to 
ascertain whether regrouping the sample into two sub-samples of core vs. periphery stressed countries 
would indeed generate a different statistical relationship when addressing the aforementioned two groups 
of countries. 
54 Appendix E reports the regulatory variables for EU-11 countries. 
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Table 21: Determinants of borrower discouragement - panel probit model with random effects–marginal effects (Robustness check). 
 Firm specific Regulatory Banking & macroeconomic 
Omnibus 
Firm controls variables     
10 (Micro) 0.170*** 0.168*** 0.180*** 0.178*** 
 50 10 (Small) 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.051** 0.050** 
10 years or more -0.028 -0.027 -0.035 -0.035 
5 to 9 years -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 
2 to 4 years 0.031 0.034 0.044 0.046 
Controls for firm quality     
Turnover decreased 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.026 0.027 
Debt to assets ratio increased -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.024 -0.024 
Credit history deteriorated -0.004 -0.004 -0.015 -0.015 
Capital position deteriorated 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 
Deteriorated prospects -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.005 
Deteriorated general economic outlook -0.001 0.000 0.011 0.009 
Deterioration on willingness of banks to provide loans 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 
Deterioration on willingness of partners to provide trade credit 0.020* 0.018* 0.026 0.024 
Deterioration on willingness of investors to invest 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.082** 0.085** 
Needs for bank loans increased 0.007 0.007 0.014 0.014 
Access to finance  0.049*** 0.050*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 
Credit line/credit cards overdraft usage -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.041** -0.042** 
Interest expenses increased -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.057*** -0.058*** 
Ownership factors     
Family or entrepreneurs -0.047* -0.047* -0.105* -0.105* 
Other enterprises or business associates -0.029 -0.027 -0.059 -0.060 
VC or business Angels -0.035 -0.034 -0.079 -0.079 
Sole Trader -0.024 -0.023 -0.062 -0.062 
Other -0.014 -0.012 -0.059 -0.037 
Regulatory factors     
Government effectiveness  0.021  0.152 
Regulatory quality  -0.251**  -0.468 
Rule of law  -0.569*  -0.165 
Control of corruption 
 
 -0.209**  0.025 
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Banking & macro factors 
Insolvency    0.026 -0.025 
Bank rate   -0.108 -0.061 
GDP   -0.062 -0.041 
10 year bond yield   0.029* 0.018 
Private sector credit   -0.012 -0.008 
Lerner index   -0.223* -0.089 
Sectoral variables     
Industry  0.004 0.004 0.027 0.026 
Construction  0.019 0.019 0.053* 0.053* 
Trade  -0.014 -0.013 0.010 0.01 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 10688 10688 3503 3503 
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country-wave level. Country and time dummies are present in every regression, yet are not depicted * p < 0.1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 
0:01. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
The impact of the credit crunch on the supply of credit to SMEs, and the possible 
subsequent impact of this on investment practices of such firms, remains a topic of 
substantial policy importance for the Eurozone Member States. In this chapter, we 
evaluate the financing structure of bank lending constrained SMEs in the euro area 
through determining whether these firms demonstrate comparably greater usage or 
requests for alternative financing. Moreover, a comprehensive examination is offered 
through revealing the impact and determinants of different financing constraints including 
credit lines, bank loans, trade credit and other lending on euro area firms. Additionally, 
we examine the notion of discouraged borrowers originally structured by Kon and Storey 
(2003).  
Using survey data from 2009 to 2014, we find that credit-constrained, rationed, rejected 
and discouraged firms have a greater tendency to utilise informal lending. Another result 
characterised younger SMEs as showing a higher tendency to use informal lending; this 
conclusion is also valid for grants or subsidised bank loans. We do not find any 
substitution connection between measures of bank lending constraints and usage of trade 
credit. This outcome is robust in both stressed and non-stressed countries of the Eurozone. 
In contrast to previous predictions, we find an inverse significant relationship between 
our constraints measures and the request for grant financing. We find that firms who 
experience rejected credit applications are 6% less likely to use grants financing. Stressed 
Eurozone countries are on average less likely to use grant financing. These thought-
provoking results could imply that the contemporary schemes of policy measures 
accessible by the SMEs at the euro area level are insufficiently aimed at firms confronting 
issues in securing credit via traditional bank lending.  
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We do not find any substitution connection between our broad measures of bank lending 
constrained with usage of leasing, hire purchase or factoring and internal funds. Focusing 
on periphery countries of the Eurozone, we find that firms who experience rejected credit 
applications are on average less likely to use this market financing as well as leasing, hire 
purchase or factoring, relative to the Eurozone ‘core’ nations. 
Our results indicate that micro and younger firms are relatively more prone to having 
applications for bank loans and credit line rejected; this result corroborates the majority 
of previous seminal studies focusing on SMEs access to finance. Similar corroborating 
evidence regarding firm’s size and trade credit rejection are identified; however, there is 
no supporting evidence to determine a linkage between firm’s age and our constrained 
indicators for trade credit and other financing. It is observed that that firms in Spain, 
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal application for bank loans are more likely to 
be rejected; this result to a great extent also holds true for trade credit, credit lines and 
other external financing. 
It is determined that micro and younger firms are relatively more likely to be discouraged 
than rejected for bank loans. Focusing on stressed countries of the Eurozone, there is 
substantial evidence to support the idea that micro firms are more likely to be 
discouraged; yet, there is no supporting data for the effects of firms’ ages on the level of 
discouragement, unlike the trend demonstrated for the main sample in addition to non-
stressed countries of euro area. 
It can be garnered from our empirical findings that future public policies would be better 
directed at accumulating credit accessibility for enterprises operating in the euro area. It 
is of integral importance to draw emphasis to the essential needs of SMEs, which are 
often referred to as the driving force of the European economy. Having a varied mixture 
of types of financing available to SMEs, in addition to differentiating lending practices 
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within each countries financial framework, should be realised. Strong capital markets 
could increase the flexibility of enterprises financing needs which would let them bypass 
the traditional bank lending channel of monetary transmission mechanism. This will be 
of vital significance specifically through financial turmoil where banks have dramatically 
tapered off their supply of lending irrespective of monetary policy stance. In order to 
reduce borrower discouragement Eurozone countries need to develop their regulatory 
framework, this is especially prevalent in the case of the stressed countries of the 
Eurozone as this would discourage the issue of moral hazard and act as a deterrent for 
bad borrowers. 
Data used in this chapter is specific for 2009 onwards and not data regarding associations 
present during the ‘normal’ economic cycle. Accordingly, it is not possible to evaluate 
the existence of appreciable modifications, fuelled by factors associated with the crisis, 
concerning how firm-specific traits influence SMEs’ financing pattern. Notably, the 
majority of data sampled in the ECB/EC SAFE survey is qualitative; as a result, this 
present investigation argues that subsequent surveys should contain both firm level 
balance sheet data and quantitative information regarding SMEs’ financial condition. 
This modification would significantly benefit future studies with respect to the 
implications of policy and its effect on SMEs’ external financing. 
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Appendices to Chapter 4 
Appendix A 
Table A1. Synopsis of empirical studies based in the Eurozone   
Study  Descriptions  Main Conclusion  Comment  
Kremp & Sevestre 
(2013) 
French SMEs 
FIBEN database 
60,000 firms 
2000-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
The primary deduction is that in spite of 
more prudent lending activity from 
banks, the impact of credit rationing on 
SMEs has not been significant during 
the post-crisis period. 
Most of the documented reduction in 
loans outstanding can be accounted for 
through reduced firm demand for credit, 
which is a result of their market decline 
in investment deals and business 
ventures. 
This outcome 
contradicts the 
general belief that 
SMEs were 
significantly 
negatively 
impacted via 
severe credit 
limitations during 
the course of the 
crisis. 
Holton et al. (2013) SAFE data 
11 euro area 
countries 
2011H1-2013H1 
Probit regressions 
3 steps approach 
 
The study argues that smaller firms and 
firms with relatively low turnover have 
a greater chance of getting loan 
applications rejected.  
Furthermore, firms which have 
improved their internal funds, credit 
history or capital positions report 
negative credit conditions less 
frequently. 
The results suggest that banks constrict 
credit conditions during periods of 
downturn for the real economy as well 
as in an environment of increased 
private sector debt. 
Primary focus: 
Loan rejection. 
Credit 
perceptions. 
Interest rate 
experience. 
 
Öztürk and  Mrkaic 
(2014) 
SAFE data 
11 euro area 
countries 
8 waves since 
2009H1 
Ordered logit 
model 
The study concludes that there is a 
negative correlation between bank 
funding costs and firms’ access to 
finance, solely within stressed nations.  
Specifically, greater borrowers’ debt-to-
asset ratios and bank financing costs are 
adversely and significantly correlated 
with SMEs’ access to financing.  
Primary focus: 
Bank loan, 
demand for 
loans, perception 
of loans and 
leverage. 
Limitations: 
Fixed-effects 
were not 
employed in the 
study. 
Casey and O’Toole 
(2014) 
SAFE data 
11 euro area 
countries 
5 waves since 
2009H1 
Panel probit 
model 
They demonstrate that credit rationed 
firms that are relatively older and bigger 
are more inclined to utilise and request 
trade credit. Furthermore, the study 
determines that constrained firms are 
more inclined to employ informal 
lending or loans from other companies. 
Primary focus: 
Alternative 
source of finance 
Trade credit, 
informal lending, 
market financing, 
grants. 
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Holton et al. (2014) SAFE data 
11 euro area 
countries 
6 waves since 
2009H1 
Results demonstrate that larger and 
older firms are least likely to experience 
rejected loan requests.  
Moreover, private sector indebtedness 
has a significant impact on SMEs’ credit 
access as well as the terms and 
conditions set in each deal. 
Primary focus: 
Loan rejection 
Perceived  
deterioration 
Demand 
Interest rate 
Loan size 
Supply vs 
Demand 
Lawless et al. 
(2015a) 
SAFE data 
16 euro area 
countries 
7 waves from 
2010H1 
Poisson 
regression 
Multinomial logit 
Regression 
Firms in each country examined employ 
two or three finance sources to fund 
their firms’ processes. 
Additionally, trade credit and informal 
sources of capital are practically 
ubiquitous in the nations sampled, with 
firms from Ireland reported as especially 
inclined to utilise them as sources of 
funding. 
Primary focus: 
Alternative 
source of finance 
SAFE: Qs4. 
Lawless et al. 
(2015b) 
Irish 
government’s 
Department of 
Finance 
SMEs data 
2013-2014 
The study determines that increased debt 
burdens exert detrimental influences on 
every parameter of firm performance; 
this is especially seen in employment, 
investment and other measures of 
financial problems.  
The impact is most pronounced in sectors 
and enterprises that are heavily 
dependent on national demand, which 
was greatly diminished post-crisis; this 
influence is also greatest in enterprises in 
the “mid-lifecycle” and “gearing phase” 
pre-crisis. The most recently established 
enterprises, founded post-crisis, as well 
as the oldest enterprises, are not 
influenced. 
Analysing the 
effects of debt 
overhang utilising 
the debt-to-
turnover ratio. 
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Appendix B 
                                                 
55 Notes: Refers to results including and after the third wave of surveys. 
56 Notes: Refers to results concerning the initial two waves of surveys.   
57 It can be supplied from the subsequently outlined resources: loans from a related company, shareholders 
or family and friends, leasing, factoring, grants, subordinated debt instruments, participating loans, peer to-
peer lending, crowdfunding, and issuance of equity and debt securities.   
Table B1:  Dependent variables 
Variables    Description  
(1) Trade credit  =1, if firm utilised trade credit over the past six months, =0 
otherwise.  
(2) Grants or subsidies bank loans   
  
=1, if firm received grants or subsidies bank loans over the past 
six months, =0 otherwise.  
(3) Other loans (from a related company or shareholders)   =1, if firm utilised other loans from a related company or 
shareholders over the past six months, =0 otherwise.  
(4) Market financing    =1, if firm utilised equity, issued debt securities or subordinated 
loans over the past six months, =0 otherwise.  
(5) Internal funds   
  
=1, if firm utilised internal funds over the past six months, =0 
otherwise.  
(6) Leasing or hire purchase or factoring   
  
=1, if firm utilised leasing/ hire purchase/factoring 
over the past six months, =0 otherwise.  
Source: SAFE survey, Question.4  
 
Table B2: Dependent variables  
Variables Coding Source 
Bank loans constraints  
dummy 
Binary variable: 
0  Received everything (1). 
0  Received 75% and above (5). 
1  Received below 75% (received a limited part of it) (6). 
1  Refused because the cost was too high (3). 
1  Was rejected (4). 
 
If you applied and tried to negotiate for 
this type of financing over the past 6 
months, what was the outcome? 
1. 1. Received everything. 
5. Received (between 75% and 99%).55 
6. Received (between 1% and 74%). 
3. Refused (the cost was too high). 
4. Rejected. 
2. Received only part of it.56 
Trade credit constraints  
dummy 
Binary variable: 
0  Received everything (1). 
0  Received 75% and above (5). 
1  Received below 75% (received a limited part of it) (6). 
1  Refused because the cost was too high (3). 
1  Was rejected (4). 
If you applied and tried to negotiate for 
this type of financing over the past 6 
months, what was the outcome? 
2. 1. Received everything. 
5. Received (between 75% and 99%). 
6. Received (between 1% and 74%). 
3. Refused (the cost was too high). 
4. Rejected. 
2. Received only part of it. 
Other external financing   
constraints dummy57 
Binary variable: 
0  Received everything (1). 
0  Received 75% and above (5). 
1  Received below 75% (received a limited part of it) (6). 
1  Refused because the cost was too high (3). 
1  Was rejected (4). 
If you applied and tried to negotiate for 
this type of financing over the past 6 
months, what was the outcome? 
3. 1. Received everything. 
5. Received (between 75% and 99%). 
6. Received (between 1% and 74%). 
3. Refused (the cost was too high). 
4. Rejected. 
2. Received only part of it. 
Credit line, bank overdraft 
or credit cards overdraft   
constraints dummy 
Binary variable: 
0  Received everything (1). 
0  Received 75% and above (5). 
1  Received below 75% (received a limited part of it) (6). 
1  Refused because the cost was too high (3). 
1  Was rejected (4). 
If you applied and tried to negotiate for 
this type of financing over the past 6 
months, what was the outcome? 
4. 1. Received everything. 
5. Received (between 75% and 99%). 
6. Received (between 1% and 74%). 
3. Refused (the cost was too high). 
4. Rejected. 
Source: SAFE survey Question. 7B  
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Table B3: Explanatory variables  
Variables  Coding  Source  
Firm size  Categorical variable:  
1. 10 (Micro).  
2. 50 10 (Small).  
3. 250 50 (Medium-sized).  
4. 250 (Large).  
How many persons does your 
company currently employ in full 
time or part time in [YOUR 
COUNTRY] at all locations?  
Firm age  Categorical variable:  
1. 10 years or more.  
2. 5 years or more, but less than 10 years.  
3. 2 years or more, but less than 5 years.  
4. Less than 2 years.  
In which year was your firm 
registered?  
Net interest expenses  Binary variable  
1 = Increased.  
0 = Remained unchanged.  
0 = Decreased.  
Please tell me whether your net 
interest expenses:  
1. Increased.  
2. Decreased.  
3. Remained unchanged.  
Profit  Binary variable  
0 = Increased.  
0 = Remained unchanged.  
1 = Decreased.  
Please tell me whether your profit:  
1. Increased.  
2. Decreased.  
3. Remained unchanged.  
Turnover  Binary variable  
0 = Increased.  
0 = Remained unchanged.  
1 = Decreased. 
Please tell me whether your turnover: 
1. Increased.  
2. Decreased.  
3. Remained unchanged. 
Debt compared to assets  Binary variable  
1 = Increased.  
0 = Remained unchanged.  
0 = Decreased. 
Please tell me whether your debt to 
total assets: 
1. Increased.  
2. Decreased.  
3. Remained unchanged. 
General economic outlook  Binary variable  
0 Improved. (1), remained unchanged (2). 
1 Deteriorated (3).  
For your firm-specific situation and 
to lenders’ attitudes concerning the 
general economic outlook to the 
degree that it influences the 
availability of external financing 
would you say that over the past 6 
months they have:  
6 months they have:  
1. Improved.  
2. Remained unchanged.  
3. Deteriorated.  
Access to public financial 
support, including guarantees  
Binary variable  
0 Improved. (1), remained unchanged (2). 
1 Deteriorated (3).  
With respect to your access to public 
financial support insofar as it affects 
the availability of external financing 
would you say that over the past 6 
months they have:  
1. Improved.  
2. Remained unchanged.  
3. Deteriorated.  
Prospects (outlook with 
respect to your sales and 
profitability or business plan)  
Binary variable  
Improved prospects:  
0 Improved. (1), remained unchanged (2) 
1 Deteriorated (3).  
With respect to your sales and 
profitability or business plan insofar 
as it affects the availability of 
external financing would you say that 
over the past 6 months they have:  
1. Improved.  
2. Remained unchanged.  
3. Deteriorated.  
Firm’s own capital  Binary variable  
0 Improved. (1), remained unchanged (2). 
1 Deteriorated (3).  
With respect to your firm’s own 
capital as it affects the availability of 
external financing would you say that 
over the past 6 months they have:  
1. Improved.  
2. Remained unchanged.  
3. Deteriorated.  
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Firm’s credit history  Binary variable  
0 Improved. (1), remained unchanged (2). 
1= Deteriorated (3).  
With respect to your firm’s credit 
history as it affects the availability of 
external financing would you say that 
over the past 6 months they have:  
1. Improved.  
2. Remained unchanged.  
3. Deteriorated.  
Source: SAFE survey  
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Appendix C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C1:  Breakdown of firms 
  
Firm age  
10 years or more  
Frequency  
  
41,337  
Percent  Cumulative frequency  
  
78.45  
  
78.45  
5-9 years   6,382  12.11  90.56  
2-4 years  2,927  5.56  96.12  
Less than 2 years  664  1.26  97.38  
DK/NA  
  
1,381  
  
2.62  
  
100  
  
Firm size  
Micro  
  
16,784  
  
31.85  
  
31.85  
Small  17,830  33.84  65.69  
Medium  13,901  26.38  92.07  
Large  
  
4,176  
  
7.93  
  
100  
  
Sector  
Industry  
  
13,281  
  
25.21  
  
25.21  
Construction  5,113  9.70  34.91  
Trade  13,427  25.48  60.39  
Services  16,694  31.68  92.07  
DK/NA  4,176  7.93  100  
Ownership  
Public shareholders  
  
1,909  
  
3.68  
  
3.68  
Family or entrepreneurs  28,498  54.99  58.67  
Other firms or business associates  6,240  12.04  70.72  
Venture capital firms or business angel  540  1.04  71.76  
A natural person, one owner only  12,962  25.01  96.77  
Other  1,147  2.21  98.98  
DK/NA  527  1.02  100  
Source: author’s own estimations utilising ECB SAFE data 
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Appendix D 
In keeping with the novel industrial organisation (IO) method, the market power is 
measured via Lerner index which confers the added benefit inherent in a separate, 
dynamic gauge of market power (Brämer et al., 2013). Marginal cost is calculated based 
on a translog cost function with one output (total assets) as well as the subsequently listed 
three input prices: price of labour, price of capital and price of funds. A cost function 
utilising panel data of bank fixed effects is calculated, incorporating time dummy 
variables to control for heterogeneity in the available sample.  
Linear homogeneity restrictions are applied to input prices as suggested in Weil (2013) 
and Fungáčová, et al. (2014). This is done by normalising total costs as well as input 
prices via one input price. Accordingly, the cost function has the following designation:  
The Lerner index gauges the banks’ capacity to increase prices in excess of marginal 
costs; this index with greater units therefore suggests greater market power and reduced 
competitive market conditions. Moreover, the Lerner index is determined as the 
proportion of the remainder between price of output and marginal cost to the price, the 
latter of which is calculated utilising the proportion of total revenues to total assets. 
Marginal cost is calculated based on a translog cost function with one output (total assets) 
as well as the subsequently listed three input prices: price of labour, price of capital and 
price of funds.  
A cost function utilising panel data of bank fixed effects is calculated, incorporating time 
dummy variables to control for heterogeneity in the available sample. Linear 
homogeneity restrictions are applied to input prices as suggested in Weil (2013) and 
Fungáčová et al. (2014). This is done by normalising total costs as well as input prices 
via one input price. Accordingly, the cost function has the following designation: 
ln (
𝑇𝐶
𝑊3
)  α0 + α1 ln y + 
α2
2
 (lny)2 + α3 ln(
𝑊1
𝑊3
) + α4 ln(
𝑊2
𝑊3
) + α5 ln(
𝑊1
𝑊3
) ln(
𝑊2
𝑊3
) + 
α6
2
  
(ln((
𝑊1
𝑊3
)2 + 
α7
2
  (ln((
𝑊2
𝑊3
)2+ α8 ln y ln(
𝑊1
𝑊3
) + α9 ln y ln(
𝑊2
𝑊3
) + 𝜀                                           (1)                                
where TC represents the total cost which is calculated as the total of personnel 
expenses, other non-interest expenses and interest paid. Y denotes total assets, w1 denotes 
the price of labour estimated as a proportion personnel expenses to total assets, w2 
symbolises the price of physical capital and is estimated as a proportion of non-interest 
expenses to fixed assets. Finally, w3 denotes the price of borrowed funds, defined as the 
ratio of interest expenses to deposits and short-term funding. The measured coefficients 
of the cost function from the preceding cost function are subsequently utilised to calculate 
the marginal cost (MC): 
MC= 
𝑇𝐶
𝑦
 (α1+ α2 ln y + α8 ln(
𝑊1
𝑊3
) + α9 ln(
𝑊2
𝑊3
))                                                                  (2)                                                                                             
After marginal cost and the price of output are estimated, this facilitates the calculation of 
the Lerner index specific to every bank sampled and consequently a complete estimation 
of bank competition. 
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Appendix E 
1. Government Effectiveness: 
    2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Country/Territory         
AUSTRIA AUT 1.77 1.67 1.84 1.61 1.56 1.57 1.57 
BELGIUM BEL 1.38 1.59 1.58 1.66 1.59 1.59 1.40 
FINLAND FIN 2.04 2.24 2.25 2.26 2.21 2.17 2.02 
FRANCE FRA 1.58 1.49 1.45 1.37 1.33 1.47 1.40 
GERMANY DEU 1.52 1.59 1.57 1.55 1.57 1.52 1.73 
GREECE GRC 0.59 0.61 0.55 0.50 0.31 0.45 0.40 
IRELAND IRL 1.49 1.34 1.34 1.45 1.53 1.46 1.60 
ITALY ITA 0.29 0.42 0.45 0.38 0.41 0.45 0.38 
NETHERLANDS NLD 1.69 1.74 1.73 1.79 1.80 1.77 1.83 
PORTUGAL PRT 1.08 1.16 1.02 0.96 1.03 1.23 1.01 
SPAIN ESP 0.92 0.93 0.99 1.03 1.11 1.15 1.15 
 
2. Regulatory Quality: 
    2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Country/Territory         
AUSTRIA AUT 1.60 1.46 1.46 1.39 1.51 1.48 1.49 
BELGIUM BEL 1.39 1.32 1.29 1.24 1.22 1.29 1.17 
FINLAND FIN 1.62 1.83 1.89 1.83 1.82 1.85 1.90 
FRANCE FRA 1.28 1.21 1.31 1.15 1.12 1.15 1.09 
GERMANY DEU 1.49 1.52 1.58 1.55 1.53 1.55 1.70 
GREECE GRC 0.87 0.81 0.63 0.49 0.50 0.61 0.34 
IRELAND IRL 1.92 1.70 1.61 1.59 1.56 1.57 1.75 
ITALY ITA 0.95 0.94 0.89 0.71 0.73 0.77 0.66 
NETHERLANDS NLD 1.77 1.71 1.74 1.81 1.75 1.76 1.78 
PORTUGAL PRT 1.10 0.98 0.73 0.63 0.81 0.78 0.77 
SPAIN ESP 1.24 1.17 1.15 1.06 0.95 0.93 0.78 
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3. Rule of Law: 
    2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Country/Territory         
AUSTRIA AUT 1.93 1.79 1.81 1.81 1.84 1.83 1.96 
BELGIUM BEL 1.33 1.36 1.37 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.51 
FINLAND FIN 1.90 1.97 1.98 1.96 1.94 1.93 2.12 
FRANCE FRA 1.48 1.43 1.51 1.44 1.43 1.40 1.47 
GERMANY DEU 1.72 1.64 1.62 1.61 1.64 1.62 1.85 
GREECE GRC 0.84 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 
IRELAND IRL 1.69 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 
ITALY ITA 0.42 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.15 
NETHERLANDS NLD 1.75 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.15 
PORTUGAL PRT 0.99 1.05 1.04 1.03 1.05 1.04 1.13 
 
4. Control of Corruption: 
    2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Country/Territory         
AUSTRIA AUT 1.92 1.76 1.63 1.44 1.35 1.51 1.44 
BELGIUM BEL 1.32 1.43 1.49 1.56 1.55 1.63 1.55 
FINLAND FIN 2.41 2.30 2.18 2.22 2.22 2.19 2.18 
FRANCE FRA 1.38 1.42 1.44 1.52 1.42 1.30 1.27 
GERMANY DEU 1.73 1.72 1.74 1.71 1.78 1.78 1.83 
GREECE GRC 0.10 0.01 -0.16 -0.18 -0.25 -0.11 -0.20 
IRELAND IRL 1.76 1.77 1.70 1.54 1.45 1.54 1.62 
ITALY ITA 0.25 0.13 0.00 0.08 -0.03 -0.04 -0.11 
NETHERLANDS NLD 2.16 2.17 2.18 2.16 2.13 2.05 2.00 
PORTUGAL PRT 1.00 1.04 1.03 1.08 0.93 0.91 0.88 
SPAIN ESP 1.11 1.00 1.01 1.05 1.05 0.81 0.53 
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European Commission and European Central Bank 
Survey on the access to finance of enterprises, 
October 2014 to March 2015 
 
[INTRODUCTION TO THE ONLINE SURVEY] 
 
 
Welcome to the Survey on the access to finance of enterprises: a joint initiative of the European 
Commission and the European Central Bank. 
 
Your business has been selected to participate in this Europe-wide survey, which aims to assess the 
financing needs and the availability of financing among companies like yours. We very much appreciate 
your participation. 
 
Your answers to this voluntary survey will be treated in strict confidence, used for statistical purposes and 
published in aggregate form only. 
 
 
Please click ‘next’ to continue. 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
[INTRODUCTION TO THE TELEPHONE SURVEY]1 
 
Hello, my name is <interviewer> and I am calling from <survey company> on behalf of the European 
Commission and the European Central Bank. Your business has been selected to participate in a Europe-
wide survey on the financing needs and the availability of financing among companies like yours. 
 
European policy-makers want to have a better understanding of the issues and circumstances faced by small, 
medium-sized and large non-financial enterprises when it comes to accessing finance from banks and other 
institutions. This survey is now being conducted across Europe and your input is of the utmost importance: 
the responses to the survey will help shape policy decisions by the European Commission and the European 
Central Bank. 
 
[IF RESPONDENT IS FROM PANEL: You may remember that we spoke to you about <INSERT 
CORRECT TIME PERIOD (e.g. six months, one year, one and a half years)> ago and you kindly said that 
you would be willing to participate again in the survey at around this time.] 
 
 
1 Used formatting: 
• TEXT IN CAPITAL LETTERS refers to the instructions and should never be read;  
• <text in brackets and italics> refers to the parameters – the dynamic text which should be adapted based on 
the respondent’s information. 
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[READ IF NECESSARY (IF RESPONDENTS ASK FOR MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE 
PROJECT): The results of the survey will help the European Commission in its evidence-based policy-
making to improve the access to finance for businesses and in the monetary policy of the European Central 
Bank. Can I e-mail you some more information about the survey?]  
May I speak with the most appropriate person – the person best able to provide information on how your 
company is financed?  
[READ IF NECESSARY: This person could be the owner, a finance manager, the finance director or the 
chief financial officer (CFO).] 
 
Your answers to this voluntary survey will be treated in strict confidence, used for statistical purposes and 
published in aggregate form only. 
 
[READ IF NECESSARY: Would you prefer to participate in the survey by phone or online?] 
 
 
 
SECTION 1: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENTERPRISE 
 
(DEMOGRAPHIC PART, COMMON) 
 
[FOR PANEL MEMBERS:] First a few demographic questions – you may have already answered 
these, but it would be good to confirm that the details are still correct. 
 
D2. NEW RESPONDENTS: How would you characterise your enterprise? Is it... 
D2. PANEL MEMBERS: Can you confirm that your enterprise is <STATE ANSWER FROM 
PREVIOUS WAVE>? [READ IF NECESSARY: If not, what is the correct category?] 
 
[ONLY ONE ANSWER IS POSSIBLE] 
 
- a subsidiary of another enterprise [READ IF NECESSARY: a separate, distinct 
legal entity that is part of a profit-oriented enterprise] ....................................................... 4 
- a  branch  of  another  enterprise  [READ  IF  NECESSARY:  branches  are 
controlled by a parent company and are not separate legal entities] ................................ 5 
- an autonomous profit-oriented enterprise, making independent financial 
decisions [READ IF NECESSARY: in the sense of making independent 
management decisions; this includes partnerships and cooperatives] .............................. 2 
- a non-profit enterprise [READ IF NECESSARY: foundation, association, semi- 
government] .............................................................................................................................. 3  
- [DK/NA] .................................................................................................................................... 9 
 
 
[IF 3 (NON-PROFIT)  STOP INTERVIEW  INTERVIEW NOT VALID] 
 
[IF 4 (SUBSIDIARY)  MAKE THE FOLLOWING REQUEST]  
In your replies to all the following questions, please respond on behalf of the subsidiary. 
 
[IF 5 (BRANCH)  ASK THE FOLLOWING QUESTION]  
Are you knowledgeable about the finances of the whole enterprise, that is, the head office and all 
branches? 
 
[IF NO  STOP INTERVIEW  INTERVIEW NOT VALID]  
[IF YES: Please respond on behalf of the whole enterprise, that is, the head office and all branches.] 
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[FILTER: IF D2 FEATURES 4 OR 5] 
D2A. NEW RESPONDENTS: In which country is the parent company of your enterprise located? 
D2A. PANEL MEMBERS: Can you confirm that the parent company of your enterprise is located 
in <STATE ANSWER FROM PREVIOUS WAVE>? [READ IF NECESSARY: If not, what is the 
correct country?] 
[DO NOT READ OUT – USE ISO COUNTRY CODES] 
 
 
[LIST OF MAIN COUNTRY CODES] 
 
EURO AREA COUNTRIES 
 
AT Austria 
 
BE Belgium 
 
CY Cyprus 
 
EE Estonia 
 
FI Finland 
 
FR France 
 
DE Germany 
 
GR Greece 
 
IE Ireland 
 
IT Italy 
 
LT Lithuania 
 
LV Latvia 
 
LU Luxembourg 
 
MT Malta 
 
NL Netherlands 
 
PT Portugal 
 
SK Slovakia 
 
SI Slovenia 
 
ES Spain 
 
OTHER EU MEMBER STATES 
 
BG Bulgaria 
 
HR Croatia 
 
CZ Czech Republic 
 
DK Denmark 
 
HU Hungary 
 
PL Poland 
 
RO Romania 
 
SE Sweden 
 
UK United Kingdom 
 
OTHER COUNTRIES 
 
CN China 
 
IS Iceland 
 
JP Japan 
 
ME Montenegro 
 
 
NO Norway 
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RU Russian Federation 
 
CH Switzerland 
 
US United States 
 
-99 Don’t know 
 
[FILTER: ALL ENTERPRISES] 
 
D1. How many people does your enterprise currently employ either full or part-time at all its 
locations in <your country>? Please do not include unpaid family workers and freelancers working 
regularly for your enterprise. 
 
[READ IF NECESSARY: Full-time and part-time employees should each count as one employee. 
Employees working less than 12 hours per week are to be excluded.] 
 
[ONLY ONE ANSWER IS POSSIBLE] 
 
NUMERICAL ANSWER [1-999999] 
[DK/NA] 
 
[READ IF 1 EMPLOYEE: The business must have at least one employee beyond the owner(s). Can you 
confirm that the employee is not the owner?] 
 
[IF 0 EMPLOYEES  STOP INTERVIEW  INTERVIEW NOT VALID] 
 
D1_rec. [IF NA/DK  ASK ABOUT APPROXIMATE NUMBER IN BRACKETS – ONLY ONE  
ANSWER IS POSSIBLE  IF STILL NA/DK  STOP INTERVIEW  INTERVIEW NOT VALID]  
What is the approximate number? 
 
- from 1 employee to 9 employees ..................................................................... 1 
- from 10 employees to 49 employees ............................................................... 2  
- from 50 employees to 249 employees ............................................................ 3 
- 250 employees or more ..................................................................................... 4  
- [DK/NA] ............................................................................................................. 9 
 
D1_C. PANEL MEMBERS: [IF THE NEW CATEGORY DIFFERS SIGNIFICANTLY (I.E. BY  
MORE THAN ONE CATEGORY) FROM THE PREVIOUS WAVE, ASK THE FOLLOWING 
QUESTION.]  
The last time your enterprise was interviewed, it had <STATE ANSWER FROM PREVIOUS WAVE> 
employees. Can you confirm that the number has <increased/decreased> to <STATE ANSWER FROM 
CURRENT WAVE>? [READ IF NECESSARY: If not, what is the correct number?] 
 
 
D3. What is the main activity of your enterprise? 
 
[ONLY ONE ANSWER IS POSSIBLE] 
 
- construction ............................................................................................................................... 2  
- industry [READ IF NECESSARY: it includes manufacturing, mining and 
electricity, gas and water supply] ......................................................................................... 12 
- wholesale or retail trade ........................................................................................................... 4 
- transport...................................................................................................................................... 5 
- agriculture [STOP INTERVIEW  INTERVIEW NOT VALID] ................................... 8  
- public administration [STOP INTERVIEW  INTERVIEW NOT VALID] ................ 9  
- financial services [STOP INTERVIEW  INTERVIEW NOT VALID] ..................... 10 
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- other services to businesses or persons ............................................................................... 13 
- [READ IF NECESSARY: If none of these, please specify.] 
[IF RECODING IS NOT POSSIBLE, STOP INTERVIEW  INTERVIEW 
NOT VALID] ......................................................................................................................... 11 
- [DK/NA] [STOP INTERVIEW  INTERVIEW NOT VALID] .................................. 99 
 
D3_C. PANEL MEMBERS: [IF SECTOR DIFFERS FROM THE PREVIOUS WAVE, ASK THE  
FOLLOWING QUESTION.] 
The last time your enterprise was interviewed, it was active in <STATE ANSWER FROM PREVIOUS 
WAVE>. Can you confirm that it is involved in <STATE ANSWER FROM CURRENT WAVE>? 
[READ IF NECESSARY: If not, what is the correct category?] 
 
 
D6. NEW RESPONDENTS: Who owns the largest stake in your enterprise? 
D6. PANEL MEMBERS: Can you confirm that the largest stake in your enterprise is still owned by 
<STATE ANSWER FROM PREVIOUS WAVE>? [READ IF NECESSARY: If not, what is the correct 
category?] 
 
[ONLY ONE ANSWER IS POSSIBLE. IF RESPONDENT CLASSIFIES THE ENTERPRISE IN ONE 
OF THE FIRST CATEGORIES, THERE IS NO NEED TO READ ALL THE CATEGORIES] 
 
[READ IF NECESSARY (NOTE ON THE REFERENCE TO THE LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANY): A limited liability company is a legal form of an enterprise that provides protection against 
personal liability to its owners. The owners can be natural persons or other enterprises. To which category 
would you classify the owner with the largest stake in your enterprise? READ THE CATEGORIES] 
 
- one owner only, that is yourself or another natural person................................................. 5  
- family or entrepreneurs [READ IF NECESSARY: more than one owner] ..................... 2 
- other enterprises or business associates................................................................................. 3 
- public shareholders, as your enterprise is listed on the stock market ............................... 1  
- venture capital enterprises or business angels [READ IF NECESSARY: 
individual investors providing capital or know-how to young innovative  
enterprises] ................................................................................................................................ 4 
- other ............................................................................................................................................ 7  
- [DK/NA] .................................................................................................................................... 9 
 
 
D4. What was the annual turnover of your enterprise in 2014? 
 
[ONLY ONE ANSWER IS POSSIBLE]  
[For non-euro area countries, the amounts in euro will be converted to national currency.] 
 
- up to €500,000 ................................................................................................... 5 
- more than €500,000 and up to €1 million ...................................................... 6 
- more than €1 million and up to €2 million .................................................... 7  
- more than €2 million and up to €10 million .................................................. 2 
- more than €10 million and up to €50 million ................................................ 3  
- more than €50 million ....................................................................................... 4  
- [DK/NA] ............................................................................................................. 9 
 
D4_C. PANEL MEMBERS: [IF THE NEW CATEGORY DIFFERS SIGNIFICANTLY (I.E. BY MORE 
THAN ONE CATEGORY) FROM THE PREVIOUS WAVE, ASK THE FOLLOWING QUESTION.]  
The last time your enterprise was interviewed, the turnover was <STATE ANSWER FROM 
PREVIOUS WAVE >. Can you confirm that it is now <STATE ANSWER FROM CURRENT 
WAVE>? [READ IF NECESSARY: If not, what is the correct category?] 
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D7. What percentage of your company’s total turnover in 2014 is accounted for by exports of goods and 
services? [READ IF NECESSARY: Exports comprise sales of goods or the provision of services to  
non-residents, including to foreign tourists visiting the relevant country.] 
 
NUMERICAL ANSWER IN PERCENTAGES [0-
100] [DK/NA: -99] 
 
 
D7_rec. [IF (NA/DK)  ASK WHETHER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES WOULD  
APPLY – ONLY ONE ANSWER IS POSSIBLE] 
Which of the following categories apply? 
 
- 0% – my enterprise did not export any goods and services last year ......... 1 
- less than 25% ...................................................................................................... 2 
- between 25% and 50% ...................................................................................... 3 
- over 50% ............................................................................................................. 4  
- [DK] .................................................................................................................... 9 
 
 
D7_C. PANEL MEMBERS: [IF THE NEW CATEGORY DIFFERS SIGNIFICANTLY (I.E. BY MORE 
THAN ONE CATEGORY) FROM THE PREVIOUS WAVE, ASK THE FOLLOWING QUESTION.]  
The last time your enterprise was interviewed, the share of total turnover accounted for by exports 
was <STATE ANSWER FROM PREVIOUS WAVE>. Can you confirm that it is now <STATE 
ANSWER FROM CURRENT WAVE>? [READ IF NECESSARY: If not, what is the correct number?] 
 
 
D5. NEW RESPONDENTS: In which year was your enterprise first registered? [READ IF 
NECESSARY: In the case of a past acquisition, please refer to the year when the acquiring enterprise was 
registered or, in the case of a merger, to the largest enterprise involved (in terms of employees)].  
D5. PANEL MEMBERS: Can you please confirm that your enterprise was registered in <STATE 
ANSWER FROM PREVIOUS WAVE>? [READ IF NECESSARY: If not, what is the correct year?] 
 
NUMERICAL ANSWER [1700-2015] <FOUR DIGITS, LESS OR EQUAL THAN YEAR OF 
SURVEY>  
[DK/NA] 
 
[THE  AGE  OF  THE  ENTERPRISE  IS  CALCULATED  AS  2015  MINUS  THE  YEAR  OF  
REGISTRATION.] 
 
D5_rec. [IF NA/DK  ASK WHETHER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES WOULD  
APPLY – ONLY ONE ANSWER IS POSSIBLE]  
Approximately, how old is your enterprise? 
 
- 10 years or more ................................................................................................ 1  
- 5 years or more, but less than 10 years ........................................................... 2 
- 2 years or more, but less than 5 years ............................................................. 3 
- less than 2 years ................................................................................................. 4  
- [DK/NA] ............................................................................................................. 9 
 
SECTION 2: GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE TYPE AND SITUATION 
OF THE ENTERPRISE 
 
We will now turn to your enterprise’s current situation. When asked about the changes experienced 
by your enterprise over the past six months, please report just the changes that have occurred 
between October 2014 and now. 
 
[FILTER: ALL ENTERPRISES] 
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Q0b. How important have the following problems been for your enterprise in the past six months? 
Please answer on a scale of 1-10, where 10 means the problem is extremely important and 1 means it 
is not at all important. 
 
[ONE ANSWER PER LINE. DK/NA (CODE 99) OPTION PERMITTED] 
 
1. Finding customers .............................................................................................................  
2. Competition ...................................................................................................................... 
3. Access to finance [READ IF NECESSARY: Financing of your business – bank loans, 
trade credit, equity, debt securities, other external financing] .........................................  
4. Costs of production or labour [READ IF NECESSARY: If your company does not have 
production costs, please refer only to labour costs. Labour costs include wages, employee 
benefits and payroll taxes paid by an employer.] ............................................. 
5. Availability of skilled staff or experienced managers ...................................................... 
6. Regulation, for example European and national laws, industrial regulations ................... 
 
[CATEGORY ‘OTHER’ FOR ALL COUNTRIES, EXCEPT 10% OF THE SAMPLE  
IN GERMANY, SPAIN, FRANCE, GREECE, ITALY AND IRELAND (SELECTED 
RANDOMLY)] 
7. Other problems not specified above [READ IF NECESSARY: for example cash flow, 
problem with finding suppliers.]........................................................................ 
 
[CATEGORY ‘OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY’ FOR 10% OF THE SAMPLE IN  
GERMANY, SPAIN, FRANCE, GREECE, ITALY AND IRELAND (SELECTED 
RANDOMLY)]  
7. Other, please specify [WRITE DOWN THE VERBATIM ANSWER] 
 
 
Q2. Have the following company indicators decreased, remained unchanged or increased over the 
past six months?  
[ONLY ONE ANSWER PER LINE] 
 
- Increased ................................................................................ 1 
- Remained unchanged ............................................................ 2 
- Decreased .............................................................................. 3 
-  [NOT APPLICABLE, ENTERPRISE HAS NO DEBT] ...... 7 
- [DK/NA] ................................................................................ 9 
 
[AS REGARDS ITEM (d) and (j), IF THE COMPANY HAS NO DEBT, CODE 7  
(NOT APPLICABLE) SHOULD BE USED.] 
 
a) Turnover .....................................................................................................................  1 2 3 9 
b) Labour costs (including social contributions) ............................................................ 1 2 3 9 
c) Other costs (materials, energy, other) ........................................................................ 1 2 3 9 
d) Interest expenses [READ IF NECESSARY: what your company pays in interest 
 for its debt] .............................................................................................................. 1 2 3 7 9 
e) Profit [READ IF NECESSARY: net income after taxes] .......................................... 1 2 3 9 
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g) Fixed  investment  [READ  IF  NECESSARY:  investment  in  property,  plant, 
machinery or equipment] .................................................................................................... 1 2 3 9 
h) Inventories and other working capital [*READ IF NECESSARY: Inventories are 
the goods and materials that a business holds for the ultimate purpose of resale. 
*READ IF NECESSARY: Working capital is the difference between current  
assets, such as inventories and invoices, and current liabilities, that is, debt or other 
obligations coming due within a year.] ............................................................................. 1 2 3 9 
i) Number of employees [READ IF NECESSARY (IF RESPONDENTS GIVES 
THE NUMBER): Please indicate if it increased or decreased in the past six 
months] .................................................................................................................................. 1 2 3 9 
j) Debt compared to assets [READ IF NECESSARY: that is the ratio of all kinds of 
debt to total assets] ........................................................................................................... 1 2 3 7 9 
 
SECTION 3: FINANCING OF THE ENTERPRISE 
 
We will now turn to the financing of your enterprise. 
 
 
Q4. Are the following sources of financing relevant to your enterprise, that is, have you used them 
in the past or considered using them in the future? Please provide a separate answer in each case. 
 
[ONE ANSWER PER LINE IS POSSIBLE (CODE 3, 7 OR 9)] 
 
- Yes, this source is relevant to my enterprise [READ FOR THE FIRST TWO 
ITEMS, AFTERWARDS IF NECESSARY: that is, I have used it in the past or I  
considered using it in the future) ..................................................................................................3 
- No, this source is not relevant to my enterprise .........................................................................7  
- [DK] .................................................................................................................................................9 
 
[FOR EACH FINANCING SOURCE, IF THE ANSWER IS “YES” (CODE 3), ASK THE RELEVANT  
FOLLOW-UP QUESTION – ONE ANSWER PER LINE IS POSSIBLE (CODE 1, 2 OR 99)] 
 
- Yes ....................................................................................................................................................1  
- No ......................................................................................................................................................2  
- [DK] ............................................................................................................................................... 99 
 
c) Credit line, bank overdraft or credit cards overdraft. [*READ IF NECESSARY: A 
credit line is a pre-arranged loan that can be used, in full or in part, at discretion and 
with limited advance warning.  
*READ IF NECESSARY: The difference between a bank loan and a credit line is 
that in the case of a bank loan, the precise amount of loan and the dates of repayments 
are usually fixed, while in the case of a credit line, the borrower can draw only part 
of the money at discretion up to an agreed maximum balance, and interest is charged 
only on money actually withdrawn.  
*READ IF NECESSARY: A bank overdraft is the negative balance on a bank 
account with or without specific penalties. 
*READ IF NECESSARY: A credit card overdraft is a negative balance on a credit 
card.] .......................................................................................................................................... 3 7 9 
 
IF “YES” (CODE 3)  Have you drawn on such types of credit  
in the past six months? .............................................................................................. 1 2 99 
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b) Grants or subsidised bank loans [READ IF NECESSARY: involving, for example, 
support from public sources in the form of guarantees or reduced interest rate 
loans.]........................................................................................................................................ 3 7 9 
 
IF “YES” (CODE 3)  Have you obtained new financing of this type in the  
past six months? ......................................................................................................... 1 2 99 
 
d) Bank loan (excluding subsidised bank loans, overdrafts and credit lines) [*READ IF 
NECESSARY: both short and long-term. 
*READ IF NECESSARY: The difference between a bank loan and a credit line is 
that in the case of a bank loan, the precise amount of loan and the dates of repayments 
are usually fixed, while in the case of a credit line, the borrower can draw only part 
of the money at discretion up to an agreed maximum balance, and  
interest is charged only on money actually withdrawn.] ................................................... 3 7 9 
 
IF “YES” (CODE 3)  Have you taken out a new loan or renewed such a 
loan in the past six months? ...................................................................................... 1 2 99 
 
e) Trade credit [READ IF NECESSARY: that means paying your suppliers at the later 
agreed date, usually 30, 60 or 90 days after the delivery of the purchased 
goods or services].................................................................................................................... 3 7 9 
 
IF “YES” (CODE 3)  Have you obtained trade credit from your business  
partners in the past six months? ............................................................................... 1 2 99 
 
f) Other  loan,  for  example  from family and  friends,  a  related  enterprise  or  
shareholders, excluding trade credit ..................................................................................... 3 7 9 
 
IF “YES” (CODE 3)  Have you taken out or renewed such a loan in the  
past six months? ......................................................................................................... 1 2 99 
 
m) Leasing or hire-purchase [READ IF NECESSARY: obtaining the use of a fixed 
asset (for example, cars or machinery) in exchange for regular payments, but  
without the immediate ownership of the asset]................................................................... 3 7 9 
 
IF “YES” (CODE 3)  Have you obtained new financing of this type in the  
past six months? ......................................................................................................... 1 2 99 
 
h) Debt securities issued [READ IF NECESSARY: short-term commercial paper or  
longer-term corporate bonds issued by your enterprise] ................................................... 3 7 9 
 
IF “YES” (CODE 3)  Have you issued any debt securities in the past six  
months? 1 2 99 
 
j) Equity capital [*READ IF NECESSARY: Equity capital refers to raising capital 
through the sale of shares in your enterprise. It is usually associated with the 
financing of companies listed on an exchange via public offerings. It can also involve 
a private sale, in which the transaction between investors and the enterprise takes 
place directly.  
*READ IF NECESSARY: Equity capital includes quoted and unquoted shares or 
other forms of equity provided by the owners themselves or by external investors, 
including venture capital or business angels.  
*READ IF NECESSARY: Venture capital enterprises or business angels are 
individual investors providing capital or know-how to young innovative 
enterprises.] .............................................................................................................................. 3 7 9 
 
 
IF “YES” (CODE 3)  Have you issued equity in the past six months?.......... 1 2 99 
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r) Factoring [READ IF NECESSARY: selling your invoices to a factoring company; 
this company gets your debt and has to collect it; it will make a profit by paying 
you less cash than the face value of the invoice] ................................................................ 3 7 9 
 
IF “YES” (CODE 3)  Have you used factoring in the past six months?........ 1 2 99 
 
a) Retained earnings or sale of assets [READ IF NECESSARY: internal funds like 
cash or cash equivalent, resulting for instance from savings, retained earnings or 
sale of assets] ........................................................................................................................... 3 7 9 
 
IF “YES” (CODE 3)  Have you retained earnings or sold assets in the past 
six months? ................................................................................................................. 1 2 99 
 
p) Other sources of financing, for example subordinated debt instruments, participating 
loans, peer-to-peer lending, crowdfunding [*READ IF NECESSARY: Subordinated 
debt is repayable only after other debts have been satisfied.  
*READ IF NECESSARY: A participating loan gives the lender the right to convert 
the loan into an ownership or equity interest in the company under specified clauses 
and conditions.  
*READ IF NECESSARY: Peer-to-peer lending consists of lending money to an 
unrelated individual or enterprise without a traditional financial intermediary, 
usually via dedicated online lending portals.  
*READ IF NECESSARY: Crowdfunding involves raising monetary contributions  
from a large number of people, typically via the internet] ................................................ 3 7 9 
 
IF “YES” (CODE 3)  Have you obtained such sources of financing in the  
past six months? ......................................................................................................... 1 2 99 
 
 
[FILTER: IF ITEM Q4.d) (BANK LOANS) IS “NOT RELEVANT” (CODE 7)]  
Q32. You mentioned that bank loans are not relevant for your enterprise. What is the main reason 
for this?  
[ONLY ONE ANSWER IS POSSIBLE] 
 
- Insufficient collateral or guarantee ................................................. 1 
- Interest rates or price too high ......................................................... 2 
- Reduced control over the enterprise ............................................... 3  
- Too much paperwork is involved ................................................... 6 
- No bank loans are available ............................................................. 4  
- I do not need this type of financing ................................................ 8 
- Other ................................................................................................... 5  
- [DK] .................................................................................................... 9 
 
 
[FILTER: FOR EACH Q4 ITEMS THAT IS “RELEVANT” (CODE 1, 2, 3, 99), NAMELY Q4.c), 
Q4.d), Q4.b), Q4.e), Q4.h) AND Q4.j), FILL THE RELEVANT ITEM IN Q5] 
 
Q5. For each of the following types of external financing, please indicate if your needs increased, 
remained unchanged or decreased over the past six months.  
[ONE ANSWER PER LINE IS POSSIBLE] 
 
- Increased ............................................................................................. 1 
- Remained unchanged ........................................................................ 2  
- Decreased ........................................................................................... 3 
- [INSTRUMENT NOT APPLICABLE TO MY 
ENTERPRISE] ....................................................................................... 7  
- [DK] .................................................................................................... 9 
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[FILTER: IF Q4.c) FEATURES CODE 1, 2 OR 99] 
f) Credit line, bank overdraft or credit cards overdraft ..................................................... 1 2 3 7 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q4.d) FEATURES CODE 3 OR Q4.b) FEATURES CODE 1, 2 OR 99]  
a) Bank loans (excluding overdraft and credit lines) ........................................................ 1 2 3 7 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q4.e) FEATURES CODE 3]  
b) Trade credit ........................................................................................................................ 1 2 3 7 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q4.j) FEATURES CODE 1, 2 OR 99] 
c) Equity capital [READ IF NECESSARY: including venture capital or business 
angels] ................................................................................................................................ 1 2 3 7 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q4.h) FEATURES CODE 1, 2 OR 99] 
d) Debt securities issued [READ IF NECESSARY: short-term commercial paper or 
longer-term corporate bonds issued by your enterprise] ............................................. 1 2 3 7 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q4.m) FEATURES CODE 1, 2 OR 99] 
 
g) Leasing or hire-purchase [READ IF NECESSARY: obtaining the use of a fixed 
asset, for example, cars or machinery, in exchange for regular payments, but 
without the immediate ownership of the asset] ........................................................... 1 2 3 7 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q4.f) FEATURES CODE 1, 2 OR 99] 
 
h) Other loan, for example from family and friends, a related enterprise or  
shareholders, excluding trade credit ............................................................................. 1 2 3 7 9 
 
 
 
[FILTER: FOR EACH Q4 ITEM THAT IS “RELEVANT” (CODE 1, 2, 3, 99), NAMELY Q4.c), 
Q4.d), Q4.b) AND Q4.e), FILL THE RELEVANT ITEM IN Q7A] 
 
Q7A. Have you applied for the following types of financing in the past six months? 
 
[ONE ANSWER PER LINE IS POSSIBLE] 
 
- Applied .................................................................................. 1 
-  Did not apply because of possible rejection .......................... 2 
-  Did not apply because of sufficient internal funds ................ 3 
-  Did not apply for other reasons ............................................. 4 
- [DK/NA] ................................................................................ 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q4.c) FEATURES CODE 1, 2 OR 99]  
d) Credit line, bank overdraft or credit cards overdraft ............................................... 1 2 3 4 9 
[FILTER: IF Q4.d) OR Q4.b) FEATURE CODE 1, 2, 3 OR 99]  
a) Bank loan (excluding overdraft and credit lines) .................................................... 1 2 3 4 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q4.e) FEATURES CODE 3]  
b) Trade credit [READ IF NECESSARY: It covers not only an explicit request for 
trade credit to the business partners, but also if you have received a trade credit 
within a standard business practice] ....................................................................... 1 2 3 4 9 
 
[FILTER: IF AT LEAST ONE OF THE Q4 ITEMS Q4.f), Q4.h), Q4.j), Q4.m), Q4.r) OR 
Q4.p) IS “RELEVANT” (CODE 1, 2, 99)] 
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c) Other external financing [READ IF NECESSARY: for example, loans from a related 
company, shareholders or family and friends, leasing, factoring, grants, subordinated 
debt instruments, participating loans, peer-to-peer lending,  
crowdfunding, and issuance of equity and debt securities] ........................................ 1 2 3 4 9 
 
 
[FILTER: FOR EACH Q7A ITEM THAT IS “APPLIED” (CODE 1), FILL THE RELEVANT ITEM IN 
Q7B] 
 
Q7B. If you applied and tried to negotiate for this type of financing over the past six months, what 
was the outcome? Please provide a separate answer in each case.  
[ONLY ONE ANSWER PER LINE IS POSSIBLE] 
 
- Received everything .................................................................................. 1 
- Received 75% and above [DO NOT READ: received most of it] ..... 5 
- Received below 75% [DO NOT READ: only received a limited 
part of it] ..................................................................................................... 6 
- Refused because the cost was too high ................................................... 3 
- Was rejected ............................................................................................... 4 
- Application is still pending ....................................................................... 8 
- [DK] ............................................................................................................. 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q7A.d) FEATURES CODE 1]  
d) Credit line, bank overdraft or credit cards overdraft .............................................. 1 3 4 5 6 8 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q7A.a) FEATURES CODE 1]  
a) Bank loan (excluding overdraft and credit lines) .................................................... 1 3 4 5 6 8 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q7A.b) FEATURES CODE 1]  
b) Trade credit .................................................................................................................. 1 3 4 5 6 8 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q7A.c) FEATURES CODE 1]  
c) Other external financing [READ IF NECESSARY: for example, loans from a related 
company, shareholders or family and friends, leasing, factoring, grants, 
subordinated debt instruments, participating loans, peer-to-peer lending, 
crowdfunding, and issuance of equity and debt securities] .................................. 1 3 4 5 6 8 9 
 
 
[FILTER: IF Q7B.a) FEATURES CODE 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 OR 8] 
 
Q8A. What is the size of the last bank loan that your enterprise… 
 
[IF Q7B. a) FEATURES CODE 1, 5 or 6] 
…obtained or renegotiated in the past six months? 
 
[IF Q7B. a) FEATURES CODE 3, 4 or 8]  
…attempted to obtain in the past six months? 
 
[ONLY ONE ANSWER IS POSSIBLE] 
 
[For non-euro area countries, the amounts in euro will be converted into national currency.] 
 
- up to €25,000 ..................................................................................... 1 
- more than €25,000 and up to €100,000 .......................................... 2 
- more than €100,000 and up to €250,000 ........................................ 5  
- more than €250,000 and up to €1 million ...................................... 6 
- over €1 million................................................................................... 4  
- [DK/NA] ............................................................................................. 9 
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[FILTER: IF Q7A.a) FEATURES CODE 1] 
 
Q41A. Referring only to the most recent loan, did the financing require collateral? 
 
[ONLY ONE ANSWER IS POSSIBLE] 
 
- Yes ....................................................................................................... 1 
- No ........................................................................................................ 2 
- [DK/NA] ............................................................................................. 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q41A FEATURES CODE 1] 
 
Q41B. What type of collateral was required? 
 
- Yes .............................................................................................. 1 
- No ............................................................................................... 2 
- [DK/NA] ..................................................................................... 9 
 
1) Land or buildings ........................................................................................................... 1 2 9 
2) Machinery or equipment ................................................................................................. 1 2 9 
3) Invoices [READ IF NECESSARY: that is accounts receivable in accounting terms]  
 and inventories ................................................................................................................ 1 2 9 
4) Personal assets of owner [READ IF NECESSARY: for example, house] ...................... 1 2 9 
5) Other forms of collateral ................................................................................................. 1 2 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q41A FEATURES CODE 1] 
 
Q41C. What was the approximate value of the collateral required as a percentage of the size of the 
loan?  
NUMERICAL ANSWER IN PERCENTAGES [0-
999] [DK/NA: -99] 
 
Q41C_rec. [IF (NA/DK)  ASK WHETHER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES WOULD  
APPLY – ONLY ONE ANSWER IS POSSIBLE]  
Which of the following categories applies? 
 
- up to 75% ............................................................................................................ 1 
- more than 75% and up to 100% ...................................................................... 2  
- more than 100% and up to 125% .................................................................... 3 
- more than 125% and up to 150% .................................................................... 4 
- over 150% ........................................................................................................... 5  
- [DK] .................................................................................................................... 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q7B.d) FEATURES CODE 1, 3, 5 OR 6] 
 
Q8B. What interest rate was charged for the credit line or bank overdraft for which you applied? 
 
NUMERICAL ANSWER IN PERCENTAGES [0-
100] [DK/NA: -99] 
 
[FILTER: ALL ENTERPRISES]  
Q6A. For what purpose was financing used by your enterprise during the past six months? [READ 
IF NECESSARY: Financing could have been obtained both from the external sources and from funds 
generated by your enterprise.] 
 
- Yes .......................................................................................................................... 1 
- No ........................................................................................................................... 2 
- [DK/NA (NOT APPLICABLE TO MY ENTERPRISE - I HAVE  
NOT USED ANY FINANCING)] .................................................................. 99 
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1)  Fixed  investment  [READ  IF  NECESSARY:  investment  in  property,  plant, 
machinery or equipment] ........................................................................................................ 1 2 99 
2)  Inventory and other working capital ....................................................................................... 1 2 99 
3)  Hiring and training of employees ........................................................................................... 1 2 99 
4)  Developing and launching of new products or services ...................................................... 1 2 99 
5)  Refinancing or paying off obligations .................................................................................... 1 2 99 
6)  Other ........................................................................................................................................... 1 2 99 
 
 
[FILTER: ALL ENTERPRISES] 
 
SECTION 4: AVAILABILITY OF FINANCE AND MARKET  
CONDITIONS 
 
In this part of the survey, we would like to ask about your enterprise’s experiences and views on the 
availability of finance and market conditions. 
 
Q11. For each of the following factors, would you say that they have improved, remained  
unchanged or deteriorated over the past six months? 
 
[ONE ANSWER PER LINE] 
 
- Improved ...................................................................................... 1  
- Remained unchanged .................................................................. 2 
- Deteriorated .................................................................................. 3  
- [NOT APPLICABLE TO MY ENTERPRISE - ONLY 
FOR b), e), f), g), h)] .................................................................. 7  
- [DK] .............................................................................................. 9 
 
 
a) General economic outlook, insofar as it affects the availability of 
external financing ................................................................................................................. 1 2 3 9  
b) Access to public financial support, including guarantees ............................................ 1 2 3 7 9 
c) Your enterprise-specific outlook with respect to your sales and profitability or 
business plan [READ IF NECESSARY: insofar as it affects the availability of  
external financing for you] ................................................................................................. 1 2 3 9 
d) Your enterprise’s own capital [READ IF NECESSARY: capital provided by the  
owners or shareholders of the enterprise] ......................................................................... 1 2 3 9 
e) Your enterprise’s credit history [READ IF NECESSARY: in other words, your  
credit worthiness, that is your track record of repaying past debts] ......................... 1 2 3 7 9 
 
 
[FILTER: IF THE ITEM Q4.c) (CREDIT LINE, BANK OVERDRAFT, CREDIT CARD OVERDRAFT), 
Q4.d) (BANK LOAN) OR Q4.b) (SUBSIDISED BANK LOAN) IS “RELEVANT” (CODE 1, 2, 3, 99)]  
[CODE 7 IS NOT TO BE USED FOR ENTERPRISES HAVING “APPLIED” (CODE 1) IN Q7A.d), OR 
Q7A.a)] 
 
f) Willingness of banks to provide credit to your enterprise [READ  IF  
NECESSARY: lender’s attitude] ................................................................................... 1 2 3 7 9 
 
[FILTER: IF THE ITEM Q4.e) (TRADE CREDIT) IS “RELEVANT” (CODE 3)]  
[CODE 7 IS NOT TO BE USED FOR ENTERPRISES HAVING “APPLIED” (CODE 1) IN Q7A.b)] 
 
g) Willingness of business partners to provide trade credit [READ IF  
NECESSARY: business partners’ attitude] ................................................................. 1 2 3 7 9 
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[FILTER: IF ONE OF THE Q4 ITEMS Q4.f) (OTHER LOAN), Q4.h) (DEBT SECURITIES), Q4.j) 
(EQUITY CAPITAL) OR Q4.p) (OTHER SOURCES OF FINANCING) IS “RELEVANT” (CODE 1, 2, 
99)] 
 
h) Willingness of investors to invest in your enterprise [READ IF NECESSARY: 
investors’ attitudes towards, for example, investing in equity or debt securities 
issued by your enterprise] ............................................................................................... 1 2 3 7 9 
 
 
[FILTER: FOR EACH OF THE Q4 ITEMS THAT ARE “RELEVANT” (CODE 1, 2, 3, 99), 
NAMELY Q4.c), Q4.d), Q4.b), Q4.e), Q4.h) AND Q4.j), FILL THE RELEVANT ITEM IN Q9] 
 
Q9. For each of the following types of financing, would you say that their availability has improved, 
remained unchanged or deteriorated for your enterprise over the past six months?  
[ONE ANSWER PER LINE] 
 
- Improved ............................................................................................ 1 
- Remained unchanged ........................................................................ 2 
- Deteriorated ........................................................................................ 3 
- [NOT APPLICABLE TO MY ENTERPRISE] ............................ 7 
- [DK] .................................................................................................... 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q4.c) FEATURES CODE 1, 2 OR 99]  
[CODE 7 IS NOT TO BE USED FOR ENTERPRISES HAVING “APPLIED” (CODE 1) IN Q7A.d)] 
 
f) Credit line, bank overdraft or credit cards overdraft ..................................................... 1 2 3 7 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q4.d) FEATURES CODE 3 OR Q4.b) FEATURES CODE 1, 2 OR 99]  
[CODE 7 IS NOT TO BE USED FOR ENTERPRISES HAVING “APPLIED” (CODE 1) IN Q7A.a)] 
 
a) Bank loans (excluding overdraft and credit lines) ........................................................ 1 2 3 7 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q4.e) FEATURES CODE 3]  
[CODE 7 IS NOT TO BE USED FOR ENTERPRISES HAVING “APPLIED” (CODE 1) IN Q7A.b)] 
 
b) Trade credit ........................................................................................................................ 1 2 3 7 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q4.j) FEATURES CODE 1, 2 OR 99]  
c) Equity capital [READ IF NECESSARY: including venture capital or business  
angels] ................................................................................................................................ 1 2 3 7 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q4.h) FEATURES CODE 1, 2 OR 99] 
 
d) Debt securities issued [READ IF NECESSARY: short-term commercial paper or  
longer-term corporate bonds issued by your enterprise] ............................................ 1 2 3 7 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q4.m) FEATURES CODE 1, 2 OR 99] 
 
g) Leasing or hire-purchase [READ IF NECESSARY: obtaining the use of a fixed 
asset (for example, cars or machinery) in exchange for regular payments, but  
without the immediate ownership of the asset] ........................................................... 1 2 3 7 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q4.f) FEATURES CODE 1, 2 OR 99] 
 
h) Other loan, for example from family and friends, a related enterprise or  
shareholders, excluding trade credit ............................................................................. 1 2 3 7 9 
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 [FILTER: Q7A.A) OR Q7A.D) IS “APPLIED” (CODE 1) (BANK LOANS, AND CREDIT LINES, 
BANK OVERDRAFT AND CREDIT CARD OVERDRAFTS)] 
 
Q10. We will turn now to the terms and conditions of bank financing, such as bank loans, overdrafts 
and credit lines. Please indicate whether the following items increased, remained unchanged or 
decreased in the past six months.  
[ONE ANSWER PER LINE] 
 
- Was increased by the bank ......................................................... 1 
- Remained unchanged .................................................................. 2 
- Was decreased by the bank ........................................................ 3 
- [DK/NA] ....................................................................................... 9 
 
Price terms and conditions: 
 
a) Level of interest rates ............................................................................................................ 1 2 3 9 
b) Level of the cost of financing other than interest rates, such as charges, fees,  
commissions ......................................................................................................................... 1 2 3 9 
 
Non-price terms and conditions: 
 
c) Available size of loan or credit line .................................................................................... 1 2 3 9 
d) Available maturity of the loan ............................................................................................. 1 2 3 9  
e) Collateral requirements [READ IF NECESSARY: the security given by the 
borrower to the lender as a pledge for the repayment of the loan] ................................ 1 2 3 9  
f) Other, for example, required guarantees, information requirements, procedures, time 
required for loan approval, loan covenants [READ IF NECESSARY: an 
agreement or stipulation laid down in loan contracts under which the borrower 
pledges either to take certain action or to refrain from taking certain action] ............. 1 2 3 9 
 
 
[FILTER: FOR EACH Q4 ITEM THAT IS “RELEVANT” (CODE 1, 2, 3, 99), NAMELY Q4.c), 
Q4.d), Q4.e), Q4.h), Q4.j) and Q4.a), FILL THE RELEVANT ITEM IN Q23] 
 
Q23. Looking ahead, for each of the following types of financing available to your enterprise, please 
indicate whether you think their availability will improve, deteriorate or remain unchanged over the 
next six months.  
[ONE ANSWER PER LINE] 
 
- Will improve ...................................................................................... 1  
- Will remain unchanged .................................................................... 2 
- Will deteriorate .................................................................................. 3  
- [INSTRUMENT NOT APPLICABLE TO MY 
ENTERPRISE] .................................................................................. 7  
- [DK] .................................................................................................... 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q4.c) FEATURES CODE 1, 2 OR 99]  
[CODE 7 IS NOT TO BE USED FOR ENTERPRISES HAVING “APPLIED” (CODE 1) IN Q7A.d)] 
 
g) Credit line, bank overdraft or credit cards overdraft .................................................... 1 2 3 7 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q4.d) OR Q4.b) FEATURES CODE 1, 2, 3 OR 99]  
[CODE 7 IS NOT TO BE USED FOR ENTERPRISES HAVING “APPLIED” (CODE 1) IN Q7A.a)] 
 
b) Bank loans (excluding overdraft and credit lines) ........................................................ 1 2 3 7 9 
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[FILTER: IF Q4.e) FEATURES CODE 3] 
[CODE 7 IS NOT TO BE USED FOR ENTERPRISES HAVING “APPLIED” (CODE 1) IN Q7A.b)] 
 
d) Trade credit ......................................................................................................................... 1 2 3 7 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q4.j) FEATURES CODE 1, 2 OR 99] 
 
c) Equity capital [READ IF NECESSARY: including venture capital or business  
angels] ................................................................................................................................ 1 2 3 7 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q4.h) FEATURES CODE 1, 2 OR 99] 
 
e) Debt securities issued [READ IF NECESSARY: short-term commercial paper or  
longer-term corporate bonds issued by your enterprise] ............................................. 1 2 3 7 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q4.a) FEATURES CODE 1, 2 OR 99] 
 
a) Retained earnings or sale of assets [READ IF NECESSARY: internal funds]......... 1 2 3 7 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q4.m) FEATURES CODE 1, 2 OR 99] 
 
i)  Leasing or hire-purchase [READ IF NECESSARY: obtaining the use of a fixed 
asset (for example, cars or machinery) in exchange for regular payments, but  
without the immediate ownership of the asset] ........................................................... 1 2 3 7 9 
 
[FILTER: IF Q4.f) FEATURES CODE 1, 2 OR 99] 
 
j) Other loan, for example from family and friends, a related enterprise or  
shareholders, excluding trade credit .............................................................................. 1 2 3 7 9 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This thesis first examines the role of banks in the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy, by concentrating on the eight new European Member States that joined the 
European Union (EU) in 2004 following the agreement by the Treaty of Accession 2003 
(Chapter 2). These transition economies have undergone substantial and extensive 
economic changes during the past decades, which enhanced their integration into the EU. 
Specifically, they have transitioned from a centrally-planned to a free-market structured 
economy. Yet, these States only recently began joining the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU), therefore a better grasp of the mechanism of monetary policy transmission 
in these countries would be appropriate and very beneficial for policy makers. 
This topic is a novel contribution to the banking literature that investigates the functioning 
of the Bank Lending Channel (BLC) of monetary policy transmission with significant 
policy implications. Here a large panel of disaggregated data is used for individual banks 
and fixed effects specification.  
Surprisingly, the growth of bank lending in reaction to monetary policy stance derived 
from money market rates in the short term is not significant apart from the Czech Republic 
and Slovenia. As a result, the theory of a direct relationship via the money lending channel 
is unproven; however, our empirical findings suggest a credible hypothesis to substantiate 
a direct relationship via the BLC of monetary policy within most of the Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries, while the strength of this channel differs between 
countries. The existence of the BLC is shown via capitalisation and seems be a significant, 
contributing bank-specific characteristic for investigating banks’ response to monetary 
policy changes in Baltic States, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia. The coefficient 
on bank size is measured as statistically insignificant for the CEE countries. As a result, 
the matter of informational asymmetry is not crucial; this conclusion is supported by the 
233 
 
 
empirical literature that investigated the BLC, particularly regarding banks in Western 
Europe.  
Although no data to corroborate the existence of the BLC via bank liquidity has been 
identified (apart from in Slovakia), bank risk seems to be an important differentiating 
factor in the reaction of banks to changes in the monetary policy stance in the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia over the analysed period. Furthermore, the 
interaction terms between the Lerner index and monetary policy, and its effect on the 
supply of loan, suggest negative and statistically significant correlation between the 
Czech Republic, Baltic States, Poland and Slovenia. A negative coefficient indicates that 
monetary policy is more effective when implemented in a background of imperfect 
markets. Particularly through contracting the monetary policy indicator, the monetary 
authorities will probably effectively reduce the supply of bank loans within a banking 
market with reduced competition.  
However, the BLC of monetary policy is determined to have weakened from 2008-2011, 
a deduction based on the observation that bank characteristics were ultimately either not 
significant or had unexpectedly negative values; these conclusions may be considered as 
an additional negation of the proposed role of these characteristics in sustaining bank 
lending activity and growth during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). This result is 
supposed by the recent empirical studies on the BLC during the GFC period, in which 
they show that bank behaviour shifted. Specifically, banks that are struggling to submit 
to a restructuring process and function in a dynamic economic background react 
dissimilarly to monetary shocks via the BLC of MTM. Accordingly, we find that the 
effectiveness of monetary policy has been declined during GFC due to various factors, 
such as bank aversion to increase lending activity and volume regardless of the changes 
in the monetary policy stance. The crucial question of whether these variations in the 
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MTM will remain in the next few years or fade while the GFC diminishes. Results 
documented in the thesis are in keeping with a situation in which these modifications can 
only be considered transient and tend to develop with time. 
Some policy implications may be garnered from the findings presented here. Firstly, we 
find that bank capital and liquidity potentially exert positive and significant influences on 
bank lending growth during the entire study spanning the 2004-2013 period. 
Consequently, it would be prudent that banks follow the banking regulations formed by 
the Basel Committee. Given that contemporary research indicates that improving core 
capital facilitates the transmission of monetary policy. Additionally, the shadow banking 
system should be intensely scrutinised due to the presence of possibly hazardous elements 
native to this system, strengthening the notion of having regulation procedures that are a 
good fit with its complementary financial institution. This thesis recommends better, 
more detailed statistical reporting on the entire banking system. Measurement by tier-1 
capital ratio would be especially advantageous because it would allow later studies to 
conduct a thorough assessment of the monetary policy transmission mechanism because 
it includes additional parameters. Thirdly, unlike many prior empirical studies on the BLC 
here it is not crucial to employ the Arellano and Bond methodology to estimate a model 
of bank loan growth in the CEE countries since the lagged dependent variable is under no 
circumstances significant; this observation is the basis of a convincing argument against 
the inclusion of the variable as a regressor. Accordingly, the empirical model is tested via 
the fixed effect model, the favoured specification. Therefore, it may be vital that 
researchers document and proof whether the lagged dependent variable is significant 
under the Arellano and Bond estimation methodology. Therefore, future studies should 
address this topic, since false suppositions concerning dynamics represented in the 
evidence may negatively affect inference.  
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Chapter 3 investigates the impact of a protracted period of low monetary policy rates on 
loosening of banks’ credit standards concerning enterprises, households and consumer 
loans. Utilising a balanced panel dataset of 9 countries that have taken part ever since the 
initiation of the Euro area Bank Lending Survey (BLS), we focus on three distinct time 
frames of pre- (2002Q4-2008Q3), mid- (2008Q 4-2010Q4) and post- (2011Q1-2014:Q4) 
financial crisis. The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator is employed for 
the majority of our regressions, an approach recommended by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
In this case the euro area represents a novel institutional environment with a common 
monetary policy. Moreover, inside this region, capital to the corporate segment is mainly 
supplied by banks, which is equal to approximately around 75–80 percent.   
From the onset of the GFC, outspoken academics have contended that suppressing 
monetary policy rates may encourage banks to engage in credit and liquidity risk owing 
to banks’ moral hazard issues. This could boost the chances of the financial crisis coming 
from accretion of bank risk in the system. We find robust evidence that low-short term 
interest rates prior to the crisis caused a disproportionate softening of credit standards 
concerning enterprises, household and consumer loans.   
Despite the scope of expansionary monetary policy chiefly recognised in the post-crisis 
period, negative Taylor-rule residuals just resulted in loosening of total lending standards 
for enterprises loans whereas demand for loans was basically somewhat unchanged. 
Moreover, we observe that 10-year government bond rates are mostly not determined 
statistically significant, highlighting that lending standards are not influenced through 
long-term national interest rates. In particular, results suggest that higher rates of GDP 
growth are connected to the softening of total lending standards, particularly in the pre-
crisis sample, supporting the claim that banks’ credit standards are ‘pro-cyclical’. 
Particularly important to recognise here are the findings which occurred before the onset 
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of the GFC; these results show that banks surprisingly relaxed margins for loans to 
borrowers that were viewed riskier, in an environment of low monetary rates in stressed 
and non-stressed countries of the sub-sample investigated. However, within periphery 
countries of the Eurozone, the data indicates that excessive risk-taking in bank lending 
behaviour occurred, particularly through periods of low monetary policy rates both pre- 
and post-crisis. Such recklessness should be targeted and systematically corrected by 
policy makers in the formulation of future policies by the European Central Bank (ECB). 
The implementation of the 3 years Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) by the 
ECB negatively affected the development of banks’ credit tightening, which is reassuring 
and important to mitigate the probable, severe consequences of the latest financial crisis. 
Nevertheless, the benefits of this scheme have yet to be observed in the euro area real 
economy with a simultaneous rise in net demand.  
We encounter a data limitation for the BLS data throughout the time frame being 
evaluated. Consequently, we could not take advantage of micro-data reaction of 
individual banks from all the nations participating in the survey, with identical guidelines 
related to micro-data on loans quantities by banks in all nations. Providing that such 
access is granted; future research may simply encapsulate a more detailed analysis of the 
role of supply and demand factors in lending to enterprises. 
Chapter 4 explores the financing structure of bank lending constrained Small and Medium 
Sized Enterprises (SMEs) in the eleven euro area countries and uses the ECB/EC Survey 
on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE) for twelve waves spanning the time frame 
2009 to 2014. Our estimations of credit constraints identify the following five separate 
forms of constrained firms: a) credit constrained firms, b) credit rationed firms, c) credit 
rejected firms, d) self-rationed firms and e) discouraged firms. Moreover, a thorough 
investigation is presented by uncovering the impact and determinants of various financing 
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constraints including credit lines, bank loans, trade credit and other lending on euro area 
firms. Furthermore, the notion of discouraged borrowers originally structured by Kon and 
Storey (2003) is investigated.  
SMEs have an important role in the euro area corporate sector. In light of the GFC, 
lending to SMEs became the number one priority to consider for policymakers 
worldwide, since they are commonly called the backbone of the EU economy. Our 
analysis shows that credit-constrained, rationed, rejected and discouraged firms have a 
greater tendency to utilise informal lending. An additional finding described younger 
SMEs as displaying a greater tendency to use informal lending; this conclusion also 
applies to grants or subsidised bank loans. There was no substitution connection between 
measures of bank lending constraints and usage of trade credit; this finding is robust in 
both stressed and non-stressed countries of the Eurozone. Additionally, we do not find 
any statistically significant results to corroborate the idea that older firms are more 
disposed to utilise trade credit than younger firms. 
An unexpected inverse significant relationship between constrained measures and the 
demand for grant financing has been determined. Firms experiencing rejected credit 
applications are 6% less likely to utilise grant financing. Stressed Eurozone countries are 
less likely to utilise grant financing relative to non-stressed countries. These thought-
provoking results may suggest that the contemporary provision of policy measures 
potentially reachable by the SMEs at the euro area level are inadequately directed at firms 
with challenging prospects for securing credit via traditional bank lending. Additionally, 
we find that that younger firms are 8% more likely to use this source of financing; 
however, this observation only applies for non-stressed countries. 
There was no substitution connection between our wide parameters of bank lending 
constrained with usage of leasing, hire purchase or factoring and internal funds. 
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Concentrating on periphery countries of the Eurozone, we find that firms who experience 
rejected credit applications are on average less likely to use market financing and leasing, 
hire purchase or factoring, compared with Eurozone ‘core’ economies. 
From the data it appears that micro and younger firms have a comparatively higher 
tendency to have applications for bank loans and credit lines rejected; this finding 
corroborates the majority of prior empirical research on SMEs’ access to finance. 
Comparable supporting data concerning firm’s size and trade credit rejection are 
recognised; however, there is no conclusive finding to control a linkage between firm’s 
age and our constrained indicators for trade credit and other financing.  
In line with our prior expectation, the data indicates that smaller, younger firms show a 
greater tendency to be discouraged for bank loans. While analysing variables connected 
with the financial profile of firms, the findings show that firms with the prospect of 
deteriorating credit history and capital position show a greater tendency to be discouraged 
at a rate of 2% and 7%, respectively. Focusing on stressed countries of the Eurozone, 
there is data to suggest that that micro firms are more likely to be discouraged; however, 
there is no corroborating evidence for the effects of firms’ ages on the level of 
discouragement, in contrast to the pattern seen for the main sample in addition to non-
stressed countries of the euro area. From the results it can be inferred that micro firms 
encounter higher discouragement, which is more common when limiting the sample to 
frequency<=3, where 20% of firms are indeed likely to face discouragement. With respect 
to banking and macroeconomic indicators, of particular significance is that higher 
government bonds yield produce discouragement in stressed countries, suggesting that 
financial pressure within the banking sector has a negative effect on firms requests for 
external financing via banks.   
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Data assessed for this thesis is from 2009 onwards and not data concerning associations 
present during the ‘normal’ economic cycle. Consequently, it was impossible to test for 
the presence of appreciable modifications, powered by elements linked to the GFC, 
regarding how firm-specific traits impact the SMEs’ financing pattern.  
Remarkably, most of the data sampled in the ECB/EC SAFE survey is qualitative; 
therefore, this current study recommends that subsequent surveys include both firm level 
balance sheet data and quantitative information regarding SMEs’ financial condition. 
This change should substantially improve future research concerning the implications of 
government policy and its influence on the SMEs’ financing structure. 
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